CHARACTERISTICKS,

&c.

VOLUME II.

CONTAINING

An Inquiry concerning VIRTUE and Merit.
The MORALISTS: a Philosophical Rhapsody.



Printed in the Year 1711.


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TREATISE IV.

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PART I.

concelling further of their Character. It ave are to di ...TMD. H & igious, we

ELIGION and VIRTUE occasion of appear in many respects so this INnearly related, that they are generally presum'd inseparable Companions. And so willing we are to believe well of their Union, that we hardly allow it just to specific the second s

fpeak, or even think of 'em a-part. It Vol. II. A 3 may

Book 1. may however be question'd, whether the occasion of Practice of the World, in this respect, be this IN answerable to our Speculation. Tis cer-

stances which feem to make against this general Suppolition. We have known People, who having the Appearance of great Zeal in Religion, have yet wanted even the common Affections of Humanity, and shewn themselves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others, again, who have paid little regard to Religion, and been look'd upon as mere ATHEISTS, have yet been observ'd to practise the Rules of Morality, and act in many Cafes with fuch good Meaning and Affection towards Mankind, as might feem to force an Acknowledgment of their being virtuous. And, in general, we find mere moral Principles of fuch weight, that in our dealings with Men, we are feldom fatisfy'd by the fullest Assurance given us of their Zeal in Religion, till we hear fomething further of their Character. If we are told, a Man is religious, we still ask, "What are his Morals?" But if we hear at first that he has honest moral Principles, and is a Man of natural Juftice and good Temper, we feldom think of the other Question, "Whether he be " religious and devout?" willing we are to believe well of their that that we had well will to

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concerning Viktue.

This has given occasion to enquire, "What Honelly or VIRTUE is, considered by it-left; and in what manner it is influenced by Religion: How far Religion necessarily implies Virtue; and whether it be a true Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be Virtuous, or bare any real degree of Honesty, or ME-

AND here it cannot justly be wonder'd at, if the Method of explaining Things shou'd appear somewhat unusual; since the Subject-Matter has been so little examin'd, and is of so nice and dangerous Speculation. For fo much is the religious part of Mankind alarm'd by the Freedom of some late Pens; and so great a Jealouly is rais'd every where on this Account; that whatever an Author may fuggest in favour of Religion, he will gain little Credit in the Cause, if he allows the least Advantage to any other Principle. On the other fide, the Men of Wit and Raillery, whose pleasantest Entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of Religion, are so desperately asraid of being drawn into any ferious Thoughts of it, that they look upon a Man as guilty of foul Play, who assumes the air of a Free Writer, and at the same time preserves any regard for the Principles of Natural Religion

Part 1

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Book 1. ligion. They are apt to give as little quarter as they receive: And are resolv'd this IN- to think as ill of the Morals of their Angenists, as their Antagonists can possibly think of theirs. Neither of 'em, it seems, will allow the least Advantage to the other. 'Tis as hard to persuade one fort, that there is any Virtue in Religion, as the other, that there is any Virtue out of the Verge of their particular Community. So that, between both, an Author must pass his time ill, who dares plead for Religion and Moral Virtue, without lessening the force of either; but allowing to each its proper Province, and due Rank, wou'd hinder their being made Enemys by Detraction.

However it be: If we wou'd pretend to give the least new light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended Compass of this Inquiry; 'tis necessary to take Things pretty deep; and endeavour, by some short Scheme, to represent the Original of each Opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the Deity. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our Philosophy; the rest, 'tis hop'd, may prove more plain and easy.

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In the Whole of Things (or in the state of Universe) either all is according to a opinions, good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest that is possible: or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contrived, and with more Advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole.

Is every thing that exists be according to a good Order, and for the best; then of necessity there is no such thing as real ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the Whole.

WHATSOEVER, then, is so as that it cou'd not really have been better, or any way better order'd, is perfectly good. Whatsoever in the Order of the World can be call'd ILL, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contriv'd or order'd. For if it cou'd not; it is perfect, and as it shou'd be.

et

WHATSOEVER is really ILL, therefore, must be caus'd or produc'd, either by Design (that is to say, with Knowledge and Intelligence) or, in desect of this, by Hazard, and mere Chance. Book 1.

State of Opinions.

If there he any thing ILL in the Universe from Design, then that which disposes all things, is no one good designing Principle. For either the one designing Principle is it-self corrupt; or there is some other in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.

Is there be any ILL in the Universe from mere Chance; then a designing Principle or Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of all things. And consequently if there be suppos'd a designing Principle, who is the Cause only of Good, but cannot prevent the Ill which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill Design; then there can be suppos'd in reality no such thing as a superiour good Design or Mind, other than what is impotent and desective: For not to correct, or totally exclude that Ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill Design, must proceed elther from Impotency, or Ill-Will.

WHATSOEVER is superiour in any degree over the World, or rules in nature with Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call Go D. If there are several such superiour Minds, they are so many Gods: But if that single, or those several Superiours are not in

in their nature necessarily good, they ra-Part ther take the name of DEMON.

To believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated for the best, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a persect Theist.

To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or Rule of Things, but Chance; so that in Nature neither the Interest of the Whole, nor of any Particulars, can be said to be in the least design'd, pursu'd or aim'd at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.

To believe no one supreme designing Principle or Mind, but rather two, three, or more (tho in their Nature good) is to be a POLYTHEIST.

To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confin'd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere Will or Fancy; is to be a DEMONIST.

THERE are few who think always consistently, or according to one certain Hypothesis, upon any Subject so abstruse and intricate as the Cause of all Things, and the Oeconomy or Government of the Universe.

Opinions.

Book 1. Universe. For 'tis evident in the Case of the most devout People, even by their own Confession, that there are Times when their Faith hardly can support 'em in the Belief of a fupreme Wisdom; and that they are often tempted to judg difadvantageously of a Providence, and just Administration in the Whole.

> THAT alone, therefore, is to be call'd a Man's Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs upon most Occasions. So that 'tis hard to pronounce certainly of any Man, that he is an Atheist; because, unless his whole Thoughts are at all Seasons, and on all Occasions, steddily bent against all Supposition or Imagination of Design in Things, he is no perfect ATHEIST. In the same manner, if a Man's Thoughts are not at all times steddy and resolute against all Imagination of Chance, Fortune, or ill Design in Things, he is no perfect THEIST. But if any one believes more of Chance and Confusion than of Design; he is to be esteem'd more an ATHEIST than a Theist, from that which most predominates, or has the Ascendant. And in case he believes more of the Prevalency of an ill-defigning Principle, than of a goodone, he is rather a DEMONIST, and may be justly so call'd, from the Side to which the Ballance of his Judgment most inclines.

ALL these sorts both of Damonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be *mix'd. Religion excludes only perfect Atheism. Perfect Damonists undoubtedly there are in Religion; because we know whole Nations that worship a Devil or Fiend, to whom they facrifice and offer Prayers and Supplications, in reality on no other account than because they fear him. And we know very well that, in some Religions, there are those who

* As thus :

^{1.} Theism with Dæmonism: 2. Dæmonism with Polytheism: 3. Theism with Atheism: 4. Dæmonism with Atheism: 5. Polytheism with Atheism: 6. Theism (as it stands in opposition to Dæmonism, and denotes Goodness in the superiour Deity) with Polytheism: 7. The same Theism or Polytheism with Dæmonism: 8. Or with Dæmonism and Atheism.

^{1.} As when the one chief Mind, or Sovereign Being, is (in the Believer's Sense) divided between a good and an ill Nature, by being the Cause of Ill as well as Good: Or when Two distinct and contrary Principles subsist; one, the Author of all Good, the other of all Ill.

^{2.} As when there is not one, but feveral corrupt. Minds that govern; which may be call'd Polydamonism.

^{3.} As when Chance is not excluded; but God and Chance divide.

^{4.} As when an evil Dæmon and Chance divide.
5. As when many Minds and Chance divide.

^{6.} As when there are more principal Minds than one, but agreeing in Good, and with one and the same Will and Reason.

^{7.} As when the same System of Deity or corresponding Deitys sublists, together with a contrary Principle, or with several contrary Principles or governing Minds.

^{8.} As when the last Case is, together with Chance. expresly

Book 1. expressly give no other Idea of God, than of a Being arbitrary, violent, causing ill, opinions. and ordaining to Misery; which in effect is the same as to substitute a DEMON, or Devil, in his room.

Now fince there are these several Opinions concerning a Superiour Power; and since there may be found perhaps some Persons, who have no form'd Opinion at all upon this Subject; either thro Scepticism, Negligence of Thought, or Consusion of Judgment: the Consideration is, how any of these Opinions, or this want of any certain Opinion, may possibly consist with VIRTUE and MERIT; or be compatible with an honest or moral Character.

PART II.

SECT. I.

A Consti-

THEN we reflect on any ordinary Frame or Constitution either of Art or Nature; and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular Part without a com-

need not wonder to find our-felves at a loss in many things relating to the Con-whole and stitution and Frame of Nature her-felf. Parts. For to what End in Nature many things, even whole Species of Creatures, refer; or to what purpose they serve; will be hard for any one justly to determine: But to what End the many Proportions and various Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually serve; we are able, by the help of Study and Observation, to demonstrate, with great exactness.

We know that every Creature has a private Good and Interest of his own; which Nature has compell'd him to feek, by all the Advantages afforded him, within the Compass of his Make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by Himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every Creature a certain Interest or Good; there must be also Interest or a certain END, to which every thing in Creatures. his Constitution must naturally refer. this END if any thing either in his Appetites, Passions, or Affections be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it ill to him. And in this manner he is ill, with respect to himself; as he certainly is, with respect to others.

Book 1. of his kind, when any such Appetites or Passions make him any way injurious to the species. them. Now if, by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Irregularitys of Appetite which make him ill to Others, make him ill also to Himself; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be good in one Sense, causes him to be good also which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to

Of this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our Inquiry. Our first Design is, to see if we can clearly determine what that Quality is to which we give the Name of Goodness, or VIRTUE.

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Private Good.

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Shou'd a Historian or Traveller deferibe to us a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of; one that had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards which he stood well-affected or inclin'd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for which he had the least Passion or Concern: we might be apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation, "That this was doubtless a very melancholy Creature, and that in this unso-

" unfociable and fullen State he was like Part 2. " to have a very disconsolate kind of " Life." But if we were affur'd, that notwithstanding all Appearances, the Creature enjoy'd himself extremely, had a great relish of Life, and was in nothing wanting to his own Good; we might acknowledg perhaps, " That the Creature " was no Monster, nor abfurdly contitu-" ted as to himself." But we shou'd hard-Private ly, after all, be induc'd to fay of him, "That he was a good Creature." However, shou'd it be urg'd against us, " That " fuch as he was, the Creature was still " perfect in himself, and therefore to be " esteem'd good: For what had he to do " with others?" In this fense, indeed, we might be forc'd to acknowledg, "That " he was a good Creature; if he cou'd be " understood to be absolute and complete " in himself; without any real relation to " any thing in the Universe besides." shou'd there be any where in nature a System of System, of which this living Creature was the Species. to be consider'd as a Part; then cou'd he no-wise be allow'd good; whilst he plainly appear'd to be fuch a Part, as made rather to the harm than good of that System or Whole in which he was included.

Is therefore, in the Structure of this or any other Animal, there be any thing which points beyond himself, and by Yo L. II. B which

Book 1. which he is plainly discover'd to have relation to some other Being or Nature besides his own; then will this Animal undoubtedly be esteem'd a Part of some other System. For instance, if an Animal has the Proportions of a Male, it shews he has relation to a Female. And the respective Proportions both of the Male and Female will be allow'd, doubtless, to have a joint-relation to another Existence and Order of things beyond themselves. the Creatures are both of 'em to be consider'd but as Parts of another System: which is that of a particular Race or Species of living Creatures, who have some one common Nature, or are provided for, by some one Order or Constitution of things fublishing together, and co-operating towards their Conservation and Support.

Animal System. In the same manner, if a whole Species of Animals contribute in their turn to the Existence or Well-being of some other Species; then are they all unitedly a Part of some other System.

For instance; To the Existence of the Spider, that of the Fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless Flight, weak Frame and tender Body of this latter Insect, fits and determines him as much a Prey, as the rough Make, Watchfulness and Cunning of the former, fits him for Capture,

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and the ensnaring part. The Web and Part 2. Wing are suted to each other. And in the Structure of each of these Animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own Bodys there is a relation of Limbs and Organs; or, as in the Branches or Leaves of a Tree, we see a relation of each to the other, and all, in common, to one Root and Trunk.

In the same manner are Flies also necessary to the Existence of other Creatures, both Fowls, and Fish. And thus are other Species or Kinds subservient to one another; as being Parts of a certain System, and included in one and the same Order of Beings.

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So that there is a System therefore of all Animals; an Animal-Order or Oeconomy, according to which the Animal Affairs are regulated and dispos'd.

Now, if the whole System of Animals, System of together with that of Vegetables, and all the Earth. other things in this inferiour World, be properly comprehended in one System of a Globe or Earth: And if, again, this Globe Planetary or Earth it-self appears to have a real De-System. pendence on something still beyond; as, for example, either on its Sun, the Galaxy, or its Fellow-Planets; then is it in reality but a PART of some other System.

Vol. II. B2 And

Book 1. And if it be allow'd, that there is in like manner a System of all Things, and a Universal Nature; there can be no particular Being or System which is not either good or ill in that general one of the Universe: For if it be insignificant and of no use, it is a Fault or Impersection, and consequently ill in the general System.

THEREFORE if any Being be wholly and really ILL, it must be ill with respect to the Universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill, or imperfect. But if the Ill of one private System be the Good of others; if it makes still to the Good of the general System (as when one Creature lives by the Destruction of another; one thing is generated from the Corruption of another; or one planetary System or Vortex may swallow up another) then is the Ill of that private System no real Ill in it-felf; more than the pain of breeding Teeth is ill, in a System or Body which, without that occasion of Pain, wou'd fuffer worfe, by being defective.

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So that we cannot say of any Being, that it is wholly and absolutely ill, unless we can positively shew and ascertain, that what we call ILL is no where Good besides, in any other System, or with respect

fpect to any other Order or Oeconomy Part 2. whatfoever.

But were there in the World any in-Relative tire Species of Animals destructive to all ILL. the other Species, it might be justly call'd perhaps an ill Species; as being ill in the Animal-System. And if in any Species of Animals (as in Men, for example) one Man is of a nature pernicious to the rest, he is in this respect justly stil'd an ill Man.

We do not however say of any one, Good and that he is an ill Man, because he has the Plague-Spots upon him, or because he has convulsive Fits which make him strike and wound such as approach him. Nor do we say on the other side, that he is a good Man, when having his Hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from doing the Mischief he designs; or (which is in a manner the same) when he abstains from executing his ill purpose, thro a fear of some impending Punishment, or thro the allurement of some expected Pleasure or Advantage, which is not necessarily join'd with good Affection.

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So that in a fensible Creature, That Goodness which is not done thro any Affection at thro Affection at thro Affection. all, makes neither Good nor Ill in the nature of that Creature; who then only is supposed Good, when the Good or Ill of B?

Book 1. the System to which he has relation, is the immediate Object of some Passion or Affection moving him.

> SINCE it is therefore by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, natural or unnatural; our business will be, to examine which are the good and natural, and which the ill and unnatural Affections. lor ain ni ai orl

SECT. II.

Private or Self-Affection.

IN the first place then, it may be obferv'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject confider'd as private Good, which is not really fuch, nor any way effential to the Interest or Happiness of the Creature; this Affection, as being superfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections, is it-felf vicious and ill.

Is there can possibly be suppos'd such an Affection towards Self-Good, as is actually conducing to the private Interest of the Creature, and at the same time inconfistent with the publick Good; this still must be esteem'd a vicious Affection. And on this Supposition a Creature cannot be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural towards Himfelf. Whereas, if

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the Affection be then only injurious to Part 2. the Society, when it is immoderate, but not fo when it is moderate, duly temper'd, and allay'd; then is the immoderate degree of the Affection vicious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be found in any Creature a more than ordinary Self-Concernment, or Regard to private Good, which is inconfiftent with the Interest of the Species or Publick; this must in every respect be esteem'd an ill and vicious Affection. And this is what we commonly call SELFISHNESS, and disapprove so much, in whatever Creature we happen to discover it.

On the other fide, if the Affection towards private or Self-Good, however felfilb it may be esteem'd, is in reality not only confiftent with publick Good, but in fome measure contributing to it; if it be fuch, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every Individual ought to share: 'tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg'd absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature Good. For if the Want of fuch an Affection as that towards Self-Prefervation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well thro this Defect, as thro the Want of any other na-And this no-one wou'd tural Affection. doubt to pronounce, if he faw a Man B 4

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Book 1. who minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made any Distinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or whatever else related to his Health and Being. The same wou'd be aver'd of one who had a Disposition which render'd him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him thro Illness of Temper (and not merely thro a Defect of Constitution) for the Propagation of his Species or Kind.

THUS the Affection towards Self-Good, may be a good Affection, or an ill one. For if this private Affection be too strong (as when the excessive Love of Life, unfits a Creature for any generous Act) then is it undoubtedly vicious; and if vicious, the Creature who is mov'd by it, is viciously mov'd, and can never be otherwife than vicious in some degree, when mov'd by that Affection. Therefore if thro fuch an earnest and passionate Love of Life, a Creature be accidentally induc'd to do good (as he might be upon the fame terms induc'd to do ILL) he is no more a good Creature for this Good he executes, than a Man is the more an honest or good Man either for pleading a just Cause, or fighting in a good one, for the fake merely of his Fee or Stipend.

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Part 2.

Whatsoever therefore is done that happens to be advantageous to the Species, thro an Affection merely towards Self-Good, does not imply any more Goodness in the Creature than as the Affection it-self is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever so well; if at the bottom, it be that selfish Affection alone which moves him; he is in himself still vicious. Nor can any Creature be consider'd otherwise, when the Passion towards Self-Good, tho ever so moderate, is his real Motive in the doing that, to which a natural Affection for his Kind ought by right to have inclin'd him.

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AND indeed whatever exteriour Helps Temperor Succours an ill-dispos'd Creature may find, to push him on towards the performance of any one good Action; there can no Goodness arise in him till his Temper be so far chang'd, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate Affection, directly, and not accidentally, to Good, and against Ill.

For instance, if one of those Creatures supposed to be by Nature tame, gentle, and savourable to Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constitution, sierce and savage; we instantly remark the Breach of Temper, and own the Creature to

Book 1. be unnatural and corrupt. If at any time Temper. afterwards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right Management, comes to lose his Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind; 'tis acknowledg'd that the Creature thus reftor'd becomes good and natural. Suppose, now, that the Creature has indeed a tame and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds only from the Fear of his Keeper; which if fet aside, his predominant Passion instantly breaks out: then is his Gentleness not his real Temper; but his true and genuine Nature, or Natural Temper remaining just as it was, the Creature is still as ill as ever.

Nothing therefore being properly either Goodness or Illness in a Creature, but what is from natural Temper; a good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper or Bent of his Affections is carry'd primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good, and against Ill: And an ill Creature is just the contrary; viz. one who is wanting in right Affections, of force enough to carry him directly towards Good, and bear him out against Ill; or who is carry'd by other Affections directly to Ill, and against Good.

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WHEN in general, all the Affections or Passions are suted to the publick Good, or Good d

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Good of the Species, as above-mention'd; Part 2. then is the natural Temper intirely good. If on the contrary any requisite Passion be wanting; or if there be any one supernumerary, or weak, or any way disserviceable or contrary to that main End; then is the natural Temper, and consequently the Creature himself, in some measure corrupt and ill.

THERE is no need of mentioning either Envy, Malice, Frowardness, or other fuch hateful Passions; to shew in what manner they are ill, and constitute an ill Creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as to Kindness and Love of the most natural fort (fuch as that of any Creature for its Offspring) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus over-great Tenderness destroys the Effect of Love, and excessive Pity renders us uncapable of giving fuccour. Hence the Excess of motherly Love is own'd to be a vicious Fondness; over-great Pity, Effeminacy and Weakness; over-great Concern for Self-prefervation, Meanness and Cowardice; too little, Rasbneß; and none at all, or that which is contrary (viz. a Passion leading to Self-Destruction) a mad and desperate Depravity.

Book I.

Good of the Species, as above-ment

BUT to proceed from what is esteem'd mere Goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible Creatures, to that which is call'd VIRTUE or MERIT, and is allow'd to Man only.

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reflex Af. In a Creature capable of forming gefedion. neral Notions of Things, not only the
outward Beings which offer themselves to
the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection; but the very Actions themselves,
and the Affections of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought
into the Mind by Resection, become Objects. So that, by means of this resected Sense, there arises another kind of
Affection towards those very Affections

Liking or Dislike.

THE Case is the same here, as in the ordinary Bodys, or common Subjects of Sense. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of these being presented to our Eye; there necessarily results a Beauty or Deformity, according to the different Measure, Arrangement and Disposition of their several Parts. So in Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our Under-

themselves, which have been already felt,

and are now become the Subject of a new

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ir rUnderstanding, there must be found, of Part 2. necessity, an apparent Difference, according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects.

THE MIND, which is Spectator or Moral Auditor of other Minds, cannot be with-Beauty and out its Eye and Ear; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought that comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the Soft, and Harsh, the Agreeable, and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a Foul and Fair, a Harmonious, and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things.

As in the fensible kind, the Species or Images of Bodys, Colours, and Sounds, are perpetually moving before our Eyes, and acting on our Senses, even in Sleep, and when the real Objects themselves are absent; so in the moral and intellectual kind, the Forms and Images of Things are no less active and incumbent on the Mind.

In these vagrant Characters or Pictures of Manners, which the Mind of necessity figures to it-self, and carries still about with it, the Heart cannot possibly remain neutral; but constantly takes part one

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Book 1. way or other. However false or corrupt it be within it-self, it finds the Difference, Beauty and as to Beauty, and Comeliness, between Deformity one Heart and another, one Turn of Affection, one Behaviour, one Sentiment and another; and accordingly, in all disinterested Cases, must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt.

Thus the several Motions, Inclinations, Passions, Dispositions, and consequent Carriage and Behaviour of Creatures in the various Parts of Life, being in several Views or Perspectives represented to the Mind, which readily discerns the Good and Ill towards the Species or Publick; there arises a new Trial or Exercise of the Heart: which must either rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or, corruptly affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and good.

Publick Good an Object. AND in this Case alone it is that we call any Creature Worthy or Virtuous, when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For tho we may vulgarly call an ill Horse vitious; yet we never say of a good-one, nor of any mere Beast, Idiot, or Changeling,

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ling, the ever so good-natur'd, that he is Part 2. worthy or virtuous.

So that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reslect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is morthy or honest; and make that Notice or Conception of Worth and Honesty to be an Object of his Affection, he has not the Character of being virtuous: Good for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable and VIR of having a Sense of Right or Wrong; a TUE. Sentiment or Judgment of what is done thro just, equal, and good Affection, or the contrary.

WHATSOEVER is done thro any un-Unequal equal Affection, is iniquous, wicked, and affection, wrong. If the Affection be equal, found, quity. and good, and the Subject of the Affection fuch as may with Advantage to Society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected; this must necessarily constitute what we call Equity and Right in any Action. For, Wrong is not barely such Action as is the Cause of Harm (fince at this rate a dutiful Son aiming at an Enemy, but by Mistake or ill Chance happening to kill his Father, wou'd do a Wrong) but when any thing is done thro infufficient or unequal Affection (as when a Son shews no Concern

Book 1. cern for the Safety of a Father; or, where there is need of Succour, prefers an indifferent Person to him) this is of the nature of Wrong.

Impair'd Sense.

NEITHER can any Weakness or Imperfection in the Senses be the occasion of Iniquity or Wrong; if the Object of the Mind it-felf be not at any time abfurdly fram'd, nor any way improper, but futable, just, and worthy of the Opinion and Affection apply'd to it. For if we will suppose a Man, who being sound and intire both in his Reason and Affection, has nevertheless so deprav'd a Constitution or Frame of Body, that the natural Objects are thro his Organs of Sense, as thro ill Glasses, falsly convey'd and misrepresented; 'twill be soon observ'd, in fuch a Person's Case, that since his Failure is not in his principal or leading Part; he cannot in himself be esteem'd iniquous, or unjust.

Corrupt Opinion.

'T is otherwise in what relates to Opinion, Belief or Speculation. For as the Extravagance of Judgment or Belief is such, that in some Countrys even Monkeys, Cats, Crocodiles, and other vile or destructive Animals have been esteem'd holy, and worship'd even as Deitys; shou'd it appear to any one of the Religion or Belief of those Countrys, that to save such

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fuch a Creature as a Cat, preferably to Part 2. a Parent, was Right; and that other Men, who had not the fame religious Opinion, were to be treated as Enemys, till converted; this wou'd be certainly Wrong, and wicked in the Believer: And every Action, grounded on this Belief, wou'd be an iniquous, wicked and vicious Action.

AND thus whatfoever causes a Mis-Right and conception or Misapprehension of the Wrong. Worth or Value of any Object, fo as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or unfocial Affection, must necesfarily be the occasion of Wrong. Thus he who affects or loves a Man for the fake of fomething which is reputed honourable, but which is in reality vicious, is himself vicious and ill. The beginnings of this Corruption may be noted in many Occurrences: As when an ambitious Man, by the Fame of his high Attempts, a Conqueror or a Pyrate by his boafted Enterprizes, raises in another Person an Esteem and Admiration of that immoral and inhuman Character, which deferves Abhorrence: 'Tis then that the Hearer becomes corrupt, when he approves the Ill he hears. But on the other fide, the Man who loves and effeems another, as believing him to have that Virtue which he has not, but only coun-Vol. II.

Book 1, terfeits, is not on this account either vi-Right and cious or corrupt. Wen, who had not also had Wrong.

A MISTAKE therefore in Fast being no Cause or Sign of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake of Right being the Cause of unequal Affection, must of necessity be the Cause of vicious Action, in every intelligent or rational Being.

Bur as there are many Occasions where the matter of Right may even to the most discerning part of Mankind appear difficult, and of doubtful Decision, tis not a slight Mistake of this kind which can destroy the Character of a virtuous or worthy Man. But when, either thro Superstition or ill Custom, there come to be very groß Mistakes in the affignment or application of the Affection; when the Mistakes are either in their nature fo grofs, or fo complicated and frequent, that a Creature cannot well live in a natural State; nor with due Affections, compatible with human Society and Civil Life; then is the Character of VIRTUE forfeited.

VICE in AND thus we find how far WORTH Opinion. and VIRTUE depend on a knowledg of Right and Wrong, and on a use of Reason

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the Affections; that nothing horrid or Part 2. unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may, on any account, or thro any Principle or Notion of Honour or Religion, be at any time affected or profecuted as a good and proper Object of Esteem. For such a Principle as this must be wholly victous: and whatfoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing Vicious which teaches Men either Treachery, Worship. Ingratitude, or Cruelty, by Divine Warrant; or under colour and pretence of any present or future Good to Mankind: if there be any thing which teaches Men to persecute their Friends thro Love; or to torment Captives of War in Sport; or to offer human Sacrifice; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious Zeal, before their God; or to commit any fort of Barbarity, or Brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it Custom that gives Applause, or Religion that gives a Sanction; this is not, nor ever can be Virtue, of any Kind, or in any Sense; but must remain still horrid Depravity, notwithstanding any Law, Vicious Custom or Religion, which may be ill Custom. and vicious it-felf; but can never alter the eternal measures, and immutable inde-pendent Nature of Worth and Virtue. Vol. II.

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SECT. IV.

Sensible and ration nalObjeEs.

UPON the whole. As to those Creatures who are only capable of being mov'd by fensible Objects; they are accordingly Good or Vicious, as the sensible Affections stand with them. 'Tis otherwise in Creatures capable of framing rational Objects of moral Good. For in one of this kind, shou'd the sensible Affections stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational Affections spoken of; 'tis evident, the Temper still holds good in the main; and the Person is with Justice esteem'd virtuous by all Men.

Trial of Virtue.

More than this. If by Temper any one is passionate, angry, searful, amorous; yet resists these Passions, and notwithstanding the force of their Impression, adheres to Virtue; we say commonly in this Case, that the Virtue is the greater: and we say well. Tho if that which restrains the Person, and holds him to a virtuous-like Behaviour, be no Affection towards Goodness or Virtue it-self, but towards private Good merely, he is not in reality the more virtuous; as has been shewn before. But this still is evident, that if voluntarily, and without foreign Constraint, an angry Temper bears, or an amorous

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amorous one refrains, so that neither any Part 2. cruel or immodest Action can be forc'd from such a Person, tho ever so strongly tempted by his Constitution; we applaud his Virtue above what we shou'd naturally do, if he were free of this Temptation, and these Propensitys. At the same time, there is no body will say that a Propensity to Vice can be an Ingredient in Virtue, or any way necessary to complete a virtuous Character.

THERE seems therefore to be some kind of Difficulty in the Case: But it amounts only to this. If there be any part of the Temper in which ill Passions or Affections are feated, whilst in another part the Affections towards moral Good are fuch as absolutely to master those Attempts of their Antagonists; this is the greatest Proof imaginable, that a strong Principle of Virtue lies at the bottom, and has posses'd it-felf of the natural Whereas if there be no ill Temper. Passions stirring; a Person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous; that is to fay, he may conform himself to the known Rules of Virtue, without sharing so much of a virtuous Principle as another. Yet if that other Person, who has the Principle of Virtue fo strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary Impediments suppos'd in him, he certainly loses nothing ın

Book 1. in Virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his Temper, is left more entire to Virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

Degrees of Virtue.

Thus is Virtue shar'd in different degrees by rational Creatures; fuch at least as are call'd rational; but who come short of that sound and well-establish'd Reason, which alone can constitute a just Affection, a uniform and steddy Will and Resolution. And thus Vice and Virtue are found variously mix'd, and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind. For it feems evident from our Inquiry, that how ill foever the Temper or Pallions may fland with respect either to the sensible or the moral Objects; however passionate, furious, lustful or cruel any Creature may become; however vicious the Mind be; or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the least Appearance of moral Good (as if there be any fuch thing as Kindness, Gratitude, Bounty, or Compassion) there is still something of Virtue left; and the Creature is not wholly vicious and unnatural.

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Thus a Ruffian, who our of a fense of Fidelity and Honour of any kind, refuses

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fuses to discover his Associates; and ra-Part 2. ther than betray them, is content to endure Torments and Death, has certainly 9.4. fome Principle of Virtue, however he may misapply it. 'Twas the same Case with that Malefactor, who rather than do the Office of Executioner to his Companions, chose to keep 'em company in their Execution.

In short: As it seems hard to pronounce of any Man, " That he is absolutely " an Atheist;" so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any Man, "That he " is absolutely corrupt or vicious;" there being few even of the horridest Villains who have not fomething of Virtue in this imperfect Sense. Nothing is more just than a known Saying, "That it is as hard to " find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good:" because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is certainly some Goodness or Virtue still in being.

AND, having consider'd thus of VIR-TUE, What it is in it-self; we may now consider how it stands with respect to the Opinions concerning a DEITY, as abovemention'd.

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PART III.

with that Walefactor, who rether than do

SECT. I.

ing (as has been explain'd) in a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the Moral Objects of Right and Wrong; nothing can possibly in such a Creature exclude a Principle of Virtue, or render it inessectual, except what

- and just Sense of Right and Wrong.
 - 2. OR creates a wrong Sense of it.
- 3. OR causes the right Sense to be oppos'd, by contrary Affections.

OFVIR.

On the other side, nothing can assist, or advance the Principle of Virtue, but what either in some manner nourishes and promotes a Sense of Right and Wrong; or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or causes it, when such, to be obey'd; by subduing

fubduing and subjecting the other Affec-Part 3.

WE are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mention'd Opinions on the Subject of a DEITY may influence in these Cases, or produce either of these three Effects.

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I. AS to the first Case; THE TAK-Loss of Mo. ING AWAY THE NATURAL SENSE ral Sense. OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

IT will not furely be understood, that by this is meant the taking away the Notion of what is good or ill in the Species, or Society. For of the reality of fuch a Good and Ill, no rational Creature can possibly be infenfible. Every one discerns and owns a publick Interest, and is conscious of what affects his Fellowship or Community. When we fay therefore of a Creature, " That he has wholly loft the " Sense of Right and Wrong;" we suppose that being able to discern the Good and Ill of his Species, he has at the same time no Concern for either, nor any Sense of Excellency or Baseness in any moral Action, relating to one or the other. So that except merely with respect to a private and narrowly confin'd Self-Good, 'tis suppos'd there is in such a Creature

no

Book 1 no Liking or Dislike of Manners; no Admiration, or Love of any thing as morally Good; nor Hatred of any thing as morally ill; be it ever so unnatural or deform'd.

Moral Senfe. THERE is in reality no rational Creature whatfoever, but knows that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an Apprehension and Fear of like harm, and confequently a Resentment and Animosity in every Creature who observes him. So that the Offender must needs be conscious to himself of being liable to such Treatment from every one, as if he had in some degree offended All.

Thus Offence and Injury is always known as punishable by every one; and equal Behaviour (which is therefore call'd MERIT) as rewardable and well-deserving from every one. Of this even the wickedest Creature living must have a So that if there be any further meaning in this Sense of Right and Wrong; if in reality there be any Sense of this kind which an absolute wicked Creature has not; it must consist in a real Antipathy or Aversion to Injustice or Wrong, and in a real Affection or Love towards Equity and Right, for its own fake, and on the account of its own natural Beauty and Worth.

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Part 3. 'Tis impossible to suppose a mere senfible Creature originally to ill-constituted, and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be try'd by sensible Objects, he shou'd have no one good Passion towards his Kind, no Foundation either of Pity, Love, Kindness, or social Affection. full as impossible to conceive, that a rational Creature coming first to be try'd by rational Objects, and receiving into his Mind the Images or Representations of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or other Virtue, shou'd have no Liking of these, or Dislike of their Contrarys; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this fort. A Soul, indeed, may as well be without Sense, as without Admiration in the Things of which it has any knowledg. Coming therefore to a Capacity of feeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a Beauty and a Deformity as well in Actions, Minds, and Tempers, as in Figures, Sounds or Colours. If there be no real Amiableness or Deformity in moral Acts, there is at least an imaginary one of full force. Tho perhaps the Thing itfelf shou'd not be allow'd in Nature, the Imagination or Fancy of it must be allow'd to be from Nature alone. Nor can any thing besides Art and strong Endeavour, with long Practice and Meditation, overcome

Book 1. come such a natural Prevention, or Prepossession of the Mind, in favour of this moral Distinction. Senfe.

How impair'd :

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SENSE of Right and Wrong therefore being as natural to us as natural Affection it-felf, and being a first Principle in our Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and pure Nature, nothing but contrary Habit or Custom (a second Nature) is able to displace. And this Affection being an original one of earliest Rise in By opposite the Soul or affectionate Part; nothing but contrary Affection, by frequent check and controul, can operate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole.

> 'Tis evident in what relates to the Frame and Order of our Bodys; that no particular odd Mien or Gesture, which is either natural to us, and confequent to our Make, or accidental and by Habit acquir'd, can possibly be overcome by our immediate Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our Will, ever fo strongly set against it. Such a Change cannot be effected without extraordinary Means, and the Intervention of Art and Method, a strict Attention, and repeated Check.

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And even thus, Nature, we find, is hard-Part 3. ly master'd; but lies sullen, and ready to revolt, on the first occasion. Much more is this the Mind's Case in respect of that natural Affection and anticipating Fancy, which makes the Sense of Right and Wrong. 'Tis impossible that this can instantly, or without much Force and Violence, be effac'd, or struck out of the natural Temper, even by means of the most extravagant Belief or Opinion in the Not by Opinion merety.

NEITHER Theism therefore, nor A-theism, nor Damonism, nor any religious or irreligious Belief of any kind, being able to operate immediately or directly in this Case, but only by the intervention of opposite or of savourable Affections; we may consider of this Effect in our last Case, where we come to examine the Agreement or Disagreement of other Affections with this natural and moral one which relates to Right and Wrong.

and you So E C T. no II. ni

II. AS to the second Case, viz. The Corruption WRONG SENSE OR FALSE IMA- of Moral GINATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

This can proceed only from the Force of Custom and Education in opposition to Nature;

of moral

Book 1. Nature; as may be noted in those Coun-Corruption trys where, according to Custom or politick Institution, certain Actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly view'd with Applaufe, and Honour afcrib'd to them. For thus 'tis possible that a Man, forcing himself, may eat the Flesh of his Enemys, not only against his Stomach, but against his Nature, and think it nevertheless both right and honourable; as supposing it to be of confiderable fervice to his Community, and capable of advancing the Name, and spreading the Terrour of his Nation.

Causes of this Corruption.

Custom.

Bur to speak of the Opinions relating to a DETTY; and what effect they may have in this place. As to Atheism, it does not feem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the fetting up a falle Species of Right or Wrong. For notwithstanding a Man may thro Custom, or by Licentiousness of Practice, favour'd by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural moral Sense; yet it does not seem that Atheism shou'd of it-self be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as Fair, Noble, and Deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought that the being able to eat Man's Flesh, or commit Bestiality, is good and excellent in it-felf. But this is certain, that by means of corrupt Religion, or Superstriton, many things the

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Non is this a Wonder. For whereever any thing in its nature odious and abominable is by Religion advanc'd, as the suppos'd Will or Pleasure of a Supreme Deity; if in the Eye of the Believer it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must the Deity of necessity bear the blame, and be confider'd as a Being naturally ill and odious, however courted, and follicited, thro Mistrust, and Fear. But this is what Religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every where prescribes Esteem and Honour in company with Worship and Adoration. Whenfoever therefore it teaches the Love and Admiration of a DEITY, that has any apparent Character of Ill; it teaches at the fame time a Love and Admiration of that Ill, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in it-felf horrid and detestable.

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For instance: if Jupiter be He that is ador'd and reverenc'd; and if his History represents him amorously inclin'd, and permitting his Desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; 'tis impossible but his Worshippers believing this History to be literally and strictly true, must

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Book 1. must of course be taught a greater Love of amorous and wanton Acts. If there be a Religion that teaches the Adoration and Love of a God, whose Character it is to be captious, and of high refentment, fubject to Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this God, a fraudulent Difposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men; favourable to a Few, tho for flight causes, and cruel to the rest: 'tis evident that fuch a Religion as this being strongly enforc'd, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a sutable Disposition, a capricious partial revengeful and deceitful Temper. For even Irregularitys and Enormitys of a heinous kind must in many cases appear illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admir'd and contemplated with the highest Honour and Veneration.

> This indeed must be allow'd; that if in the Cult or Worship of such a Deity there be nothing beyond common Form, nothing but what proceeds from mere Example, Custom, Constraint, or Fear; if there be, at the bottom, no real Heartiness, no Esteem or Love imply'd; the Worshipper perhaps may not be much misled

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misled as to his Notion of Right and Part 3. Wrong. If in following the Precepts of his fuppos'd Goo, or doing what he esteems necessary towards the satisfying of fuch his DEITY, he is compell'd only by Fear, and contrary to his Inclination, performs an Act which he fecretly detefts as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an Apprehension or Sense still of Right and Wrong, and, according to what has been already observ'd, is sensible of Ill in the Character of his God; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this Subject, or fo thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct Opinion in the But if by infensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious Faith and devout Exercife, he comes to be more and more reconcil'd to the Malignity, Arbitrariness, Partiality, or Revengefulness of his believ'd DEITY, his Reconciliation with. these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in proportion; and the most cruel, unjust and barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this Example, be often consider'd by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthily imitable.

For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falshood, Right and Vol. II. D Wrong;

Book 1. Wrong; according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be faid absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong, then are these latter words of no fignificancy at all. For thus if each part of a Contradiction were affirm'd for Truth, by the Supreme Power, they wou'd con-fequently become true. Thus if one Perfon were decreed to fuffer for another's fault, the Sentence wou'd be just and equi-And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some Beings were destin'd to endure perpetual Ill, and others as constantly to enjoy Good; this also wou'd pass under the same Denomination. But to fay of any thing that it is just or unjust, on such a foundation as this, is to fay nothing, or to fpeak without a Meaning.

AND thus it appears, that where a real Devotion and hearty Worship is paid to a Supreme Being, who in his History or Character is represented otherwise than as really and truly just and good; there must ensue a Loss of Rectitude, a Disturbance of Thought, and a Corruption of Temper and Manners in the Believer. His Honesty will, of necessity, be supplanted by his Zeal, whilst he is thus unnaturally influenc'd, and render'd thus immorally devout.

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Part 3.

To this I need only add, that as the ill Character of a God does injury to the Influence of Affections of Men, and diffurbs and im- Religion. pairs the natural Sense of Right and Wrong; fo on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a found Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth. Such a View of Divine Providence and Bounty, extended to All, and express'd in a constant good Affection towards the Whole, must of necessity engage us, within our Compass and Sphere, to act by a like Principle and Affection. having once the Good of our Species or Publick in view, as our End or Aim, 'tis in a manner impossible we shou'd be misguided by any means to a wrong Apprehension or Sense of Right and Wrong.

As to this second Case therefore; RE-LIGION (according as the kind may prove) is capable of doing great Good, or Harm; and ATHEISM nothing positive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occasion of Mens losing a good and sufficient Sense of Right and Wrong; it will not, as Atheism merely, Vol. II. D 2

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Book 1. be the occasion of setting up a false Species of it; which only false Religion or fantastical Opinion, deriv'd commonly from Superstition and Credulity, is able to effect.

SECT. III.

Opposition of the Affections.

NOW as to the last Case, The Opposition made by other Affections to the natural Sense of Right and Wrong.

'Tis evident, that a Creature having this fort of Sense or good Affection in any degree, must necessarily act according to it; if it happens not to be oppos'd, either by some settled sedate Affection towards a conceiv'd private Good, or by some sudden, strong and forcible Passion, as of Lust or Anger; which may not only subdue the Sense of Right and Wrong, but the very Sense of private Good it-self; and overrule even the most samiliar and receiv'd Opinion of what is conducing to Self-Interest.

But it is not our business in this place to examine the several Means or Methods by which this Corruption is introduc'd or increas'd. We are to consider only how the Opinions concerning a Deity can influence one way or another.

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Part 3. THAT it is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection, to have a Li- 8.3. king or Dislike of moral Actions, and con-ral sense. fequently a Sense of Right and Wrong, before fuch time as he may have any fertled Notion of A G o D, is what will hardly be question'd: it being a thing not expected, or any way possible, that a Creature such as Man, arising from his Childhood flowly and gradually, to feveral degrees of Reason and Resection, shou'd, at the very first, be taken up with those Speculations, or more refin'd fort of Reflections, about the Subject of Goo's Existence. Insupplied Landalist

and frondly Actions; others prond, LET us suppose a Creature, who wanting Reason, and being unable to reflect, has, notwithstanding, many good Qualitys and Affections; as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. 'Tis" certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting Faculty, it will at the fame instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness, and Pity; be taken with any shew or representation of the social Passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is to be capable of VIRTUE, and to have a Sense of RIGHT and WRONG. inni sidersia bas sist

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BEFORE the time, therefore, that a Rift of mo- Creature can have any plain or politive Notion one way or other, concerning the Subject of a God, he may be suppos'd to have an Apprehension or Sense of Right and Wrong, and be possessed of Virtue and Vice in different Degrees; as we know by Experience of those, who having liv'd in fuch Places, and in fuch a manner as never to have enter'd into any ferious Thoughts of Religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their Characters of Honesty and Worth: fome being naturally modest, kind, friendly, and consequently Lovers of kind and friendly Actions; others proud, barfo, oruel, and consequently inclin'd to admire rather the Acts of Violence and Power 2002 wasmy and publication

Now, as to the Belief of a DEITY, and how Men are influenc'd by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account Men yield Obedience, and act in conformity to fuch a Supreme Being. It must be either in the way of his Power, as presupposing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him; or in the way of his EXCELLENCY and WORTH, as thinking it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and refemble him.

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Part 3.

Ir (as in the first Case) there be a Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who is Fear and consider'd only as powerful over his Crea- Hope. ture, and inforcing Obedience to his ab-Solute Will by particular Rewards and Punishments; and if on this account, thro Hope merely of Reward, or Fear of Pinishment, the Creature be incited to do the Good he hates, or restrain'd from doing the Ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse; there is in this Case (as has been already shewn) no Virtue or Goodness whatsoever. Creature, notwithstanding his good Conduct, is intrinfecally of as little Worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no Dread or Terror of any fort. There is no more of Rectitude, Piety, or Sanctity in a Creature thus reform'd, than there is Meekness or Gentleness in a Tyger strongly chain'd, or Innocence and Sobriety in a Monkey under the Discipline of the Whip. For however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself upon like Terms, may be induc'd to act, whilft the Will is neither gain'd, nor the Inclination wrought upon, but Awe alone prevails and forces Obedience; the Obedience is fervile, and all that is done thro it merely fervile. The greater degree of fuch a Submission or Obedience, is but the greater Servility; whatever may be D 4

Book 1. the Object. For, whether fuch a Creature has a good Master, or an ill one, he is neither more or less fervile in his own nature. Be the Master or Superiour ever fo perfect, or excellent, yet the greater Submission caus'd in this Case, thro this Principle or Motive only, is but the lower and more abject Servitude, and implies the greater Wretchedness and Meanness in the Creature, who has those Passions of Self-Love so predominant, and is in his Temper fo vicious and defective, as has been explain'd need and and and Viruge on Goodnos wharlowen.

Honour

As to the fecond Cafe. If there be a and Love. Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who is consider'd as Worthy and Good, and admir'd and reverenc'd as fuch; being understood to have, besides mere Power and Knowledg, the highest Excellence of Nature, fuch as renders him justly amiable to All; and if in the manner that this Sovereign and mighty Being is reprefented, or as he is historically defcrib'd, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and ex--cellent, a Concern for the good of All, and an Affection of Benevolence and Love towards the Whole; fuch an Example as this must undoubtedly ferve (as above explain'd) to raise and increase the Affection towards Virtue, and help to fubmit and fubdue all other Affections to that alone. NOR

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Nor is this Good effected by Example merely. For where the Theistical Belief 9.3. is intire and perfect, there must be a steddy Opinion of the Superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of all that is felt or acted in the Universe: So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest Solitude, there must be One still presum'd remaining with us; whose Presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most August Assembly on Earth. In such Divine a Presence as this, 'tis impossible but as Presence. the Shame of guilty Actions must be the greatest of any; so must the Honour be, of well-doing, even under the unjust Cenfure of a World. And in this Case, 'tis very apparent how far conducing a perfect Theism must be to Virtue, and how great Deficiency there is in Atheism. A visus ni

WHAT the FEAR of future Punish-Fear and ment, and Hope of future Reward, added to this Belief, may further contribute towards Virtue, we come now to confider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gather'd from what has been said above; That neither this Fear or Hope can possibly be of the kind call'd good Affections, such as are acknowledg'd the Springs and Sources of all Actions truly good. Nor can this

Book this Fear or Hope, as above intimated, confift in reality with Virtue, or Goodness; if it either stands as effential to any moral Performance, or as a confiderable Morive to any Act, of which some better Affection ought, whome, to have been a suf-Actent Caufe.

Self-Love, Ir may be confider'd withal; That, in this religious fort of Discipline, the How ad- Principle of Self-Love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no way mo-derated, or restrain'd, but rather improv'd and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the Passions in a Subject of more extended Self-Interest; there may be reason to apprehend lest the Temper of this kind shou'd extend it-felf in general thro all the Parts of Life. For if the Habit be fuch as to occasion, in every Particular, a stricter Attention to Self-Good, and private Interest; it must infensibly diminish the Affections towards Publick Good, or the Interest of Society; and introduce a certain Narrowness of Spirit, which (as some pretend) is peculiarly observable in the devout Persons and Zealots of almost every religious Perfuation.

Its Effects This, too, must be confess'd; That if inReligion. it be true Piety, to love God for his own fake; the over-follicitous regard to private ted,

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vate Good expected from him, must of Part 2. necessity prove a diminution of Piety. For whilft God is belov'd only as the Caufe of private Good, he is no otherwife belov'd than as any other Instrument or Means of Pleasure by any vicious Creature. Now the more there is of this violent Affection towards private Good, the less room is there for the other fort towards Goodness it-felf, or any good and deferving Object, worthy of Love and Admiration for its own fake; such as God is univerfally acknowledg'd, or at least by the generality of civiliz'd or refin'd Worshippers.

Tis in this respect that the strong Defire and Love of Life may also prove an Obstacle to Piery, as well as to Virtue and publick Love. For the stronger this Affection is in any one, the lefs will he be able to have true Refignation, or Submission to the Rule and Order of THE DETTY. And if that which he calls Re-False Refignation depends only on the expectation signation. of infinite Retribution or Reward, he discovers no more Worth or Virtue here. than in any other Bargain of Interest: The meaning of his Refignation being only this, "That he refigns his prefent "Life, and Pleafures, conditionally for "THAT which he himself confesses to " be beyond an Equivalent; eternal Liv-" ing,

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Book 1. " ing, in a State of highest Pleasure and "Enjoyment?" unimin a sovora viillosen For whill God is below'd only as

Bur notwithstanding the Injury which the Principle of Virtue may possibly suffer, by the Increase of the selfish Passion, in the way we have been mentioning; tis certain, on the other fide, that the Belief of Principle of Fear of future Punishment, and Hope of future Reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, Hand Support to least by the generality of civiliz'd sutrily

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in'd Worldippers. I'T has been already consider'd, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the Heart a real Sense of Right and Supporting, Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society; yet by the violence of Rage, Luft, or any other counterworking Passion, this good Affection may frequently be controul'd and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to render fuch ill Passions the Objects of its Aversion, and cause them earnestly to be opposid; itis apparent how much a good Temper in time must suffer, and a Character by degrees change for the worfe. But if Religion interpoling, creates a Belief that the ill Paffions of this kind, no less than their consequent Actions, are the Objects of a Deity's Sui 33 Animadch

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Animadversion; 'tis certain that such a Part 3. Belief must prove a seasonable Remedy against Vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to Virtue. For a Belief of this kind must be supposed to tend considerably towards the calming of the Mind, and disposing or sitting the Person to a better Recollection of himself, and to a stricter Observance of that good and virtuous Principle, which needs only his Attention, to engage him wholly in its Party and Interest.

AND as this Belief of a future Reward Saving and Punishment is capable of supporting those who thro ill Practice are like to apostatize from Virtue; so when by ill Opinion and wrong Thought, the Mind it-self is bent against the honest Course, and debauch'd even to an Esteem, and deliberate Preference of a vicious one; the Belief of the kind mention'd may prove on this occasion the only Relief and Safety.

A Person, for instance, who has much of Goodness and natural Rectitude in his Temper, but withal, so much Softness, or Esseminacy, as unsits him to bear Poverty, Crosses or Adversity; if by ill Fortune he meets with many Tryals of this kind, it must certainly give a Sourness and Distaste to his Temper, and make him exceedingly averse to that which

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Book I. which he may fally prefume the occasion of fuch Calamity or Ill. Now if his own Thoughts, or the corrupt Infinuations of other Men present it often to his Mind, "That bis HONESTY is the occasion of this Calamity, and that if he mere deli"ver'd from this Restraint of VIRTUE and " HONESTY, he might be much happier:" 'tis very obvious that his Esteem of these good Qualitys must in proportion diminish every day, as the Temper grows uneafy, and quarrels with it-felf. But if he opposes to this Thought the Consideration, "That Honesty carries with it, if not a " present, at least a future Advantage, such as to compensate that Loss of private "Good which he regrets;" then may this injury to his good Temper and honest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain as it was before.

In the same manner, where instead of Improving. Regard or Love, there is rather an Aversion to what is good and virtuous (as, for in-

stance, where Lenity and Forgiveness are despis'd, and Revenge highly thought of, and belov'd) if there be this Considera-

tion added, " That Lenity is, by its Re-" wards, made the cause of a greater

" Self-Good and Enjoyment than what is " found in Revenge," that very Affection of Lenity and Mildness may come to be in-

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dustriously nourish'd, and the contrary Pas-Part 3. fion depress'd. And thus Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity, and other good Affections, however despis'd at first, may come at last to be valu'd for their own fakes, the contrary Species rejected, and the good and proper Object belov'd and profecuted, when the Reward or Punishment is not fo much as thought of.

THUS in a civil STATE OF PUBLICK, Rewards we fee that a virtuous Administration, and Puand an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest In the fervice; not only by restraining the Vi-State. cious, and forcing them to act usefully to Society; but, by making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every one, so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a People rais'd from Barbarity or despotick Rule, civiliz'd by Laws, and made virtuous by the long Course of a lawful and just Administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any Misgovernment of unjust and arbitrary Power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger Virtue, in opposition to such Violence and Corruption. And even, where by long and continu'd Arts of a prevailing Tyranny, fuch a People are at last totally op-

Book 1. oppress'd, the scatter'd Seeds of Virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second Generation; e'er the utmost Force nishments, of misapply'd Rewards and Punishments can bring them to the abject and compliant State of long-accustom'd Slaves.

But the a right Distribution of Justice in a Government be fo effential a cause of Virtue, we must observe in this Case, that it is Example which chiefly influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a People. For a virtuous Administration is commonly accompany'd with Virtue in the Magistrate. wise it can be of little effect; and of no long duration. But where it is sincere and well-establish'd, there Virtue and the Laws must necessarily be respected and belov'd. So that as to Punishments and Rewards, their Efficacy is not so much from the Fear or Expectation which they raife, as from a natural Esteem of Virtue, and Detestation of Villany, which is awaken'd and excited by thefe publick Expressions of the Approbation and Hatred of Mankind in each Case. For in the publick Executions of the greatest Villains, we see generally that the Infamy and Odiousness of their Crime, and the Shame of it before Mankind, contribute more to their Mifery than all besides; and that it is not the immediate Pain, or Death

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it-self which raises so much Horrour ei-Part 3. ther in the Sufferers or Spectators, as that ignominious kind of Death which is in- §. 3. slicted for publick Crimes, and Violations of Justice and Humanity.

AND as the Case of Reward and Pu- In the Fanishment stands thus in the Publick, so, mily. in the same manner, as to private Familys. For Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrain'd and made orderly by Punishment, and the Severity of their Master, are not on this account made good or honest. Yet the fame Master of the Family using proper Rewards and gentle Punishments towards his Children, teaches them Goodness, and by this help instructs them in a Virtue, which afterwards they practife upon other grounds, and without thinking of a Penalty or Bribe. And this is what we call a Liberal Education and a Liberal Service: the contrary Service and Obedience, whether towards God or Man, being illiberal, and unworthy of any Honour or Commendation.

In the Case of Religion, however, it in Religion. must be considered, that if by the Hope of Reward, be understood the Love and Desire of virtuous Enjoyment, or of the very Practice and Exercise of Virtue in another Life; the Expectation or Hope of this kind is so far from being derogatory to Vol. II. E Virtue,

loving it the more sincerely and for its own sake. Nor can this Principle be justly call'd selfsb: for if the Love of Virtue be not mere Self-Interest, the Love and Desire of Life for Virtue's sake cannot be esteem'd so. But if the Desire of Life, be only thro the Violence of that natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro the Love of something else than virtuous Affection, or thro the Unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or to-ken of real Virtue.

Thus a Person loving Life for Life's fake, and Virtue not at all, may by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc'd to practife Virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what he practifes. Yet neither is this very Endeavour to be esteem'd a Virtue. For tho he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become for having only intended, or aim'd at it, thro Love of the Reward. But as foon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect fuch Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in it-felf; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till

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Such are the Advantages or Disadvantages which accrue to Virtue from Security to Reflection upon private Good or Interest. Virtue. For the the Habit of Selfishness, and the Multiplicity of interested Views, are of little Improvement to real Merit or Virtue; yet there is a necessity for the Preservation of Virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true Interest, and Self-Enjoyment.

WHOEVER therefore, by any strong Persuasion or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, That Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery, carrys with him that Security and Affistance to Virtue which is requir'd. Or tho he has no fuch Thought, nor can believe Virtue his real Interest, either with respect to his own Nature and Constitution, or the Circumstances of human Life; yet if he believes any Supreme Powers concern'd in the Affairs of Mankind, and interpoling in behalf of the Honest and Virtuous, against the Impious and Unjust; this will serve to preserve in him still that just Esteem of Virtue, which might otherwise diminish. shou'd he believe little of the immediate or present Interposition of Providence inthe Affairs of this Life; yet if he believes a God dispensing future Rewards and Punishments to Vice and Virtue in another; E 2 VOL. II. he

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Book 1. he carrys with him still the same Advan-

tage and Security; whilst his Belief is steddy, and in no wife wavering or doubtful. For it must be observ'd, that an Expectation and Dependency, fo miraculous and great as this, must naturally take off from other inferiour Dependencys and Encouragements. Where infinite Rewards are thus inforc'd, and the Imagination strongly turn'd towards them, the other common and natural Motives to Goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by Disuse. Other Interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the Mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest, so narrowly confin'd within our-felves. On this account, all other Affections towards Friends, Relations, or Mankind, are often flightly regarded, as being worldly, and of little moment, in respect of the Interest of our Soul. And so little Thought is there of any immediate Satisfaction arifing from fuch good Offices of Life, that it is customary with many devout People zealoufly Imprudent to decry all temporal Advantages of Goodness, all natural Benefits of Virtue: and magnifying the contrary Happiness of a vicious State, to declare, "That except' " only for the fake of future Reward, and

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" fear of future Punishment, they wou'd " divest themselves of all Goodness at

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"most immoral and profligate." From Part 3. whence it appears, that in some respects there can be nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain Belief of a future Reward and Punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no further Prop or Security to Mens Morals. And thus Virtue is supplanted and betray'd.

Now as to ATHEISM: tho it be Atheism. plainly deficient and without Remedy, in the case of ill Judgment on the Happiness of Virtue; yet it is not, indeed, of necessity the Cause of any such ill Judgment. It may be alledg'd perhaps, that without an absolute Assent to any Hypothesis of Theism, the Advantages of Virtue may be seen and own'd, and a high Opinion of it establish'd in the Mind. However, it must be confess'd, that the natural Tendency of Atheism is very different.

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'Tis in a manner impossible, to have any great opinion of the Happiness of Virtue, without conceiving high Thoughts of the Satisfaction resulting from the Love of it: And nothing but the Experience of such a Love is likely to make this Satisfaction be credited. The chief Ground and Support therefore of this Opinion of Happiness in Virtue, must arise from the powerful feeling of this Affection, and the E3 Knowledg

Atheism.

Book 1. Knowledg of its Power and Strength. But this is certain, that it can be no great strengthning to the moral Affection, or support to the Love of Goodness, to suppose that there is neither Goodness nor Beauty in the WHOLE it-self; nor any Example, or Precedent of good Affection in any superior Being. Such a Belief as this must tend rather to the weaning the Affections from any thing amiable or felf-worthy, and to the suppressing the very Habit and familiar Custom of admiring natural Beautys, or whatever in the Order of things is according to uft Defign, Harmony, and Proportion. For how little dispos'd must a Person be, to love or admire any thing as orderly in the Universe, who thinks the Universe it-self a Pattern of Disorder? How unapt to reverence or respect any particular subordinate Beauty of a Part; when even THE WHOLE it-felf is thought to want Perfection, and to be only a vast and infinite Deformity?

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Nothing indeed can be more melancholy, than the Thought of living in a distracted Universe, from whence many Ills may be suspected, and where there is nothing good or lovely that prefents itfelf, nothing that can fatisfy in Contemplation, or raife any Passion besides that of Contempt, Hatred, or Dislike. Such an Opinion as this may by degrees imbitter the Temper, and not only make the

the Love of Virtue to be less felt, but help Part 3. to impair and ruin the very Principle of Virtue, viz. natural and kind Affection.

Upon the whole; whoever has a firm Theism. Belief of a GoD, whom he does not merely call good, but of whom in reality he believes nothing but real Good, nothing but what is truly futable to the exacteft Character of Benignity and Goodness; such a Person believing Rewards or Retributions in another Life, must believe them annex'd to real Goodness and Merit, real Villany and Baseness, and not to any accidental Qualitys or Circumstances, in which respect they cannot properly be stil'd Rewards, or Punishments, but capricious Distributions of Happiness or Unhappiness to Crea-These are the only Terms on tures. which the Belief of a World to come, can happily influence the Believer. And on thele Terms, and by virtue of this Belief, Man may retain his Virtue and Integrity, even under the hardest Thoughts of human Nature; when either by any ill Circumstance or untoward Doctrine, he is brought to that unfortunate Opinion of Virtue's being naturally an Enemy to Happiness in Life.

This, however, is an Opinion which can hardly be suppos'd consistent with found Theism. For whatever be decided

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Book 1. as to a future Life, or the Rewards and Punishments of hereafter; he who, as a found Theist, believes a reigning Mind, sovereign in Nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as Wisdom and Power, cannot but of necessity believe Virtue to be naturally good and advantageous. For what is there that cou'd more strongly imply an unjust Ordinance, a Blot and Impersection in the general Constitution of Things, than to suppose Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice the natural Good of any Creature?

Atheism and Theism.

AND now last of all, there remains for us to propose a further Advantage to Virtue, in the Theistical Belief above the Atheistical. The Proposition may at first sight appear over-refin'd, and of a fort which is esteem'd too nicely philosophical. But after what has been already examin'd, the Subject perhaps may be more easily explain'd.

Effects of each.

THERE is no Creature, according to what has been already prov'd, but must be ill in some degree, by having any Affection or Aversion in a stronger degree than is sutable to his own private Good, or that of the System to which he is join'd. For in either Case the Affection is ill and vicious. Now if a rational Creature has that Degree of Aversion which

which is requisite to arm him against any Part 3. particular Misfortune, and alarm him against the Approach of any Calamity; 9.3. this is regular and well. But if after the Misfortune is happen'd, his Aversion continues still, and his Passion rather grows upon him; whilft he rages at the Accident, and exclaims against his private Fortune or Lot; this will be acknowledg'd both vicious in prefent, and for the future; as it affects the Temper, and difturbs that easy Course of the Affections on which Virtue and Goodness so much depend. On the other side, the patient enduring of the Calamity, and the bearing up of the Mind under it, must be acknowledg'd immediately virtuous, and preservative of Virtue. Now according to of Atheism. the Hypothesis of those who exclude a general Mind, it must be confess'd, there can nothing happen in the Course of things to deferve either our Admiration, and Love, our Anger, or our Abhorrence. However, as there can be no Satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what Atoms and Chance produce; so upon disasterous Occasions, and under the Circumstances of a calamitous and hard Fortune, 'tis scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of Abhorrence and Spleen, which will be entertain'd and kept alive by the Imagination of fo perverse an Order of Things. But in another Hypothesis (that of per-

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Book 1. fect Theism) it is understood, " That whatof Theism. " ever the Order of the World produces, is in the main both just and good." Therefore in the Course of Things in this World, whatever hardship of Events may seem to force from any rational Creature a hard Censure of his private Condition or Lot; he may by Reflection nevertheless, come to have Patience, and to acquiesce in it. Nor is this all. He may go further still in this Reconciliation; and from the same Principle may make the Lot itfelf an Object of his good Affection; whilst he strives to maintain this generous Fealty, and stands so well-dispos'd towards the Laws and Government of his higher Country.

> Such an Affection as this must needs create the highest Constancy in any State of Sufferance, and make us in the best manner fupport whatever Hardships are to be endur'd for Virtue's fake. And as this Affection must of necessity cause a greater Acquiescence and Complacency with respect to ill Accidents, ill Men, and Injurys; fo it cannot but of course produce still a greater Equality, Gentleness, and Benignity in the Temper. Confequently the Affection must be a truly good one, and a Creature the more truly good and virtuous, by possessing it. For whatfoever is the occasion or means of more affec

affectionately uniting a rational Creature Part 3. to his PART in Society, and causes him to profecute the Publick Good, or Interest of his Species, with more Zeal and Affection than ordinary, is undoubtedly the Cause of more than ordinary Virtue in fuch a Person.

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THIS too is certain; that the Admi-Contemration and Love of Order, Harmony and Plation, Proportion, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the Temper, advantageous to focial Affection, and highly affistant to Virtue; which is it-felf no other than the Love of Order and Beauty in Society. In the meanest Subjects of the World, the Appearance of Order gains upon the Mind, and draws the Affection towards it. But if the Order of the World itfelf appears just and beautiful; the Admiration and Esteem of Order must run higher, and the elegant Passion or Love of Beauty, which is fo advantageous to Virtue, must be the more improv'd by its Exercise in so ample and magnificent a Subject. For 'tis impossible that Religious fuch a Divine Order shou'd be contempla. Affection. ted without + Extasy and Rapture; since in the common Subjects of Science, and the liberal Arts, whatever is according

[†] Below, Treatise V. Part 3. S. 2. And MISC. II. chap. 1. in the beginning.

Book 1. to just Harmony and Proportion, is so transporting to those who have any Knowledg or Practice in the kind.

Now if the Subject and Ground of this Divine Passion be not really just or adequate (the Hypothesis of Theism being suppos'd false) the Passion still in it-self is so far natural and good, as it proves an Advantage to Virtue and Goodness; according to what has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other side, the subject of this Passion be really adequate and just (the Hypothesis of Theism being real, and not imaginary) then is the Passion also just, and becomes absolutely due and requisite in every rational Creature.

the relation which VIRTUE has to PIETY: The first being not compleat but in the latter: Since where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the same Benignity, Firmness, or Constancy, the same good Composure of the Affective.

tions, or Uniformity of Mind.

AND thus the Perfection and Height of VIRTUE must be owing to the Belief of a God.

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BOOK II.

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PART I.

SECT. I.

Tue is, and to whom the Character belongs. It remains now to inquire, What Obligation there is to VIRTUE; or what Obligation to VIRTUE.

We have found, that to deserve the name of Good or Virtuous, a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, sutable, and agreeing with the Good of his Kind, or of that System in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a Part. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's Affections right and intire, not only in respect of one's self, but of Society and the Publick: This is Rectitude, Integrity, or Virtue. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their Contrarys,

Book 2. Contrarys, is Depravity, Corruption, and VICE.

Difficulty ftated.

IT has been already shewn, that in the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures, there is a conftant relation to the Interest of a Species, or common Nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of natural Affection, parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship and Company, Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any one deny that this Affection of a Creature towards the good of the Species or common Nature, is as proper and natural to him as it is to any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its known Courfe, and regular way of Growth. 'Tis not more natural for the Stomach to digest, the Lungs to breathe, the Glands to separate Juices, or other Intrails to perform their feveral Offices; however they may fometimes be difor-der'd or obstructed in their Operations.

Union with THERE being allow'd therefore in a a Kind, or Creature such Affections as these towards the common Nature, or System of the Kind, together with those other which regard the private Nature, or Self-System; it must necessarily happen, that in following the sirst

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on many Occasions contradict and go against the latter. How else shou'd the species be preserv'd? Or what wou'd signify that implanted natural Affection, by which a Creature thro so many Difficultys and Hazards preserves its Offspring, and supports its Kind?

IT may therefore be imagin'd, perhaps, opposition that there is a plain and absolute Oppo-from Selffition between these two Habits or Affec-Interest. tions. It may be prefum'd, that the purfuing the common Interest or publick Good thro the Affections of one kind, must be a hindrance to the Attainment of private Good thro the Affections of another. For it being taken for granted, that Hazards and Hardships, of whatever fort, are naturally the Ill of the private State; and it being certainly the Nature of those publick Affections to lead often to the greatest Hardships and Hazards of every kind; 'tis presently infer'd, "That 'tis the Crea-" ture's Interest to be without any publick " Affection whatfoever."

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This we know for certain; That all focial Love, Friendship, Gratitude, or whatever else is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the self-interesting Passions, draws us out of our-selves, and makes us disregardful of our own

Book 2. own Convenience and Safety. So that according to a known way of reasoning on tram self. Self-Interest, that which is of a social Interest. kind in us, shou'd, of right, be abolish'd. Thus Kindness of every fort, Indulgence, Tenderness, Compassion, and in short, all natural Affection shou'd be industriously suppress'd, and, as mere Folly, and Weakness of Nature, be resisted and overcome; that, by this means, there might be nothing remaining in us, which was contrary to a direct Self-End; nothing which might stand in opposition to a steddy and deliberate Pursuit of the most narrowly confin'd Self-Interest.

this extraordinary ACCORDING to Hypothesis, it must be taken for granted, "That in the System of a Kind or Spe-" cies, the Interest of the private Nature is " directly opposite to that of the common " one; the Interest of Particulars directly " opposite to that of the Publick in gene-" ral." A strange Constitution! in which it must be confess'd there is much Diforder and Untowardness; unlike to what we observe elsewhere in Nature. As if in any vegetable or animal-Body, the Part or Member cou'd be suppos'd in a good and prosperous State as to it-self, when under a contrary Disposition, and in an unnatural Growth or Habit as to its WHOLE.

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Part 1.

Now that this is in reality quite other- §. 2. wife, we shall endeavour to demonstrate; Reconcifo as to make appear, "That what Men liation." represent as an ill Order and Constitu-

"tion in the Universe, by making moral "Rectitude appear the Ill, and Depravity

" the Good or Advantage of a Creature,
" is in Nature just the contrary. That

" to be well affected towards the Publick

"Interest and one's own, is not only con"fistent, but inseparable: and that mo-

" ral Rectitude, or Virtue, must accor-" dingly be the Advantage, and Vice the

" Injury and Disadvantage of every Crea-

" ture."

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SECT. II.

THERE are few perhaps, who when contradicthey consider a Creature void of na-tory No. tural Affection, and wholly destitute of a communicative or focial Principle, will fuppose him, at the same time, either tolerably happy in himself, or as he stands abroad, with respect to his Fellow-Creatures or Kind. 'Tis generally thought, that fuch a Creature as this, feels but small Enjoyment in Life, and finds little Satisfaction in the mere fenfual Pleafures which remain with him, after the Loss of focial Enjoyment; and all that can be call'd Humanity or Good-Nature. We know Vol. II. that

Book 2. that to fuch a Creature as this, 'tis not only incident, to be morose, rancorous and or immo- malignant; but that, of necessity, a Mind or ral State. Temper thus destitute of Mildness and Benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by Passions of a different kind. Such a Heart as this must be a continual Seat of perverse Inclinations and bitter Aversions, rais'd from a constant ill Humour, Sourness, and Disquiet. The Consciousness of such a Nature, so obnoxious to Mankind, and to all Beings that approach it, must overcloud the Mind with dark Suspicion and Jealoufy, alarm it with Fears and Horrour, and raise in it a continual Disturbance, even in the most seeming fair and fecure State of Fortune, and in the highest

degree of outward Prosperity.

In whole.

THIS, as to the compleat immoral State, is what, of their own accord, Men readily remark. Where there is this absolute Degeneracy, this total Apostacy from all Candour, Equity, Trust, Sociableness, or Friendship; there are few who do not see and acknowledg the Mifery which is confequent. Seldom is the Case misconstru'd, when at worst. The misfortune is, we look not on this Depravity, nor confider how it stands, in less degrees. The Calamity, we think, does not of necessity hold proportion with the Injustice or In-

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quity. As if to be absolutely immoral and Part i. inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfortune and misery; but that to be it, in 9. 2. a little degree, shou'd be no misery nor harm at all! Which to allow, is just as reasonable as to own, that 'tis the greatest Ill of a Body to be in the utmost manner distorted and maim'd; but that to lose the use only of one Limb, or to be impair'd in some one single Organ or Member, is no Inconvenience or Ill worthy the least notice.

THE Parts and Proportions of the Mind, Inward their mutual Relation and Dependency, the Connexion and Frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper, may eafily be understood by any one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward Anatomy. 'Tis certain that the Order or Symmetry of this inward Part is, in it-felf, no less real and exact, than that of However, 'tis apparent that the Body. few of us endeavour to become Anatomists of this fort. Nor is any one asham'd of the deepest Ignorance in such a Subject. For notwithstanding the greatest Misery and Ill is generally own'd to be from Difposition, and Temper; notwithstanding 'tis allow'd that Temper may often change, and that it actually varys on many occasions, much to our disadvantage; yet how this matter is brought about, we inquire not. We never trouble our-felves to consider YOL. II. thorowly

Book 2. thorowly by what means or methods our inward Constitution comes at any time to Continuity. be impair'd or injur'd. The Solutio Continui, which real Surgeons talk of, is never apply'd in this case, by Surgeons of another fort. The Notion of a Whole and Parts is not apprehended in this Science. We know not what the effect is, of straining any Affection, indulging any wrong Passion, or relaxing any proper and natural Habit, or good Inclination. Nor can we conceive how a particular Action shou'd have such a sudden Influence on the whole Mind, as to make the Person an immediate Sufferer. We suppose rather that a Man may violate his Faith, commit any Wickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any Vice or Villany, without the least prejudice to himself, or any

'T is thus we hear it often faid, "Such a Person has done ill indeed: But what is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking of any Nature thorowly savage, curst, and inveterate, we say truly, "Such a one is a plague and torment to himself:" And we allow, "That thro certain Humours, or Passions, and from Temper merely, a Man may be compleatly mimerely, a Man may be compleatly mimerely; a this Circumstances be ever so fortunate." These different Judgments

Misery naturally following from the ill

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ments fufficiently demonstrate that we are Part 1. not accustom'd to think with much Coherency on these moral Subjects; and that our Notions, in this respect, are not a little confus'd, and contradictory.

Now if the Fabrick of the Mind or Fabrick or Temper appear'd fuch to us as it really is; System of the Affect if we faw it impossible to remove hence tions. any one good or orderly Affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute State, which at its height is confess'd to be fo miserable; 'twou'd then undoubtedly be confess'd, that since no ill immoral or unjust Action cou'd be committed without either a new inroad and breach on the Temper and Passions, or a farther advancing of that Execution already begun, whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Integrity, Good-Nature, or Worth, wou'd of necessity act with greater Cruelty towards himself, than he who fcrupled not to fwallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands shou'd voluntarily mangle or wound his natural Body, Limbs, or outward Con-Stitution.

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SYSTEMT T has been shewn before, that no Aniexplain'd. mal can be faid properly to att, otherwife than thro Affections or Passions, such as are proper to an Ahimal. For in convulsive Fits, where a Creature strikes éither himself or others, 'tis a simple Mechanism, an Engine, or Piece of Clockwork that acts, and not the Animal.

Spring of Actions.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done or acted by any Animal as such, is done only thro fome Affection or Passion, as of Feat, Love, or Hatred moving him.

AND as it is impossible that a weaker Affection shou'd overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the Affections or Passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most confiderable Party, either by their Force or Number; thither the Animal must incline: And according to this Ballance he must be govern'd and led to Action.

three kinds.

Affections, THE Affections or Passions which mult influence and govern the Animal, are either,

> 1. THE natural Affections, which lead to the Good of THE PUBLICK.

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ne qı only to the Good of THE PRIVATE.

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3. OR such as are neither of these; nor tending either to any Good of THE PUBLICK OF PRIVATE; but contrary-wise; and which may therefore be justly still unnatural Affections.

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So that according as these Affections stand, a Creature must be good or ill, virtuous or vicious.

THE latter fort of these Affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vicious. The two former may be vicious or virtuous, according to their degree.

It may feem strange, I know, to speak Degrees of of natural Affections as too strong, or of Self-Affections as too weak. But to clear this Difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explain'd, "That natural Affection may, in particular Cases, be "excessive, and in an unnatural degree:" As when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own End, and prevent the Succour and Relief requir'd; or as when Love to the Offspring proves such a Fondness as destroys the Parent, and consequently the Offspring it-self. And not-withstanding it may seem harsh to call that

Book 2. that unnatural and vicious, which is but an Extreme of some natural and kind Affection; yet'tis most certain, that whereever any single good Affection of this fort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their Force and natural Operation. For a Creature possess'd with fuch an immoderate Degree of Passion, must of necessity allow too much to that one, and too little to others of the same Character, and equally natural and useful as to their End. And this must necessarily be the occasion of Partiality and Injustice, whilst only one Duty or natural Part is earnestly follow'd, and other Parts or Dutys neglected, which shou'd accompany it, and perhaps take place and be prefer'd.

> This may well be allow'd true in all other respects; since even Religion itfelf, consider'd as a Passion, not of the selfilb but nobler kind, may in some Characters be strain'd beyond its natural Proportion, and be said also to be in too high a Degree. For as the End of Religion is to render us more perfect, and accomplish'd in all moral Dutys and Performances; if by the height of devout Extafy and Contemplation we are rather disabled in this respect, and render'd more unapt to the real Dutys and Offices of civil Life, it may be faid that RELIGION is then too frong in us.

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tur its For how, possibly, we can call this Su-Part 1.

PERSTITION, I can't see; whilst the Object of the Devotion is acknowledg'd just, and the Faith orthodox. 'Tis only the Excess of Zeal, which, in this Case, is so transporting, as to render the devout Person more remiss in secular Affairs, and less concern'd for the inferiour and temporal Interests of Mankind.

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Now as in particular Cases, publick Affection, on the one hand, may be too high; so private Affection may, on the other hand, be too weak. For if a Creature be felf-neglectful, and infenfible of Danger; or if he want fuch a degree of Passion in any kind, as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself; this must certainly be esteem'd vicious, in regard of the Design and End of Nature. She her-felf discovers this in her known Method and stated Rule of Operation. 'Tis certain, that her provisionary Care and Concern for the whole Animal must at least be equal to her Concern for a fingle Part or Member. Now to the feveral Parts she has given, we see, proper Affections, sutable to their Interest and Security; so that even without our Consciousness, they act in their own Defence, and for their own Benefit and Prefervation. Thus an Eye, in its natural State, fails not to shut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar

Book 2. peculiar Caution and Timidity; which if it wanted, however we might intend the Preservation of our Eye, we shou'd not in effect be able to preserve it, by any Observation or Forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal Affections, which respect the Good of the whole Constitution, must be a Vice and Imperfection, as great surely in the principal part (the Soul or Temper) as it is in any of those inferiour and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving Affections which are proper to them.

AND thus the Affections towards private Good become necessary and essential to Goodness. For the no Creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for possessing these Affections; yet since it is impossible that the publick Good, or Good of the System, can be preserv'd without them; it follows that a Creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude; and may thus be esteem'd vicious and desective.

'T is thus we say of a Creature, in a kind way of Reproof, that he is too good; when his Affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his Part; or when he really acts beyond it, not thro too warm a Passion

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of that fort, but thro an over-cool one of Part 1. another, or thro want of some Self-Passion 5.3.

IT may be objected here, that the having the natural Affections too strong, (where the Self-Affections are overmuch fo) or the having the Self-Affections defective or weak, (where the natural Affections are also weak) may prove upon occasion the only Cause of a Creature's acting honeftly and in moral proportion. For, thus, One who is to a fault regardless of his Life, may with the smalleft degree of natural Affection do all that. can be expected from the highest Pitch of focial Love, or zealous Friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a Creature excessively timorous may, by as exceeding a degree of natural Affection, perform whatever the perfectest Courage is able to inspire.

To this I answer. That whenever we charge any Passion as too strong, or complain of any as too weak; we must speak with respect to a certain Constitution or Oeconomy of a particular Creature, or Species. For if a Passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong; if we may be assured that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance

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Book 2. bance within, nor of any disproportion Degrees of between it-felf and other Affections; then Affection. consequently the Passion, however strong, cannot be condemn'd as vicious. But if to have all the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the Constitution of the Creature cannot bear; fo that only some Passions are rais'd to this height, whilst others are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the fame proportion; then may those strong Passions, the of the better kind, be call'd excessive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and caufing an ill Ballance in the Affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of Inequality in the Conduct, and incline the Party to a wrong moral Practice.

Oeconomy of the Passions.

But to shew particularly what is meant by the Oeconomy of the Passions, from Instances in the Species or Kinds below us. As for the Creatures who have no manner of Power or Means given them by Nature for their defence against Violence, nor any thing by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them; 'tis necessary they shou'd have an extraordinary degree of Fear, but little or no Animosity, such as might cause 'em to make Resistance, or incline 'em to delay their Flight. For in this their Sasety lies, and to this the Passion of Fear is serviceable by keeping

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Spirits in readiness to give the start.

AND thus Timorousness, and an habitual strong Passion of Fear, may be according to the Oeconomy of a particular Creature, both with respect to himself, and to the rest of his Species. On the other hand, Courage may be contrary to his Oeconomy; and therefore vicious. Even in one and the same Species, this is by Nature differently order'd; with respect to different Sexes, Ages, and Growths. The tamer Creatures of the grazing kind, who live in Herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in Pairs only, apart from Company, as is natural and futable to their rapacious Life. Yet is there found, even among the former inoffensive kind, a Courage proportionable to their Make and Strength. At a time of danger, when the whole Herd flies, the Bull alone makes head against the Lion, or whatever other invading Beast of Prey, and shews himself conscious of his Make. Even the Female of this kind is arm'd, we fee, by Nature, in some degree, to resist Violence; so as not to fly a common Danger. As for a Hind, or Doe, or any other inoffensive and mere defenceless Creature; 'tis no way unnatural or vicious in them, when the Enemy approaches, to defert their Offspring, and fly for Safety.

But

Oeconomy of the Paffions.

Book 2. But for Creatures that are able to make Resistance, and are by Nature arm'd of fensively; be they of the poorest Infectkind, fuch as Bees or Wasps; 'tis natural to 'em to be rous'd with Fury, and at the hazard of their Lives, oppose any Enemy or Invader of their Species. For by this known Passion in the Creature, the Species it-felf is fecur'd; when by Experience 'tis found that the Creature, tho unable to repel the Injury, yet voluntarily exposes his Life for the Punishment of the Invader; and fuffers not his Kind to be injur'd with Impunity. And of all other Creatures, Man is in this Sense the most formidable: fince if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his Country's Caufe, revenge an Injury on any one living; and by throwing away his own Life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often ferv'd to restrain those in Power, from using it to the utmost Extent, and urging their Inferiours to Extremity.

Measurs. Tone.

Upon the whole: It may be faid properly to be the fame with the Affections or Passions in an Animal-Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a Musical Instrument. If these, tho in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd be-

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yond a certain degree, 'tis more than the Part 1. Instrument will bear: The Lute or Lyre is abus'd, and its Effect lost. On the o- 9-3, ther hand, if while some of the Strings are duly strain'd, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the Instrument still in disorder, and its Part ill perform'd. The feveral Species of Creatures are like different forts of Instruments: And even in the same Species of Creatures (as in the same fort of Instrument) one is not intirely like the other, nor will the fame Strings fit each. The fame degree of Strength which winds up one, and fits the feveral Strings to a just Harmony and Confort, may in another burst both the Strings and Instrument it-self. Thus Men who have the livelieft Sense, and are the easiest affected with Pain or Pleasure, have need of the strongest Influence or Force of other Affections, fuch as Tenderness, Love, Sociableness, Compassion, in order to preferve a right BALLANCE within, and to Ballance. maintain them in their Duty, and in the just performance of their Part: whilst others, who are of a cooler Blood, or lower Key, need not the same Allay or Counter-part; nor are made by Nature to feel those tender and indearing Affections in so exquisite a degree.

I T might be agreeable, I shou'd think, to inquire thus into the different Tunings of

Book 2. of the Passions, the various Mixtures and Allays by which Men become so different from one another. For as the highest

Best or worst in Man.

Improvements of Temper are made in Human kind; fo the greatest Corruptions and Degeneracys are discoverable in this Race. In the other Species of Creatures around us, there is found generally an exact Proportionableness, Constancy and Regularity in all their Passions and Affections; no failure in the care of the Offfpring, or of the Society, to which they are united; no Prostitution of themselves; no Intemperance, or Excefs, in any kind. The smaller Creatures, who live as it were in Citys (as Bees and Ants) continue the fame Train and Harmony of Life: Nor are they ever false to those Affections, which move them to operate towards their Publick Good. Even those Creatures of Prey, who live the farthest out of Society, maintain, we fee, fuch a Conduct towards one another, as is exactly futable to the Good of their own Species. Whilft Man, notwithstanding the Assistance of Religion, and the Direction of Laws, is often found to live in less conformity with Nature; and by means of Religion itfelf, is often render'd the more barbarous Marks are fer on Men: and inhuman. Distinctions form'd: Opinions decreed, under the feverest Penaltys: Antipathys instill'd, and Aversions rais'd in Men against

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gainst the generality of their own Spe-Part 1. cies. So that 'tis hard to find in any Region a human Society that has human Laws. No wonder if in such Societys 'tis so hard to find a Man who lives NATURALLY, and as a MAN.

BUT having shewn what is meant State of by a Passion's being in too high, or in too ment. low a degree; and that, "To have any "natural Affection too high, or any Self-"Affection too low," tho it be often approv'd as Virtue, is yet, strictly speaking, a Vice and Impersection; we come now to the plainer and more essential part of VICE, and which alone deserves to be consider'd as such: that is to say,

- 1. "WHEN either the publick Affec-"tions are weak or deficient;"
- 2. " OR the private and Self-Affections too strong."
- 3. "OR that such Affections arise as "are neither of these, nor in any degree "tending to the Support either of the "publick or private System."

OTHERWISE than thus, it is impossible any Creature can be such as we call ILL or VICIOUS. So that if once we Vol. II. G prove

Book 2 prove that it is really not the Creature's State of Interest to be thus viciously affected, but the Argu- contrariwise; we shall then have prov'd, ment. "That it is his Interest to be wholly "Good and Virtuous:" Since in a wholesom and sound State of his Affections, such as we have describ'd, he cannot possibly be other than sound, good and virtuous, in his Action and Behaviour.

Our Business, therefore, will be, to prove;

I. "THAT to have the NATURAL, "KINDLY, OF GENEROUS AFFEC"TIONS strong and powerful towards the "Good of the Publick, is to have the chief "Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment." And, "That to want them, is certain Mi"fery and Ill."

II. "THAT to have THE PRIVATE or SELF-AFFECTIONS too strong, or beyond their degree of Subordinary to the kindly and natural, is also miserable."

"III. AND, "That to have THE UN"NATURAL AFFECTIONS (viz. such
"as are neither founded on the Interest
"of the Kind, or Publick; nor of the Pri"vate Person, or Creature himself) is to
be miserable in the highest degree."

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any kind. Thus Teo Go a Stanta Barka

caline, and can be no way diverted

O begin therefore with this Proof, FIRST
THAT TO HAVE THE NA-Proof, from
the natu-"TURAL AFFECTIONS (fuch ral Affec-" as are founded in Love, Complacency, tions.

"Good-will, and in a Sympathy with the

" Kind or Species) is TO HAVE THE

" CHIEF MEANS AND POWER OF

"SEEF-ENJOYMENT: And THAT

" TO WANT THEM IS CERTAIN

" MISERY AND ILL."

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We may inquire, first, what those are, which we call Pleasures or Satisfac- Pleasures tions; from whence Happiness is general- of the BOly computed. They are (according to MIND. the common distinction) either Satisfactions and Pleasures of the Body, or of the Mind.

THAT the latter of these Satisfactions are The latter the greatest, is allow'd by most People, preferable. and may be prov'd by this: That whenever the Mind, having conceiv'd a high Vol. II.

Book 2. Opinion of the Worth of any Action or Behaviour, has receiv'd the strongest Impression of this fort, and is wrought up to the highest pitch or degree of Passion towards the Subject; at fuch time it fets it-felf above all bodily Pain as well as Pleasure, and can be no way diverted from its purpose by Flattery or Terrour of Thus we fee Indians, Barbaany kind. rians, Malefactors, and even the most execrable Villains, for the sake of a particular Gang or Society, or thro fome cherish'd Notion or Principle of Honour or Gallantry, Revenge, or Gratitude, embrace any manner of Hardship, and defy Torments and Death. Whereas on the other hand, a Person being plac'd in all the happy Circumstances of outward Enjoyment, furrounded with every thing that can allure or charm the Sense, and being then actually in the very moment of fuch a pleafing Indulgence; yet no fooner is there any thing amiss within, no sooner has he conceiv'd any internal Ail or Disorder, any thing inwardly vexatious or distemper'd, but inftantly his Enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of Sense is at an end; and every means of that fort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneafy, and fubject to give Distast.

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Inference.

THE Pleasures of the Mind being allow'd, therefore, superiour to those of the Body;

Body; it follows, "That whatever can Part 2. "create in any intelligent Being a con-

" stant flowing Series or Train of mental "Enjoyments, or Pleasures of the Mind,

" is more considerable to his Happiness,

" than that which can create to him a like

" constant Course or Train of sensual En-

" joyments, or Pleasures of the Body."

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Now the mental Enjoyments are ei-Mental ther actually the very natural Affections Enjoyment, themselves in their immediate Operation: Or they wholly in a manner proceed from them, and are no other than their Effects.

If so; it follows, that the natural Affections duly established in a rational Creature, being the only Means that can procure him a constant Series or Succession of the mental Enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid Happiness.

NOW, in the first place, to explain, Energy of "How much the natural Affections are in natural Affections themselves the highest Pleasures and Enjoy-

"ments:" There shou'd methinks be little need of proving this to any one of human kind, who has ever known the Condition of the Mind under a lively Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Succour, or whatever else is of a social or G 3 friendly

Energy of natural Affection.

Book 2 friendly fort. He who has ever so little knowledg of human Nature, is sensible what pleasure the Mind perceives when it is touch'd in this generous way. The Difference we find between Solitude and Company; between a common Company and that of Friends; the reference of almost all our Pleasures to mutual Converse, and the dependence they have on Society either present or imagin'd; all these are sufficient Proofs in our behalf.

How much the focial Pleasures are superiour to any other, may be known by vifible Tokens and Effects. The very outward Features, the Marks and Signs which attend this fort of Joy, are expresfive of a more intense, clear and undisturb'd Pleasure, than those which attend the Satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, and other ardent Appetites. But more particularly still may this Superiority be known, from the actual Prevalence and Ascendency of this fort of Affection over all befides. Wherever it presents it-felf with any Advantage, it filences and appeales every other Motion of Pleasure. No Joy, merely of Sense, can be a Match for it. Whoever is Judg of both the Pleasures, will ever give the Preference to the former. But to be able to judg of both, 'tis necesfary to have a Sense of each. The honest Man indeed can judg of sensual Pleasure, and

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and knows its utmost Force. For nei-Part 2. ther is his Taste, or Sense, the duller; but, on the contrary, the more intense, and clear, on the account of his Temperance, and moderate Use. But the immoral and prosligate Man can by no means be allow'd a good Judg of social Pleasure, to which he is so mere a Stranger by his Nature.

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Nor is it any Objection here; that in many Natures the good Affection, tho really present, is found to be of insufficient Force. For where it is not in its natural degree, 'tis the same indeed as if it were not, or had never been. The less there is of this good Affection in any untoward Creature, the greater the wonder is, that it shou'd at any time prevail. And if it prevails but for once, in any single Instance; it shews evidently, that if the Affection were thorowly experienc'd or known, it wou'd prevail in all.

Thus the Charm of kind Affection is superiour to all other Pleasure: since it has the power of drawing from every other Appetite or Inclination. And thus in the Case of Love to the Offspring, and a thousand other Instances, the Charm is sound to operate so strongly on the Temper, as, in the midst of other Temptations, to render it susceptible of this G 4 Passion

Book 2. Passion alone; which remains as the Master-Pleasure and Conqueror of the rest.

Energy of natural Affettion.

THERE is no one who, by the least progress in Science or Learning, has come to know barely the Principles of Mathematicks, but has found, that in the exercise of his Mind on the Difcoverys he there makes, tho merely of speculative Truths, he receives a Pleafure and Delight superiour to that of Sense. When we have thorowly fearch'd into the nature of this contemplative Delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private Interest of the Creature, nor has for Object any Self-Good or Advantage of the private System. The Admiration, Joy, or Love turns wholly upon what is exteriour, and foreign to our-felves. And tho the reflected Joy or Pleafure, which arises from the notice of this Pleasure once perceiv'd, may be interpreted a Self-Passion, or interested Regard; yet the original Satisfaction can be no other than what refults from the Love of Truth, Proportion, Order, and Symmetry, in the Things without. If this be the Case, the Passion ought in reality to be rank'd with natural Affection. For having no Object within the Compass of the private System; it must either be esteem'd superfluous and unnatural (as having no Tendency towards the Advantage or Good of

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any thing in Nature) or it must be judg'd Part 2. to be, what it truly is, "A natural Joy "in the Contemplation of those Numbers," 1.

" that Harmony, Proportion and Concord,

" which supports the universal Nature, and is essential in the Constitution and

" Form of every particular Species, or

" Order of Beings."

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But this speculative Pleasure, however confiderable or valuable it may be, or however superiour to any Motion of mere Sense; must yet be far surpass'd by virtuous Motion, and the Exercise of Benignity and Goodness; where together with the most delightful Affection of the Soul, there is join'd a pleafing Affent and Approbation of the Mind to what is acted in this good Disposition and honest Bent. For where is there on Earth a fairer Matter of Speculation, a goodlier View or Contemplation, than that of a beautiful, proportion'd, and becoming Action? Or what is there relating to us, of which the Consciousness and Memory is more solidly and lastingly entertaining?

We may observe that in the Passion of Love between the Sexes, where, together with the Affection of a vulgar sort, there is a mixture of the kind and friendly, the Sense or Feeling of this latter is in reality superiour to the former; since often

natural Affection.

Book 2 often throthis Affection, and for the fake of the Person belov'd, the greatest Hardships in the World have been submitted to, and even Death it-felf voluntarily imbrac'd, without any expected Compensation. For where shou'd the Ground of fuch an Expectation lie? Not here, in this World furely; for Death puts an end Nor yet hereafter, in any other. For who has ever thought of providing a Heaven or future Recompence for the fuffering Virtue of Lovers?

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WE may observe, withal, in favour of the natural Affections, that it is not only when Joy and Sprightliness are mixt with them, that they carry a real Enjoyment above that of the fenfual kind. The very Disturbances which belong to natural Affection, tho they may be thought wholly contrary to Pleasure, yield still a Contentment and Satisfaction greater than the Pleasures of indulg'd Sense. And where a Series or continu'd Succession of the tender and kind Affections can be carry'd on, even thro Fears, Horrours, Sorrows, Griefs; the Emotion of the Soul is still agreeable. We continue pleas'd even with this melancholy Aspect or Sense of Virtue. Her Beauty supports it-self under a Cloud, and in the midst of surrounding Calamitys. For thus, when by mere Illusion, as in a Tragedy, the Passions of this kind

kind are skilfully excited in us; we prefer Part 2; the Entertainment to any other of equal duration. We find by our-selves, that the moving our Passions in this mournful way, the engaging them in behalf of Merit and Worth, and the exerting whatever we have of social Affection, and human Sympathy, is of the highest Delight, and affords a greater Enjoyment in the way of Thought and Sentiment, than any thing besides can do in a way of Sense and common Appetite. And after this manner it appears, "How much the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections themselves,"

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NOW, in the next place, to explain, Effects of How they proceed from them, as their natural affects: " we may consider first, that the Effects of Love or kind Affection in a way of mental Pleasure are, "An Enjoyment of Good by Communication, "A receiving it, as it were, by Reflection, or by may of Participation in the Good of others." And "A pleasing Consciousness of the actual Love, merited Esteem or "Approbation of others."

diential part.

How considerable a part of Happiness arises from the former of these Effects, will be easily apprehended by one who is not exceedingly ill-natur'd. It will be consider'd

Book 2. der'd how many the Pleasures are, of floating Contentment and Delight with others; of receiving it in Fellowship and Company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleas'd and happy States of those around us, from accounts and relations of such Happinesses, from the very Countenances, Gestures, Voices and Sounds, even of Creatures foreign to our Kind, whose Signs of Joy and Contentment we can any way discern. So infinuating are these Pleasures of Sympathy, and so widely diffus'd thro our whole Lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Satisfaction or Contentment, of which they make not an essential part.

As for that other Effect of focial Love, viz. the Consciousness of merited Kindness or Esteem; 'tis not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental Pleasure, and constitutes the chief Enjoyment and Happiness of those who are, in the narrowest fense, voluptuous. How natural is it for the most felfish among us, to be continually drawing some fort of fatisfaction from a Character, and pleasing our-selves in the Fancy of deferv'd Admiration and Esteem? For tho it be mere Fancy, we endeavour still to believe it Truth, and flatter our-selves, all we can, with the Thought of Merit of some kind, and the Perfualion of our deferving well from some few

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Now fuch as Courses are, fuch him

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few at least, with whom we happen to Part 2. have a more intimate and familiar Commerce.

WHAT Tyrant is there, what Robber, or open Violator of the Laws of Society, who has not a Companion, or some particular Set, either of his own Kindred, or fuch as he calls Friends; with whom he gladly shares his Good; in whose Welfare he delights; and whose Joy and Satisfaction he makes his own? Who is there that receives not fome Impressions from the Flattery or Kindness of such as are familiar with him? 'Tis to this foothing Hope and Expectation of Friendship, that almost all our Actions have some reference. 'Tis this that goes thro our whole Lives, and mixes it-felf even with most of our Of this, Vanity, Ambition, and Luxury, have a share; and many other Disorders of our Life partake. Even the unchastest Love borrows largely from this Source. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the way that other things commonly are; it might properly be faid, that out of these two Branches (viz. Community or Participation in the Pleasures of others, and Belief of meriting well from others) wou'd arise more than nine Tenths of all that is enjoy'd in Life. And thus in the main Sum of Happiness, there is scarce a lingle Article, but what derives it-felf from

Book 2. from focial Love, and depends immediate-

Now fuch as CAUSES are, such must be their Effects. And therefore as natural Affection or social Love is perfect, or imperfect; so must be the Content and Happiness depending on it.

Partial Affection examin'd.

BUT lest any shou'd imagine with themselves that an inferiour Degree of natural Affection, or an imperfect partial Regard of this fort, can supply the place of an intire, sincere, and truly moral one; left a small Tincture of focial Inclination shou'd be thought sufficient to answer the End of Pleasure in Society, and give us that Enjoyment of Participation and Commanity which is so essential to our Happiness; we may consider first, That PAR-TIAL AFFECTION, of focial Love in part, without regard to Society or a Whole, is in it-felf an Inconsistency, and implies an absolute Contradiction. Whatever Affection we have towards any thing besides our-selves; if it be not of the natural fort towards the System, or Kind; it must be, of all other Affection the most diffociable, and destructive of the Enjoyments of Society: If it be really of the natural fort, and apply'd only to fome one Part of Society, or of a Species, but not

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to the Species or Society it-felf; there can Part 2. be no more account given of it, than of the most odd caprillous or humoursom Passion that may arise. The Person, therefore, who is conscious of this Affection, can be conscious of no Merit or Worth on the account of it. Nor can the Persons on whom this capricious Affection has chanc'd to fall, be in any manner fecure of its Continuance or Force. As it has no Foundation or Establishment in Reason; so it must be easily removable, and fubject to alteration, without Reason. Now the Variableness of fuch fort of Passion. which depends folely on Capriciousness and Humour, and undergoes the frequent Successions of alternate Hatred and Love. Aversion and Inclination, must of necesfity create continual Disturbance and Disgust, give an allay to what is immediately enjoy'd in the way of Friendship and Society, and in the end extinguish, in a manner, the very Inclination towards Friendship and human Commerce. Whereas, on the other hand, INTIRE AFFEC-TION (from whence Integrity has its name) as it is answerable to it-felf, proportionable, and rational; fo it is irrefragable, folid, and durable. And as in the Case of Partiality, or vicious Friendship, which has no rule or order, every Reflection of the Mind necessarily makes to its disadvantage, and lessens the Enjoyment;

Book 2. so in the case of Integrity, the Consciousness of just Behaviour towards Mankind in general, casts a good reflection on each friendly Affection in particular, and raises the Enjoyment of Friendship still the higher, in the way of Community or Participation above-mention'd.

nating capacions Alfallion AND in the next place, as PARTIAL AFFECTION is fitted only to a short and slender Enjoyment of those Pleasures of Sympathy or Participation with others; fo neither is it able to derive any confiderable Enjoyment from that other principal Branch of human Happiness, viz. Consciousness of the actual or merited Esteem of others. For whence shou'd this Esteem arise? The Merit furely, must in it-self be mean, whilst the Affection is so precarious and uncertain. What Trust can there be to a mere casual Inclination or capricious Liking? Who can depend on fuch a Friendship as is founded on no moral Rule, but fantaftically affign'd to some fingle Person, or small Part of Mankind, exclusive of Society, and the Whole?

IT may be consider'd, withal, as a thing impossible; That they who esteem or love by any other Rule than that of Virtue, shou'd place their Affection on such Subjects as they can long esteem or love. 'Twill be hard for them, in the number

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of their so belov'd Friends, to find any, Part 2. in whom they can heartily rejoice; or whose reciprocal Love or Esteem they can sincerely prize, and enjoy. Nor can those Pleasures be sound or lasting, which are gather'd from a Self-Flattery, and salfe Persuasion of the Esteem and Love of others, who are incapable of any sound Esteem or Love. It appears therefore how much the Men of narrow or partial Affection must be Losers in this sense, and of necessity sall short in this second principal Part of mental Enjoyment.

MEAN while intire Affection has all the Intire Af. opposite advantages. It is equal, con-festion. stant, accountable to it-self, ever satisfactory, and pleafing. It gains Applause and Love from the best; and in all difinterested cases, from the very worst of Men. We may fay of it, with justice, that it carrys with it a Consciousness of merited Love and Approbation from all Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and from whatever is Original to all other Intelligence. And if there be in Nature any fuch Original; we may add, that the Satisfaction which attends Intire Affection, is full, and noble, in proportion to its final Object, which contains all Perfection; according to the Sense of Theism abovenoted. For this, as has been shewn, is the refult of Virtue. And to have this Vol. II. INTIRE

Book 2. INTIRE AFFECTION OF INTEGRI-TX of Mind, is to live according to Nature, and the Dictates and Rules of Supreme fettion. Wisdom. This is Morality, Justice, Piety, and natural Religion. re-trather di riom a Sch-Plarrery.

of memilia Enjoyment.

BUT left this Argument shou'd appear perhaps too scholastically stated, and in Terms and Phrases, which are not of familiar use; we may try whether possibly we can fet it yet in a plainer light.

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LET any one, then, consider well those Pleasures which he receives either in private Retirement, Contemplation, Study, and Converse with bimself; or in Mirth, Jollity, and Entertainment, with others; and he will find, That they are wholly founded in An easy Temper, free of Harsb. Mind and neß, Bitterneß, or Distast; and in A Mind or Reason well compos'd, quiet, easy within itself, and such as can freely bear its own Inspection and Review. Now such a MIND, and fuch A TEMPER, which fit and qualify for the Enjoyment of the Pleasures mention'd, must of necessity be owing to the natural and good Affections.

Temper.

TEM-PER.

As to what relates to TEMPER, it may be consider'd thus. There is no State of outward Prosperity, or flowing Fortune, where Inclination and Defire are always LHTIKE

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always fatisfy'd, Fancy and Humour pleas'd. Part 2. There are almost hourly some Impediments or Crosses to the Appetite; some Accidents or other from without; or fomething from within, to check the licentious Courfe of the indulged Affections. They are not always to be fatisfy'd by mere Indulgence. And when a Life is guided by Fancy only, there is fufficient Ground of Contrariety and Disturbance. The very ordinary Laffirudes, Uneafinesses, and Defects of Disposition in the foundest Body; the interrupted Course of the Humours, or Spirits in the healthiest People; and the accidental Disorders common to every Constitution, are fufficient, we know, on many occasions to breed Uneasiness and Distast. And this, in time, must grow into a Ha-bit; where there is nothing to oppose its progress, and hinder its prevailing on the Temper. Now the only found Opposite to ILL HUMOUR, is natural and kind Affection. For we may observe that when the Mind, upon reflection, refolves at any time to suppress this Disturbance already risen in the Temper, and sets about this reforming Work with heartiness, and in good earnest; it can no otherwise accomplish the Undertaking, than by introducing into the affectionate Part some gentle Feeling of the focial and friendly kind; lome enlivening Motion of Kindness, Fellowship, Complacency or Love, to allay VOL. II. H 2

Book 2. and convert that contrary Motion of Imparience and Discontent.

IF it be faid perhaps that Religious Affection or Devotion is a fufficient and proper Remedy in this case; I answer, That itis according as the Kind may happily prove. For if it be of the * difmal fort; if it brings along with it any Affection opposite to Manhood, Generosity, Courage, and Free-Thought; there will be nothing gain'd by this Application: and the Remedy will, in the issue, be undoubtedly found worse than the Disease. The severest Reflections on our Duty, and the Confideration merely of what is by Authority and under Penaltys enjoin'd, will not by any means ferve to calm us on this occasion. The more dismal our Thoughts are on fuch a Subject; the worse our Temper will be, and the readier to discover it-self in Harshness, and Austerity. If, perhaps, thro Policy, or by any Necessity or Fear, a different Carriage be at any time affected, or different Maxims own'd; the Practice at the bottom will be the fame. If the Countenance be compos'd; the Heart, however, will not be chang'd. The ill Passion may for the time be withheld from breaking into Action; but will not be fubdu'd, or in the least debilitated

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^{*} Treatife I. p. 35, 36. and MISC. II. ch. 3. against

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against the next occasion. So that in such Part 2. a Breast as this, whatever Devotion there may be; 'tis likely there will in time be little of an easy Spirit, or good Temper remaining; and consequently but sew and slender Enjoyments of a mental kind.

If it be objected, on the other hand, that in a Course of outward Prosperity and in the height of Fortune, there can nothing probably occur which shou'd thus four the Temper, and give it fuch difrelish as is suggested; we may consider. that the most humour'd and indulg'd State is apt to receive the most disturbance from every Disappointment or smallest Ail. And if Provocations are easiest rais'd, and the Passions of Anger, Offence, and Enmity are found the highest in the most indulg'd State of Will and Humour; there is still the greater need of a Supply from social Affection, to preserve the Temper from running into Savageness and Inhumanity.

NOW as to the other part of our Con-MIND. fideration, and what relates to a MIND or Reason well compos'd and easy within it-self; upon what account this Happiness may be thought owing to natural Affection, we may possibly resolve our-selves, after this manner. It will be acknowledg'd that a Creature, such as Man, who from H 3 feveral

Book 2 several degrees of Reflection has rifen to that Capacity which we call Reason and Understanding; must in the very use of this his reasoning Faculty, he fore'd to receive Reflections back into his Mind of what passes in it-felf, and in the Affections. or Will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his Character, Conduct, or Behaviour towards his Fellow-Creatures, and Soclety. Or shou'd he be of himself unapt; there are others ready to remind him, and refresh his Memory, in this way of Criticism. We have all of us Remembranders enow to help us in this Work. Nor are the greatest Favourites of Fortune exempted from this Task of Self-Inspection. Even Flattery it felf, by making the View agreeable, renders us more attentive this way, and infnares us in the Habit. The vainer any Person is, the more he has his Eye inwardly fix'd upon himself; and is, after a certain manner, employ'd in this home-Survey. And when a true Regard to our-felves cannot oblige us to this Inspection, a false Regard to

> In whatever manner we consider of this, we shall find still, that every reasoning or reslecting Creature is, by his Nature, forc'd to endure the Review of his

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others, and a Fondness for Reputation furnishes us sufficiently with Acts of Reslec-

tion on our own Character and Conduct,

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own Mind, and Actions; and to have Re-Part 2. presentations of himself, and his inward Affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his Mind. Now as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off natural Affection; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserv'd it with sincerity.

THERE are Two Things, which to conscience. a rational Creature must be horridly offensive and grievous; viz. "To have the "Reflection in his Mind of any unjust" Action or Behaviour, which he knows to be odious and ill-deserving: "Or, of "any foolish Action or Behaviour, prejudicial to his own Interest or Happiness."

THE former of these is alone properly Moral Concall'd Conscience; whether in a mo-science. ral, or religious sense. For to have Awe and Terrour of the Deity, does not, of it-felf, imply Conscience. No one is esteem'd the more conscientious for the fear of evil Spirits, Conjurations, Enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or devilish Nature. Now to fear God any otherwise than as in consequence of fome justly blamable and im-. putable Act, is to fear a devilish Nature; not a divine one. Nor does the Fear of Hell, or a thousand Terrors of the DEITY imply H 4

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Book 2. imply Conscience; unless where there is an Apprehension of what is wrong, odious, science. morally deform'd, and ill-deserving. And where this is the Case, there Conscience must have effect, and Punishment of necessity be apprehended; even the it be not expresly threaten'd.

AND thus religious Conscience supposes moral or natural Conscience. And tho the former be understood to carry with it the Fear of divine Punishment; it has its force however from the apprehended moral Deformity and Odiousness of any Act, with respect purely to the Divine Presence, and the natural Veneration due to such a supposed Being. For in such a Presence, the Shame of Villany or Vice must have its force, independently on that surther Apprehension of the magisterial Capacity of such a Being, and his Dispensation of particular Rewards or Punishments in a future State.

It has been already said, that there is no Creature who maliciously and intentionally does ill, but is sensible, at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible Creature may be said to have Conscience. For with all Mankind, and all intelligent Creatures, this must ever hold, "That what they know they deserve from every one, that they necessially

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"farily must sear and expect from All." Part 2. And thus Suspicions and ill Apprehensions must arise, with Terrors both of Men and of the Deity. But besides this, there must in every rational Creature, be yet farther Conscience; viz. From Sense of Deformity in what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural: and from the consequent Regret of incurring what is odious, and moves Aversion.

brance and dilpleach

THERE scarcely is, or can be any Creature whom Consciousness of Villany, as such merely, does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinously imputable, move, or affect. If there be fuch a one; 'tis evident he must be absolutely indifferent towards moral Good or Ill. If this indeed be his Case; 'twill be allow'd he can be no way capable of natural Affection: If not of that; then neither of any focial Pleasure, or mental Enjoyment, as shewn above; but on the contrary, he must be subject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill Affection. So that to want Conscience, or natural Sense of the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice, is to be most of all miserable in Life: but where Conscience, or Sense of this fort, remains; there, confequently, whatever is committed against it, must of necessity, by means of Reflection, as we have shewn, be continually grievous and offensive.

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Book 2. Il A most flagged bus used flum which "

A MAN who in a Passion happens to Confeience, kill his Companion, relents immediately on the fight of what he has done. His Revenge is chang'd into Pity, and his Hatred turn'd against himself. And this merely by the Power of the Object. On this account he fuffers Agonys; the Subject of this continually occurs to him; and of this he has a constant ill Remembrance and displeasing Consciousness. If on the other fide, we suppose him not to relent or fuffer any real Concern; then, either he has no Sense of the Deformity of Crime and Injustice, no natural Affection, and confequently no Happiness or Peace within; or if he has any Sense of moral Worth or Goodness, it must be of a perplex'd, and contrary kind. He must pursue an inconsistent Notion, idolize some false Species of Virtue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and abfurd. And how tormenting this must be to him, is easy to conceive. For never can fuch a Phantom as this, be reduc'd to any certain Form. Never can this PROTEUS of Honour be held steddy, to one Shape. The pursuit of it can only be vexatious and distracting. There is nothing but real Virtue (as has been shewn) which can possibly hold any proportion to Esteem,

Approbation, or good Conscience. And

Falle Con-Science.

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he who, being led by false Religion or Part 2. prevailing Custom, has learnt to esteem or admire any thing as Virtue which is not really fuch; must either thro the Inconfiftency of such an Esteem, and the perpetual Immoralitys occasion'd by it, come at last to lose all Conscience, and so be miserable in the worst way: or, if he retains any Conscience at must be of a kind never satisfactory, or able to bestow Content. For 'tis imposfible that a cruel Enthusiast, or Bigot, a Persecutor, a Murderer, a Bravo, a Pirate, or any Villain of less degree, who is false to the Society of Mankind in general, and contradicts natural Affection, shou'd have any fix'd Principle at all, any real Standard or Measure by which he can regulate his Esteem, or any solid Reason for his Approbation of any one moral Act. And thus the more he fets up Honoar, or advances Zeal; the worse he makes his Nature, and the more detestable his Character. The more he engages in the Love or Admiration of any Action or Practice, as great and glorious, which is in it-felf morally ill and vicious; the more Contradiction and Self-disapprobation he must incur. For there being nothing more certain than this, "That no natural Affection can be con-"tradicted, nor no unnatural one ad-" yanc'd, without a prejudice in some de-" gree

Book 2. " gree to all natural Affection in gene-" ral:" it must follow, " That inward Falle Con-" Deformity growing greater, by the feience, " Incouragement of unnatural Affection; " there must be so much the more Subject

" for diffatisfactory Reflection, the more " any false Principle of Honour, any

" false Religion, or Superstition prevails."

So that whatever Notions of this kind

are cherish'd; or whatever Character affected, which is contrary to moral Equity, and leads to Inhumanity, thro a false Conscience, or wrong Sense of Honour, serves eauses Re- only to bring a Man the more under the proach from Lash of real and just Conscience, Shame and Self-Reproach. Nor can any one who, by any pretended Authority, commits one fingle Immorality, be able to fatisfy himself with any Reason, why he shou'd not at another time be carry'd further, into all manner of Villany; fuch perhaps as he even abhors to think of. And this is a Reproach which a Mind must of necessity make to it-self upon the least Violation of natural Conscience; in doing what is morally deform'd and ill-deferving; tho warranted by any Example or Precedent amongst Men, or by any suppos'd Injunction or Command of higher Powers. and not both A disturbed on and

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DA A Hard To make only Balan Part 2. Now as for that other part of Conscience, viz. the remembrance of what on Conscience was at any time unreasonably done, and in from Inprejudice of one's real Interest or Happines: terest. This distatisfactory Reflection must follow still and have effect, wherefoever there is a Sense of moral Deformity, contracted by Crime, and Injustice. For even where there is no Sense of moral Deformity, as fuch merely; there must be still a Sense of the ill Merit of it with respect to God and Man. Or tho there were a possibility of excluding for ever all Thoughts or Suspicions of any superiour Powers, yet considering that this Infenfibility towards moral Good or Ill implies a total Defect in natural Affection, and that this Defect can by no Dissimulation be conceal'd; 'tis evident that a Man of this unhappy Character must suffer a very sensible Loss in the Friendship, Trust, and Considence of other Men; and consequently must suffer in his Interest and outward Happiness. Nor can the Sense of this Disadvantage fail to occur to him; when he fees, with Regret, and Envy, the better and more grateful Terms of Friendship, and Esteem, on which better People live with the rest of Mankind. Even therefore where natural Affection is wanting; 'tis certain still, that by Immorality, necessarily happening

Book 2. pening thro want of fuch Affection, there must be disturbance from Conscience of this fort, viz. from Sense of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real Interest and Advantage.

Conclusion drawn from the PLEA-SURES.

From all this we may easily conclude, how much our Happiness depends on na-MENTAL tural and good Affection. For if the chief Happiness be from the MENTAL PLEAsur Es; and the chief mental Pleasures are fuch as we have describ'd, and are founded in natural Affection; it follows, "That " to have the natural Affections, is to have " the chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoy-" ment, the highest Possession and Happiness " of Life."

Pleasures of the SENSE, Dependent also on nafeltion.

NOW as to the Pleasures of THE Bo-DY, and the Satisfactions belonging to mere SENSE; 'tis evident, they cannot possibly have their Effect, or afford any tural Af. valuable Enjoyment, but by the means of Social and natural Affection.

To live well, has no other meaning Vulgar Epicurism. with some People, than to eat and drink And methinks 'tis but an unwary Concession we make in favour of these pretended good Livers, when we join with 'em, in honouring their way of Life with the Title of living fast. As if they liv'd the

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the fastest who took the greatest Pains to Part 2.
enjoy least of Life: For if our Account of Happiness be right; the greatest Enjoy-pleasures ments in Life are such as these Men pass of the over in their haste, and have scarce ever Sense allow'd themselves the Liberty to taste.

But as considerable a Part of Voluptuousness as is sounded in the Palate; and as notable as the Science is, which depends on it; one may justly presume that the Imagination, of Elegance, and a certain Emulation and Study how to excel in this sumptuous Art of Living, goes very far in the raising such a high Idea of it, as is observ'd among the Men of Pleasure. For were the Circumstances of a Table and Company, Equipages, Services, and the rest of the Management withdrawn; there wou'd be hardly left any Pleasure worth acceptance, even in the Opinion of the most Debauch'd themselves.

The very Notion of a Debauch (which A Deis a Sally into all that can be imagin'd of
Pleasure and Voluptuousness) carries with
it a plain reference to Society, or Fellowship. It may be call'd a Surfeit, or Excess
of Eating and Drinking, but hardly a De
bauch of that kind, when the Excess is
committed separately, out of all Society,
or Fellowship. And one who abuses himself in this way, is often call'd a Sot, but
never

of the Senfe. Women.

Book 2. never a Debanchee. The Courtizans, and even the commonest of Women, who live by Prostitution, know very well how neceffary it is, that every one whom they entertain with their Beauty, shou'd believe that there are Satisfactions reciprocal; and that Pleasures are no less given than receiv'd. And were this Imagination to be wholly taken away, there wou'd be hardly any of the groffer fort of Mankind, who wou'd not perceive their remaining Pleasure to be of slender Estimation.

> Who is there that can well, or long enjoy any thing, when alone, and abstracted perfectly, even in his very Mind and Thought, from every thing belonging to Society? Who is there that on these Terms wou'd not presently be cloy'd by any senfual Indulgence? Who is there that wou'd not foon grow uneafy with his Pleafure, however exquisite, till such time as he had found means to impart it, and make it truly pleasant to him, by communicating, and sharing it at least with some one fingle Person? Let Men imagine what they please; let 'em suppose themselves ever so felfish; or desire ever so much to follow the Dictates of that narrow Principle, by which they wou'd bring Nature under restraint: Nature will break out; and in Agonys, Disquiets, and a distem-

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per'd State, demonstrate evidently the ill Part 2. Consequence of such Violence, the Absurdity of such a Device, and the Punishment which belongs to such a monstrous and horrid Endeavour.

THUS, therefore, not only the Plea-Pleasures sures of the Mind, but even those of the Sense, Body depend on natural Affection: infomuch that where this is wanting, they not only lose their Force, but are in a manner converted into Uneafiness and Disgust. The Sensations which shou'd Convertinaturally afford Contentment and De-Difgust; light, produce rather Discontent and Sourness, and breed a Wearisomness and Restlesness in the Disposition. This we may perceive by the perpetual Inconstancy, and Love of Change, so remarkable in those who have nothing communicative or friendly in their Pleasures. Good Fel-Variable ! lowsbip, in its abus'd Sense, seems indeed to have fomething in it more constant and determining. The Company supports the Humour. 'Tis the same in Love. A Insupportacertain Tenderness and Generosity of Af-ble. fection supports the Passion, which otherwife wou'd instantly be chang'd. The perfectest Beauty cannot, of it-felf, retain, or fix it. And that Love which has no other Foundation, but relies on this exterior kind, is foon turn'd into Aver-Satiety, perpetual Difgust, and Fe-Vol. II. verifhSenfe.

Book 2. verishness of Desire, attend those who passionately study Pleasure. They best Pleasures enjoy it, who study to regulate their Pasfions. And by this they will come to know how absolute an Incapacity there is in any thing fenfual to please, or give Contentment, where it depends not on fomething friendly or focial, fomething conjoin'd, and in Affinity with kind or natural Affection.

Ballance of the Affections.

BUT e'er we conclude this Article of focial or natural Affection, we may take a general View of it, and bring it, once for all, into the Scale; to prove what kind of * BALLANCE it helps to make within; and what the Consequence may be, of its Deficiency, or light Weight.

THERE is no one who understands ever so little what belongs to a human Constitution, but knows that without Action, Motion, and Employment, the Body languishes, and is oppress'd; its Nourishment turns to Disease; the Spirits, unimploy'd abroad, help to confume the Parts within; and Nature, as it were, preys upon her-felf. In the fame manner, the fenfible and living Part, the Soul or Mind, wanting its proper and natural

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Exercise,

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^{*} Above, pag. 92, 93, &c.

Exercife, is burden'd and diseas'd. Its Part 2. Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally withheld from their due Objects, turn Ballance of against it-self, and create the highest Im-the Affections.

IN * Brutes, and other Creatures, who have not the use of Reason or Resection (at least not after the manner of Man-Instance in kind) 'tis fo order'd in Nature, that by the Animal Kinds. their daily fearch after Food, and their Application either towards the Business of their Livelihood, or the Affairs of their Species or Kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full Imployment for their Passion, according to that degree of Agitation to which they are fitted, and which their Constitution requires. If any one of these Creatures be taken out of his natural laborious State. and plac'd amidst such a Plenty as can profusely administer to all his Appetites and Wants; it may be observ'd, that as his Circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his Temper and Passions have the same Growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the Accommodations of Life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dear for 'em in another way; by losing his

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^{*} Above, pag. 92, 93. And below, Treatife V. Part 2. § 4. latter end. And MISC. IV. ch. 2. Vol. II. 1 2 natural

Book 2. natural good Disposition, and the Order-Balance of liness of his Kind or Species.

the Affections.

This needs not to be demonstrated by particular Inflances. Whoever has the least Knowledg of Natural History, or has been an Observer of the several Breeds of Creatures, and their ways of Life, and Propagation, will eafily understand this Difference of Orderliness between the Wild and the Tame of the same Species. The latter acquire new Habits; and deviate from their original Nature. They lofe even the common Instinct and ordinary Ingenuity of their Kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilft they continue in this pamper'd State: But being turn'd to shift abroad, they resume the natural Affection and Sagacity of their Species. They learn to unite in stricter Fellowship; and grow more concern'd for their Offspring. They provide against the Seasons, and make the most of every Advantage given by Nature for the Support and Maintenance of their particular Species, against such as are foreign and hostile. And thus as they grow busy and imploy'd, they grow regular and good. Their Petulancy and Vice for fakes them with their Idleness and Ease.

Animal Kinds.

Mankind.

natural

IT happens with Mankind, that whilst some are by necessity confin'd to Labour, others

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others are provided with abundance of Part 2. all things, by the Pains, and Labour of Inferiours. Now, if among the fuperiour and eafy fort, there be not fomething of fit and proper Imployment rais'd in the room of what is wanting in common Labour and Toil; if instead of an Application to any fort of Work, fuch as has a good and honest end in Society (as Letters, Sciences, Arts, Husbandry, publick Affairs, Oeconomy, or the like) there be a thorow Neglect of all Duty or Imployment; a settled Idleness, Supineness and Inactivity; this of necessity must occafion a most relax'd and dissolute State: It must produce a total Disorder of the Paffions, and break out in the strangest Irregularitys imaginable.

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We see the enormous Growth of Luxury in capital Citys, such as have been long the Seat of Empire. We see what Improvements are made in Vice of every kind, where numbers of Men are maintain'd in lazy Opulence, and wanton Plenty. 'Tis otherwise with those who are taken up in honest and due Imployment, and have been well inur'd to it from their Youth. This we may observe in the hardy remote Provincials, the Inhabitants of smaller Towns, and the industrious sort of common People; where 'tis rare to meet with any Instances of those

Book 2. those Irregularitys, which are known in Courts and Palaces, and in the rich Fountie Affect dations of easy and pamper'd Priests.

Now if what we have advanc'd concerning an inward Constitution be real and just; if it be true that Nature works by a just Order and Regulation as well in the Passions and Affections, as in the Limbs and Organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this inward Part, that nothing is fo effential to it as Exercise; and no Exercise so essential as that of focial or natural Affection; it follows that where this is remov'd or weaken'd, the inward Part must necessarily fuffer and be impair'd. Let Indolence, Indifference, or Infenfibility, be study'd as an Art, or cultivated with the utmost Care; the Passions thus restrain'd will force their Prison, and in one way or another procure their Liberty, and find full Employment. They will be fure to create to themselves unusual and unnatural Exercife, where they are cut off from fuch as is natural and good. And thus in the room of orderly and natural Affection, new and unnatural must be rais'd, and all inward Order and Oeconomy destroy'd.

Occonomy.

ONE must have but a very impersed Idea of the Order of Nature in the Formation and Structure of Animals, to imagine y

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gine that so great a Principle, so funda-Part 2. mental a Part as that of natural Affection shou'd possibly be lost or impair'd, with- 9.1. out any inward Ruin or Subversion of the Temper and Frame of Mind.

WHOEVER is the least vers'd in this moral Kind of Architecture, will find the inward Fabrick so adjusted, and the whole Fabrick. fo nicely built; that the barely extending of a fingle Passion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable Ruin and Mifery. will find this experienc'd in the ordinary Case of Phrenzy, and Distraction; when the Mind, dwelling too long upon one Subject (whether prosperous or calamitous) finks under the weight of it, and proves what the necessity is, of a due Ballance, and Counterpoise in the Affections. He will find, that in every different Creature, and distinct Sex, there is a different and distinct Order, Set, or Suit of Passions; proportionable to the different Order of Life, the different Functions, and Capacitys affign'd to each. As the Operations and Effects are different, fo are the Springs and Causes in each System. The infide Work is fitted to the outward Action and Performance. So that where Habits or Affections are dislodg'd, misplac'd or chang'd; where those belonging to one Species are intermixt with those belonging to another, there must I 4

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Book 2. of necessity be Confusion and Disturbance Ballance of Within.

the Affections.

ALL this we may observe easily, by Monsters. comparing the more perfect with the imperfect Natures, such as are imperfect from their Birth, by having fuffer'd Violence within, in their earliest Form, and inmost Matrix. We know how it is with Monsters, fuch as are compounded of different Kinds, or different Sexes. Nor are they less Monsters, who are mishapen or distorted in an inward Part. The ordinary Animals appear unnatural and monftrous, when they lose their proper Instincts, forfake their Kind, neglect their Offspring, and pervert those Functions or Capacitys bestow'd by Nature. How wretched must it be, therefore, for MAN, of all other Creatures, to lose that Sense, and Feeling, which is proper to him as a M A N, and futable to his Character, and Genius? How unfortunate must it be for a Creature, whose dependence on Society is greater than any others, to lose that natural Affection by which he is prompted to the Good and Interest of his Species, and Community? Such indeed is Man's natural Share of this Affection, that He, of all other Creatures, is plainly the least able to bear Solitude. Nor is any thing more apparent than that there is naturally in every Man fuch

fuch a degree of focial Affection as in-Part 2. clines him to feek the Familiarity and Friendship of his Fellows. 'Tis here 9.1. that he lets loose a Passion, and gives reins to a Defire which can hardly by any struggle or inward violence be with-held; or if it be, is fure to create a Sadness, Dejection, and Melancholy in the Mind. For whoever is unfociable, and voluntarily shuns Society, or Commerce with the World, must of necessity be morose and ill-natur'd. He, on the other fide, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his Temper the ill Effects of this Restraint. The Inclination, when suppress'd, breeds Discontent; and on the contrary affords a healing and enlivening Joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full scope: as we may fee particularly, when after a time of Solitude and long Absence, the Heart is open'd, the Mind disburden'd, and the Secrets of the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-Friend,

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This we see yet more remarkably instanc'd in Persons of the most elevated Stations; even in Princes, Monarchs, and those who seem by their Condition to be above ordinary human Commerce, and who affect a fort of distant Strangeness from the rest of Mankind. But their Carriage is not the same towards all Men. The wifer and better fort, it's true, are often Book 2. often held at a distance; as unfit for their Intimacy, or secret Trust. But to Ballance of compensate this, there are others subtions. Stituted in the room, who the they have the least Merit and are perhaps the

the least Merit, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of Men, are fusficient, however, to serve the purpose of an imaginary Friendship, and can become Favourites in form. These are the Subjects of Humanity in the Great. For These we see them often in concern and pain: in These they easily conside: to These they can with pleasure communi-cate their Power and Greatness, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful; as rejoicing in the Action it-felf: having no Intention or Aim beyond it; and their Interest, in respect of Policy, often standing a quite contrary way. But where neither the Love of Mankind, nor the Passion for Favourites prevails, the Tyrannical Temper fails not to shew it-self in its proper Colours, and to the Life, with all the Bitterness, Cruelty, and Mistrust, which belongs to that solitary and gloomy State of un-communicative and un-friendly Greatness. Nor needs there any particular Proof from History or present Time to fecond this Remark.

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THUS it may appear, how much NATURAL AFFECTION is predominant;

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nant; how it is inwardly join'd to us, Part 2. and implanted in our Natures; how interwoven with our other Passions; and how effential to that regular Motion and Course of our Affections, on which our Happiness and Self-Enjoyment so immediately depend.

AND thus we have demonstrated, That as, on one side, To have the Natural and Good Affections, is to have the chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment: So on the other side, to want them, is certain Misery, and Iti."

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WE are now to prove, That by HAV-SECOND ING THE SELF-PASSIONS TOO from the INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE Self-Paffine BECOMES MISERABLE.

In order to this, we must, according to Method, enumerate those Home-Affections, which relate to the private Interest or separate Oeconomy of the Creature: such as Love of Life;—Resentment of Injury;—Pleasure, or Appetite towards Nourishment and the Means of Generation;—Interest, or Desire of those Convenientes, by which we are well provided for, and maintain'd;—Emulation, or Love of Praise

Book 2. Praise and Honour; — Indolence, or Love of Ease and Rest. — These are the Affections which relate to the private System, and constitute whatever we call Interestedness or Self-Love.

Now these Affections, if they are moderate, and within certain Bounds, are neither injurious to social Life, nor a hinderance to Virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become Comardice,—
Revengefulness,—Luxury,—Avarice,—Vanity and Ambition,—Sloth;—and, as such, are own'd vicious and ill, with respect to human Society. How they are ill also with respect to the private Person, and are to his own disadvantage as well as that of the Publick, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

Love of Life.

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IF there were any of these Self-Passions, which for the Good and Happiness of the Creature might be oppos'd to Natural Affection, and allow'd to over-ballance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE wou'd have the best Pretence. But it will be found perhaps that there is no Passion which, by having much allow'd to it, is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.

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Part 2.

of vinenti THERE is nothing more certain, or more univerfally agreed than this; "That " Life may sometimes be even a Misfor-" tune and Misery." To inforce the continuance of it in Creatures reduc'd to fuch Extremity, is esteem'd the greatest Cruelty. And the Religion forbids that any one shou'd be his own Reliever; yet if by some fortunate accident, Death offers of it-self, it is embrac'd as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the Release of one entirely belov'd; even tho he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline Death, and endeavour the utmost Prolongment of his own uneligible State.

Since Life, therefore, may frequently prove a Misfortune and Misery; and since it naturally becomes so, by being only prolong'd to the Infirmitys of Old Age; since there is nothing, withal, more common than to see Life over-valu'd, and purchas'd at such a Cost as it can never justly be thought worth; it follows evidently, that the Passion it-self (viz. the Love of Life, and Abhorrence or Dread of Death) if beyond a certain degree, and over-ballancing in the Temper of any Creature, must lead him directly against his own Interest; make him, upon occasion, become the greatest

Book 2. greatest Enemy to himself; and necessi-Love of tate him to act as fuch. Life.

Bur the it were allow'd the Interest and Good of a Creature, by all Courses and Means whatfoever, in any Circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve Life; yet wou'd it be against his Interest still to have this Passion in a high degree. For it wou'd by this means prove ineffectual, and no way conducing to its end. Various Instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive Fear betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? 'Tis impossible for any one to act fenfibly, and with Prefence of Mind, even in his own Prefervation and Defence, when he is strongly pres'd by such a Passion. On all extraordinary Emergences, 'tis Courage and Resolution faves; whilft Cowardice robs us of the means of Safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive Facultys, but even runs us to the brink of Ruin, and makes us meet that Evil which of it-felf wou'd never have invaded us.

Bur were the Consequences of this Pasfion less injurious than we have represented; ir must be allow'd still that in it-self it can be no other than miserable; if it be Misery to feel Cowardice, and be haunted by those Specters and Horrors which are proper to

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the Character of one who has a thorow Part 2. Dread of Death. For 'tis not only when Dangers happen, and Hazards are in- 9.2. curr'd, that this fort of Fear oppresses and distracts. If it but once prevails, it gives no quarter, so much as at the safest stillest hour of Retreat and Quiet. Every Object fuggests Thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is least observ'd by others; and enters at all times into the pleasantest parts of Life; so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment, and Content. One may fafely aver, that by reafon of this Passion alone, many a Life, if inwardly and closely view'd, wou'd be found to be thorowly miserable, tho attended with all other Circumstances that in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this, the Meannesses, and base Condescensions, occasion'd by such a passionate Concern for Living; when we consider how by means of it, we are driven to Actions which we can never view but with Dislike, and forc'd by degrees from our natural Conduct, into still greater Crookednesses and Perplexity; there is no one (I think) fo difingenuous as not to allow, that Life, in this case, becomes a forry Purchase, and is pass'd with little Freedom or Satisfaction. For how can this be otherwise, whilst all that is generous and worthy, even the chief sellife Pathon that one Custom Relifb.

Book 2. Relish, Happiness, and Good of Life, is for Love of Life's Sake abandon'd and renounc'd? Life.

> AND thus it feems evident, " That to " have this Affection of DESIRE and

" LOVE OF LIFE, too intense, or be-

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"Interest of a Creature, and contrary to his Happiness and Good."

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Refentment.

THERE is another Passion very different from that of Fear, and which in a certain degree is equally preservative to us, and conducing to our Safety. As that is ferviceable, in prompting us to shun Danger; so is this, in fortifying us against it, and enabling us to repel Injury, and resist Violence when offer'd. 'Tis true that according to ftrict Virtue, and a just Regulation of the Affections in a wife and virtuous Man, fuch Efforts towards Action amount not to what is justly stil'd Passion or Commotion. A Man of Courage may be cautious without real Fear. a Man of Temper may refift or punish without Anger. But in ordinary Characters there must necessarily be some Mixture of the real Passions themselves; which however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus ANGER in a manner becomes necessary. 'Tis by this Passion that one Creature offering

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offering Violence to another, is deter'd Part 2. from the Execution; whilft he observes how the Attempt affects his Fellow; and knows by the very Signs which accompany this rifing Motion, that if the Injury be carry'd further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. Tis this Passion withal, which after Violence and Hostility executed, rouzes a Creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like Hostility and Harm on the Invader. For thus, as Rage and Despair increase, a Creature grows still more terrible; and being urg'd to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of Strength and Boldness unexperienc'd till then, and which had never rifen but thro the height of Provocation. As to this Affection therefore, tho its immediate Aim be indeed the Ill or Punishment of another, yet it is plainly of the fort of those which tend to the Advantage and Interest of the Self-System, the Animal himself; and is withal in other respects contributing to the Good and Interest of the Species. But there is hardly need we shou'd explain how mischievous and self-destructive A N-GER is, if it be what we commonly understand by that word: if it be fuch a Passion as is rash, and violent in the instant of Provocation; or such as imprints it-felf deeply, and causes a settled Revenge, and an eager vindicative Pursuit. No wonder indeed that so much is done in Vol. II. mere

Book 2. Relish, Happiness, and Good of Life, is for Love of Life's sake abandon'd and renounc'd?

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Book 2. mere Revenge, and under the Weight of a Refentment.

deep Resentment, when the Relief and Satisfaction found in that Indulgence is no other than the affuaging of the most torturous Pain, and the alleviating the most weighty and preffing Sensation of Misery. The Pain of this fort being for a while remov'd or alleviated by the accomplishment of the Defire, in the Ill of another, leaves indeed behind it the perception of a delicious Ease, and an overflowing of fost and pleafing Sensation. Yet is this, in truth, no better than the Rack it-felf. For whoever has experienc'd racking Pains, can tell in what manner a fudden Ceffation or Respite is us'd to affect him. From hence are those untoward Delights of Perverseness, Frowardness, and an envenom'd malignant Disposition, acting at its liberty. For this is only A perpetual assuaging of ANGER perpetually renew'd. In other Characters, the Paffion arises not so suddenly, or on flight Causes; but being once mov'd, is not so easily quieted. The dormant Fury, REVENGE, being rais'd once to her highest pitch, rests not till she attains her End; and, that attain'd, is eafy, and reposes; making our fucceeding Relief and Ease so much the more enjoy'd, as our preceding Anguish and incumbent Pain was of long duration, and bitter fense. Certainly if among Lovers, and in the Language of Gallantry, the Success of ardent

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Pain; this other success may be far more justly term'd so. However soft or flattering the former Pain may be esteem'd, this latter surely can be no pleasing one i Nor can it be possibly esteem'd other than sound and thorow Wretchedness, a grating and disgustful Recling, without the least mixture of any thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.

Tis not very necessary to mention the ill effects of this Passion, in respect of our Minds, or Bodys, our private Condition or Circumstances of Life. These are of the moral fort of Subjects, join'd commonly with Religion, and often treated in publick, to the general Satiety of Mankind, entertain'd more than fufficiently with the Rhetorick of this Authoritative kind. What has been faid, may be enough perhaps to make this evident, " That to be " fubject to fuch a Passion as we have been " mentioning, is, in reality, to be very " unhappy.". And, "That the Habit " of it, is a Disease, of the worst sort; " from which Mifery is inseparable."

NOW as to Luxury, and what the PLEA-World calls PLEASURE: Were it true SURE. (as has been prov'd the contrary) that the most considerable Enjoyments were those Vol. II. K 2 merely

Incurred only 40

Luxury.

Book 2. merely of the Sense; and were it true, withal, that those Enjoyments of the SURE. Sense lay in certain outward things capable of yielding always a due and certain Portion of Pleasure, according to their de-gree and quality; it wou'd then follow, that the certain way to obtain Happiness, wou'd be to procure largely of these Subjects, to which Happiness and Pleasure were thus infallibly annex'd. But however fashionably we may apply the Notion of good Living, 'twill hardly be found that our inward Facultys are able to keep pace with these outward Supplys of a luxuriant Fortune. And if the natural Disposition and Aptness from within be not concurring; 'twill be in vain that these Subjects are thus multiply'd from abroad, and acquir'd with ever fo great facility. this Authoritative

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IT may be observ'd in those who by Excess have gain'd a constant Nauseating and Distaste, that they have nevertheless as constant a Craving or Eagerness of Stomach. But the Appetite of this kind is false and unnatural; as is that of Thirst arifing from a Fever, or contracted by habitual Debauch. Now the Satisfactions of the natural Appetite, in a plain way, are infinitely beyond those Indulgences of the most refin'd and elegant Luxury. This is often perceiv'd by the Luxurious themselves. It has been experienc'd in People merely

bred after the sumptuous way, and us'd Part 2.

never to wait, but to prevent Appetite;
that when by any new Turn of Life they
came to fall into a more natural Course, or
for a while, as on a Journy, or a day of
Sport, came accidentally to experience the
Sweet of a plain Diet, recommended by
due Abstinence and Exercise; they have
with freedom own'd, that it was then they
receiv'd the highest Satisfaction and Delight which a Table cou'd possibly afford.

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On the other side, it has been as often remark'd in Persons accustom'd to an active Life, and healthful Exercise; that having once thorowly experienc'd this plainer and more natural Diet, they have upon a following Change of Life regretted their Loss, and undervalu'd the Pleasures receiv'd from all the Delicacys of Luxury, in comparison with those remember'd Satisfactions of a preceding State. 'Tis plain, that by urging Nature, forcing the Appetite, and inciting Sense, the Keenness of the natural Sensations is lost. And tho thro Vice or ill Habit the same Subjects of Appetite may, every day, be fought with greater Ardour; they are enjoy'd with less Satisfaction. Tho the Impatience of abstaining be greater; the Pleafure of Indulgence is really less. Palls or Nauseatings which continually intervene, are of the worst and most hateful K 3.

Luxury.

Book 2. ful kind of Senfation. Hardly is there any thing tafted which is wholly free PLEA from this ill relish of a furfeited Sense and SURE. ruin'd Appetite. So that instead of a constant and flowing Delight afforded in such a State of Life, the very State it-felf is in reality a Sickness and Infirmity, a Corruption of Pleasure, and destructive of every natural and agreeable Senfation. So far is it from being true; " That in this licen-" tious Course we enjoy LIFE best, or are " likely to make the most of it." Ou the other fide, it has been as often

As to the Consequences of fuch an Indulgence; how fatal to the Body, by Difeases of many kinds, and to the Mind, by Sottishness and Stupidity; this needs not any explanation, of I do legand griwol Lofs, and undervalue the Pleasures

THE Consequences as to Interest are plain enough. Such a State of impotent and unrestrain'd Desire, as it increases our Wants, so it must subject us to a greater Dependence on others. Our private Circumstances, however plentiful or easy they may be, can less easily content us. Ways and Means must be invented to procure what may administer to such an imperious Luxury, as forces us to facrifice Honour to Fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of Conduct. The Injurys we do our-selves, by Excess and Unforbearance, are then furely apparent,

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apparent, when thro an Imporence of this Part 2. fort, and an Impossibility of Restraint, we do what we our selves declare to be PLEA. destructive to us. But these are Mat-sure. ters obvious of themselves. And from less than what has been said, tis easy to conclude, "That Luxury, Riot, and De"bauch, are contrary to real Interest, and "to the true Enjoyment of Life."

ardone Sentations accidentally experiencid; THERE is another Luxury superiour Amours. to the kind we have been mentioning, and which in strictness can scarce be call'd a Self-Paffion, fince the fole End of it is the advantage and promotion of the Species. But whereas all other focial Affections are join'd only with a mental Pleasure, and founded in mere Kindness and Love : this has more added to it, and is join'd with a Pleasure of Sense. Such Concern and Care has Nature shewn for the Support and Maintenance of the several Species, that by a certain Indigence and kind of Necessity of their Natures, they are made to regard the Propagation of their Kind. Now whether it be the Interest or Good of the Animal to feel this Indigence beyond a natural and ordinary degree; is what we may consider. out Ardomy wast no'd, comes the nearer to meier R

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HAVING already said so much concerning natural and unnatural Appetite, K 4 there Book 2. there needs less to be faid on this oc-PLEA. casion. If it be allow'd, that to all o-SURE ther Pleasures there is a Measure of Appetite belonging, which cannot possibly be exceeded without prejudice to the Creature, even in his very Capacity of enjoying Pleafure; it will hardly be thought that there is no certain Limit or just Boundary of this other Appetite of the A MOROUs kind. There are other forts of ardent Sensations accidentally experienc'd, which we find pleasant and acceptable whilft they are held within a certain degree; but which as they increase, grow oppressive and intolerable. Laughter provok'd by Titillation, grows an excessive Pain; tho it retains still the same Features of Delight and Pleasure. And the in the case of that particular kind of Itch which belongs to a Distemper nam'd from that effect, there are some who far from disliking the Senfation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed fuch amongst the more refin'd fort, even of those who make Pleasure their chief Study, and highest Good.

Now if there be in every Sensation of mere Pleasure, a certain Pitch or Degree of Ardour, which by being surther advanc'd, comes the nearer to mere Rage and Fury; if there be indeed a necessity of stopping somewhere, and determining

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on some Boundary for the Passion; where Part 2. can we fix our Standard, or how regulate our selves but with regard to Nature, beyond which there is no Measure or Rule of things? Now Nature may be known from what we see of the natural State of Creatures, and of Man himself, when unprejudic'd by vicious Education.

WHERE happily any one is bred to a natural Life, inur'd to honest Industry and Sobriety, and un-accustom'd to any thing immoderate or intemperate; he is found to have his Desires and Inclinations of this fort at command. Nor are they on this account less able to afford him the Pleasure or Enjoyment of the kind. On the contrary; as they are more vigorous, healthy, and un-injur'd by Excess and Abuse, they must afford him proportionate Satisfaction. So that were both these Sensations to be experimentally compar'd; that of a virtuous Course which belong'd to one who liv'd a natural and regular Life, and that of a vicious Course which belong'd to one who was relax'd and diffolute; there is no question but Judgment wou'd be given in favour of the former, without regard to Consequences, and only with respect to the very Pleasure of Sense it-self.

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As to the Confequences of this Nice. SURE with respect to the Health and Vigour of the Body; there is no need to mention any thing. The Injury it does the Mind, tho less notic'd, is yet greater. The Hinderance of all Improvement, the wretched Waste of Time, the Effeminacy, Sloth, Supineness, the Disorder and Looseness of a thousand Passions, through a relaxation and enervating of the Mind; are all of them Effects fufficiently apparent, thing immoderate or inno bassaffer nadw bund to have his Defires and Inclinations

> WHAT the Disadvantages are of this Intemperance, in respect of Interest, Society, and the World; and what the Advantages are of a contrary Sobriety, and Self-Command, wou'd be to little purpose to mention. 'Tis well known there can be no Slavery greater than what is confequent to the Dominion and Rule of fuch a Passion. Of all other, it is the least manageable by Favour or Conceffion, and assumes the most from Privilege and Indulgence. What it costs us in the Modesty and Ingentity of our Natures, and in the Faith and Honesty of our Characters, is as easily apprehended by any one who will reflect. And it will from hence appear, " That there is no Passion, " which in its Extravagance and Excess " more

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" more necessarily occasions Disorder and Part 2.
" Unhappiness."

which is believed on Summuonings and NOW as to that Paffion which is ef- INTEteem'd peculiarly interesting; as having REST. for its Aim the Possession of Wealth, and what we call a Settlement or Fortune in the World: If the Regard towards this kind be moderate, and in a reasonable degree; if it occasion no passionate Pursuit, nor raises any ardent Desire or Appetite, there is nothing in this Cafe but what is compatible with Virtue, and even sutable and beneficial to Society. The publick as well as private System is advanc'd by the Industry, which this Affection excites. But if it grows at length into a real Passion; the Injury and Mischief it does the Publick, is not greater than that which it creates to the Person himself. Such a one is in reality a Self-Oppressor, and lies heavier on himself than he can ever do on Mankind.

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How far a Coveting or Avaritious Temper is miserable, needs not, I think, be explain'd. Who is there that knows not how small a Portion of worldly Matters is sufficient for a Man's single Use and Convenience; and how much his Occasions and Wants might be contracted and reduc'd, if a just Frugality Book 2. lity were study'd, and Temperance and a natural Life came once to be pursu'd with half that Application, Industry and Art which is bestow'd on Sumptuousness and Luxury? Now if Temperance be in reality fo advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Consequences of it so pleasing and happy, as has been before express'd; there is little need, on the other fide, to mention any thing of the Miferys attending those covetous and eager Desires after things which have no Bounds or Rule; as being out of Nature, beyond which there can be no Limits to Defire. For where shall we once stop, when we are beyond this Boundary? How shall we any way fix or ascertain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? Or what Method or Regulation shall we fet to mere Imagination, or the Exorbitancy of Fancy, in adding Expence to Expence, or Possession to Possession? Oppression, and they heavier on himid

> HENCE that known Restlesness of covetous and eager Minds, in whatever State or Degree of Fortune they are plac'd; there being no thorow or real Satisfaction, but a kind of Infatiableness belonging to this Condition. For 'tis impossible there shou'd be any real Enjoyment but in consequence of natural and just Appetite. Nor do we readily call that an Enjoyment of Wealth or of Honour, when

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And hence it is a

thro Covetousness or Ambition, the De-Part 2. fire is still forward, and can never rest satisfy'd with its Gains. But against this Vice of Covetousness, there is enough said continually in the World; and in our common way of speaking, "A co-" vetous, and a miserable Temper has, in "reality, but one and the same Signification."

NOR is there less said, abroad, as to Emulation. the Ills of that other aspiring Temper, which exceeds an honest Emulation, and Love of Praise, and passes the Bounds even of Vanity and Conceit: fuch, I mean, as breaks into an enormous PRIDE and AMBITION. If one confiders the Eafe, Happiness, and a thousand Advantages and Securitys which attend a modest Disposition and quiet Mind, such as is of easy Command, fitted to every Station in Society, and able to fute it-felf with any reafonable Circumstances whatever; 'twill not be found necessary any further to call to mind the Excellence and Good of Moderation, and the Mischief and Self-Injury of immoderate Defires, and conceited fond Imaginations of personal Advantage in fuch things as Titles, Honours, Precedencys, Fame, Glory, or vulgar Astonishment, Admiration and Applause.

Book 2.

thro Coveraufnels or Ambirion, the H This too is obvious, that as the Defires of this kind are rais'd, and become impetuous, and out of our Command; fo the Aversions and Fears of the contrary part, grow proportionably strong and violent, and the Temper accordingly fufpicious, jealous, captious, subject to Apprehensions from all Events, and uncapable of bearing the least Repulse or ordinary Disappointment. And hence it may be concluded, " That all Rest and Secu-" rity as to what is future, and all Peace, " Contentedness and Ease as to what is pre-" fent, is forfeited by the aspiring Passions " of this emulous kind; and by having " the Appetites towards Glory and out-" ward Appearance thus transporting and " beyond Command."

Indolence.

often in opposition to those eager and aspiring Aims of which we have been speaking. Not that it really excludes either the Passion of Covetonsness or Ambition; but because it hinders their Effects, and keeps them from breaking into open Action. 'Tis this Passion, which by soothing the Mind, and softning it into an Excessive Love of Rest and Indo-Lence, renders high Attempts impracticable, and represents as insuperable the Difficultys

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Difficultys of a painful and laborious Part 2. Course towards Wealth and Honours. Now tho an Inclination to Ease, and a Love of moderate Recess and Rest from Action, be as natural and useful to us as the Inclination we have towards Sleep; yet an excessive Love of Rest, and a contracted Aversion to Action and Imployment, must be a Disease in the Mind equal to that of a Lethargy in the Body.

How much Action and Exercise are necessary for the Body, let it be judg'd by the difference we find in the Constitutions that are accustom'd, and those that are wholly Strangers to it; and by the different Health and Complexion which Labour and due Exercise create, in comparison with that Habit of Body which we fee confequent to an indulg'd State of Indolence and Reft. Nor is the lazy Habit ruinous to the Body only. The languishing Disease corrupts all the Enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy Sense, and carries its Infection into the Mind: where it spreads a worse Contagion. For however the Body may hold out, 'tis impossible that the Mind, in which the Diftemper is feated, can escape without an immediate Affliction and Diforder. The Habit begets a Tediousness and Anxiety, which influences the whole Temper, and converts the unnatural Rest into an unhappy

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Book 2. happy fort of Activity, ill Humour, and Spleen: of which there has been enough faid above, where we consider'd the want of a due Ballance in the Assections.

Action, beas natural and utelest to us a Tis certain that as in the Body, when no Labour or natural Exercise is us'd, the Spirits which want their due Imployment, turn against the Constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; fo in a Soul, or Mind, unexercis'd, and which languishes for want of proper Action and Employment, the Thoughts and Affections being obstructed in their due Course, and depriv'd of their natural Energy, raise Disquiet, and foment a rancorous Eagerness and tormenting Irritation. The Temper from hence becomes more impotent in Passion, more incapable of real Moderation, and like prepar'd Fuel, readily takes Fire by the least Spark.

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As to Interest, how far it is here concern'd; how wretched that State is, in which by this Habit a Man is plac'd, towards all the Circumstances and Affairs of Life, when at any time he is call'd to Action; how subjected he must be to all Inconveniences, wanting to himself, and depriv'd of the Assistance of others; whilst being unsit for all Offices and Dutys of Society, he yet of any other Person most needs

needs the help of it, as being least able to Part 2. affift or support himself; all this is obvious. And thus 'tis evident, " That to

" have this over-byaffing Inclination to-

" wards Rest; this flothful, foft, or effe-

" minate Temper, averse to Labour and " Imployment, is to have an unavoidable

" Mischief, and attendant Plague." and Sulpicions, Healoulys,

ad Engy multiply'd. A feparate End and THUS have we consider'd the Self-Self-Pas-Passions; and what the Consequence is of fions in their rifing beyond a moderate degree. These Affections, as Self-interesting as they are, can often, we fee, become contrary to our real Interest. They betray us into most Misfortunes, and into the greatest of Unhappinesses, that of a profligate and abject Character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occasion that a Creature in proportion becomes mean and low. They are original to that which we call Selfishness, and give rife to that fordid Disposition of which we have already spoken. It appears that there can be nothing so miserable in itfelf, or fo wretched in its Consequence, as to be thus impotent in Temper, thus master'd by Passion, and by means of it, brought under the most fervile Subjection to the World.

Vol. II. L

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Self- Paffions in general.

Tas evident withal, that as this Selfilmes increases in us, so must a certain Subtlety, and Feignedness of Carriage, which naturally accompanys it. And thus the Candour and Ingenuity of our Natures, the Ease and Freedom of our Minds must be forfeited; all Trust and Confidence in a manner lost; and Suspicions, Jealousys, and Envys multiply'd. A separate End and Interest must be every day more strongly form'd in us : Generous Views and Motives laid aside: And the more we are thus senfibly disjoin'd every day from Society and our Fellows; the worfe Opinion we shall have of those uniting Passions which bind us in strict Alliance and Amity with others. Upon these Terms we must of course endeavour to silence and suppress our natural and good Affections: fince they are fuch as wou'd carry us to the Good of Society, against what we fondly conceive to be our private Good and Interest; as has been shewn.

Now if thefe SELFISH PASSIONS, besides what other ill they are the occasion of, are withal the certain means of lofing us our natural Affections; then (by what has been prov'd before) ?tis evident, "That they must be the certain means of "Toling us the chief Enjoyment of Life,

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"and raising in us those horrid and un-Part 2.

"natural Passions, and that Savageness of "Temper, which makes The GREA"TEST OF MISERYS, and the most "wretched State of Life:" as remains for us to explain.

Bur to delight in the Torrure. I'H her. T 3 Es adifferently.

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THE Passions therefore, which, in the THIRD last place, we are to examine, are Proof from the those which lead neither to a publick nor a Unnatural private Good; and are neither of any Ad-Affestions. vantage to the Species in general, or Creature in particular. These, in opposition to the social and natural, we call the Unnatural Affections.

OF this kind is that UNNATURAL Inhumaand INHUMAN DELIGHT in beholding Torments, and in viewing Distress, Calamity, Blood, Massacre and Destruction, with a peculiar Joy and Pleasure. This has been the reigning Passion of many Tyrants, and barbarous Nations; and belongs, in some degree, to such Tempers as have thrown off that Courteousness of Behaviour which retains in us a just Reverence of Mankind, and prevents the Growth of Harshness and Brutality. This Passion enters not where Civility or affable Manners have the least place. Such is the Nature of what we call good Breeding, WOL. II. that L 2

Inbumanity.

Book 2. that in the midft of many other Corruptions, it admits not of INHUMANITY. or savage Pleasure. To see the Sufferance of an Enemy with cruel Delight, may proceed from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other extended Self-Passions: But to delight in the Torture and Pain of other Creatures indifferently, Natives or Foreigners, of our own or of another Species, Kindred or no Kindred, known or unknown; to feed, as it were, on Death, and be entertain'd with dying Agonys; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of Self-Interest or private Good above-mention'd, but is wholly and absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miferable. And VIOITA A ANDTAG

Petulancy. THERE is another Affection nearly related to this, which is a gay and frolicksome Delight in what is injurious to others; a fort of WANTON MISCHIEVOUS-NESS, and Pleasure in what is destructive; a Passion which instead of being restrain'd, is usually incourag'd in Children: fo that 'tis indeed no wonder if the Effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the World. For 'twill be hard, I Suppose, for any one to give a reason why that Temper which was us'd to delight in Disorder and Ravage, when in a Nursery; shou'd not afterwards find Delight in other Diffurbances, and be the occasion of .II . equal

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equal Mischief in Familys, amongst Part 2. Friends, and in the Publick it-self. But of this Passion there is not any foundation in Nature; as has been explain'd.

MALICE, MALIGNITY, or ILL-Malignity.
WILL, such as is grounded on no Self-Consideration, and where there is no Subject of Anger or Jealousy, nor any thing to provoke or cause such a Desire of doing ill to another; this also is of that kind of Passion.

Envy too, when it is such as arises Envy. from the Prosperity or Happiness of another Creature no ways interfering with ours, is of the same kind of Passion.

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uch as annatural Lufts in foreign Kinds or THERE is also among these, a fort of Moroseness. HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCI-ETY; a Passion which has been known perfectly reigning in some Men, and has MISANhad a peculiar Name given to it. A large THROPT. share of this belongs to those who have long indulg'd themselves in a habitual Moroseness, or who by force of ill Nature, and ill Breeding, have contracted fuch a Reverse of Affability, and Civil Manners, that to see or meet a Stranger is offensive. The very Aspect of Mankind is a Difturbance to 'em, and they are fure always to hate at first sight. The Distemper of this kind is fometimes found to be in a manner beyond

Book 2. ner National; but peculiar to the more favage Nations, and a plain Characteristick lity, Bar of unciviliz'd Manners, and Barbarity.

This is the immediate Opposite to that no ble Affection, which, in antient Language, was term'd * Hospitality, viz. extensive Love of Mankind, and Relief of Strangers.

Supersti-

We may add likewise to the number of the unnatural Passions, all those which are rais'd from Superstition (as before-mention'd) and from the Customs of barbarous Countrys: All which are too horrid and odious in themselves, to need any proof of their being miserable.

Unnatural Lusts.

THERE might be other Passions nam'd, such as unnatural Lusts in foreign Kinds or Species, with other Perversions of the amorous Desire within our own. But as to these Depravitys of Appetite, we need add nothing here; after what has been already said, on the Subject of the more natural Passion.

Swe H as these are the only Affections or Passions we can strictly call unnatural, ill, and of no Tendency so much as to any separate or private Good. Others indeed there are which have this Tendency, but are so exorbitant and out of measure, so

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beyond the common Bent of any ordinary Part 2. Self-Passion, and so utterly contrary and abhorrent to all social and natural Affection, that they are generally call'd, and may be justly esteem'd unnatural and monstrous.

AMONG these may be reckon'd such Tyranny. an Enormous Pride or Ambition. fuch an ARROGANCE and TYRAN-NY, as wou'd willingly leave nothing eminent, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the World: fuch an ANGER as wou'd facrifice every thing to it-felf: fuch a REVENGE as is never to be extinguish'd, nor ever satisfy'd but with the greatest Crueltys: such an INVETER A-CY and RANCOUR as feeks, as it were, occasion to exert it-felf; and lays hold of the least Subject, so as often to make the weight of its Malevolence fall even upon such as are mere Objects of Pity and Compassion.

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TREACHERY and INGRATITUDE Treachery, are in strictness mere negative Vices; Ingratiand, in themselves, no real Passions; having neither Aversion or Inclination belonging to them; but are deriv'd from the Desect, Unsoundness or Corruption of the Assections in general. But when these Vices become remarkable in a Character, and arise in a manner from Inclination and Choice; when they are so for-

OR HELDE OF AMELTION,

Book 2. ward and active, as to appear of their wown accord, without any preffing occafion; 'tis apparent they borrow fomething of the mere unnatural Passions, and are deriv'd from Malice, Envy, and Inveteracy; as explain'd above. A HONG CHECK BER DO FECTOR OF

general.

Unnatural IT may be objected here, that these Pleasure in Passions, unnatural as they are, carry still a fort of Pleasure with them; and that however barbarous a Pleasure it be, yet still it is a Pleasure and Satisfaction which is found in Pride, or Tyranny, Revenge, Malice, or Cruelty exerted. Now if it be possible in Nature, that any one can feel a barbarous or malicious Joy, otherwife than in confequence of mere Anguish and Torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of Satisfaction to be call'd Pleasure or Delight. But the Case is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind; to have focial or natural Affection, Complacency and Good-Will, is to feel immediate Satisfaction and genuine Content. 'Tis in it-felf original Joy, depending on no preceding Pain or Uneafiness; and producing nothing but Satisfaction merely. On the other side, Animosity, Hatred and Bitterness is original Misery and Torment, producing no other Pleasure or Satisfaction, than as the unnatural Defire is for the instant satisfy'd by something

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thing that appeales it. How strong foe-Part 2. ver this Pleasure, therefore, may appear; it does but the more imply the Misery of 9.3. that State which produces it. For as the cruellest bodily Pains do by Intervals of Affuagement, produce (as has been shewn) the highest bodily Pleasure; so the fiercest and most raging Torments of the Mind, do, by certain moments of Relief. afford the greatest of mental Enjoyments, to those who know little of the truer manner left all that ere call Assert bris

THE Men of gentlest Dispositions, and Umatural best of Tempers, have at some time or State. other been fufficiently acquainted with those Disturbances which, at ill Hours, even small occasions are apt to raise. From these slender Experiences of Harshness and ill Humour, they fully know and will confess the ill Moments that are pass'd, when the Temper is ever fo little gall'd or fretted. How must it fare, therefore, with those who hardly know any better hours in Life; and who, for the greatest part of it, are agitated by a thorow active Spleen, a close and settled Malignity, and Rancour? How lively must be the Sense of every thwarting and controuling Accident? How great must be the Shocks of Disappointment, the Stings of Affront, and the Agonys of a working Antipathy, against the multiply'd Objects of Offence?

be supposed to stand, in respectives she So-

Nor

Book 2. Nor can it therefore be wonder'd at, if to proceed the persons thus agitated and oppress'd, it state. State. Seems a high Delight to appease and allay for the while those furious and rough Motions, by an Indulgence of their Passion in Mischief and Revenge.

Now as to the Consequences of this unnatural State, in respect of Interest, and the common Circumstances of Life; upon what Terms a Person who has in this manner lost all that we call Nature, can be supposed to stand, in respect of the Society of Mankind; how he feels himself in it; what Sense he has of his own Disposition towards others, and of the mutual Disposition of others towards himself; this is easily conceived.

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thefer flender Experiences of Harffmels WHAT Injoyment or Rest is there for one who is not conscious of the merited Affection or Love, but, on the contrary, of the ill-Willand Hatred of every human Soul? What ground must this afford for Horrour and Despair? What foundation of Fear, and continual Apprehension from Mankind, and from superiour Powers? How thorow and deep must be that Melanaboly, which being once mov'd, has nothing foft or pleafing from the fide of Friendship, to allay or divert it? Whereever fuch a Creature turns himfelf; which-ever way be cafts his Eye; every thing

thing around must appear ghastly and hor-Part 2. rid; every thing hostile, and, as it were, bent against a private and single Being, who is thus divided from every thing, and at defiance and war with the rest of Nature.

'Tis thus, at last, that a Mind becomes a Wilderness; where all is laid waste. every thing fair and goodly remov'd, and nothing extant but what is favage and deform'd. Now if Banishment from one's Country, Removal to a foreign Place, or any thing that looks like Solitude or Defertion, be so heavy to endure; what must it be to feel this inward Banishment, this real Estrangement from human Commerce; and to be after this manner in a Defart. and in the horridest of Solitudes, even when in the midft of Society? What must it be to live in this Disagreement with every thing, this Irrecontilableness and Opposition to the Order and Government of the Universe?

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HENCE it appears; That the greatest of Miserys accompanys that State which is confequent to the Lofs of natural Affection; and That TO HAVE THOSE HOR-RID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO BE MISERABLE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

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thing around mult appear ghally and hor . shood

rid; every thing holfile, and, as it were, beat . NinO 1 & . Utale D N O Dag.

HUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And fince in the common and known Sense of Vice and Illness, no one can be vicious or ill, but either,

- natural Affections;
- 2. OR by the Violence of the selfish;
- 3. OR by fuch as are plainly unnatural:

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IT must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his compleatest State of Misery is made from hence; To BE WICKED OR VICIOUS, IS, TO BE MISERABLE AND UNHAPPY.

AND since every vicious Action must in proportion, more or less, help towards this Mischief, and Self-Ill; it must follow, That EVERY VICIOUS ACTION MUST BE SELF-INJURIOUS AND ILL.

On the other side; the Happiness and Good of VIRTUE has been prov'd from the contrary Effect of other Affections, such

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fuch as are according to Nature, and the Part 2. Occonomy of the Species or Kind. We have cast up all those Particulars, from whence (as by way of Addition and Substraction) the main Sum or general Account of Happiness, is either augmented or diminish'd. And if there be no Article exceptionable in this Scheme of Moral Arithmetick; the Subject treated may be faid to have an evidence as great as that which is found in Numbers, or Mathematicks. For let us carry Scepticism ever fo far; let us doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we cannot doubt of what passes within our-selves. Our Passions and Affections are known to us. They are certain, whatever the Objects may be, on which they are employ'd. Nor is it of any concern to our Argument how thefe exteriour Objects stand; whether they are Realitys, or mere Illusions; whether we wake or dream. For ill Dreams will be equally disturbing: And a good Dream (if Life be nothing else) will be easily and happily pass'd. In this Dream of Life, therefore, our Demonstrations have the fame force; our Ballance and Oeconomy hold good, and our Obligation to VIR-TUE is in every respect the same. Saleine? timagin'd Love of others; on which how-

presume, the least degree of Certainty wanting, in what has been said concerning the

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Book 2. the Preferableness of the mental Pleasures conclusion. to the sensual; and even of the sensual, accompany'd with good Affection, and under a temperate and right use, to those that are no ways restrain'd, nor supported by any thing social or affectionate.

nd if there be no Arricle Nox is there less Evidence in what has been faid, of the united Structure and Fabrick of the Mind, and of those Passions which constitute the Temper, or Soul; and on which its Happiness or Misery so immediately depend. It has been shewn, That in this Constitution, the impairing of any one Part must instantly tend to the diforder and ruin of other Parts, and of the Whole it-felf; thro the necessary Connexion and Ballence of the Affections: That those very Passions thro which Men are vicious, are of themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatfoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill Confeiousness, and in proportion, as the Act is ill, must impair and corrupt focial Enjoyment, and deftroy both the Capacity of kind Affection, and the Confrientness of meriting any fuch. So that neither can we participate thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive Satisfaction from the mutual Kindness or imagin'd Love of others: on which howleverthe greatest of all our Pleasures are vfounded) to some warring, for what has been faid concerning

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2, 11sq Friendship, and Correspondence amongs IF this be the Case of moral Delinquency; and if the State which is confequent to this Defection from Nature, be of all other the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; 'twill appear, " That to " yield or confent to any thing ill or immo-"ral, is a Breach of Interest, and leads to " the greatest Ills:" and, " That, on the " other fide, Every thing which is an Im-" provement of Virtue, or an Establishment of " right Affection and Integrity, is an Ad-" vancement of Interest, and leads to the " greatest and most folid Happiness and En-" joyment of Life." vieve to Made ato IV

Thus the Wisdom of what rules, and is FIRST and CHIEF in Nature, has made it to be according to the private Interest and Good of every one, to work towards the general Good; which if a Creature ceases to promote, he is wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own Happiness and Welfare. He is, on this account, his own Enemy: Nor can he any otherwife be good or useful to himself, than as he is good to Society, and to that Whole of which he is himself a So that VIRTUE, which of all Excellencys and Beautys is the chief, and most amiable, that which is the Prop and Ornament of human Affairs; which upholds Communitys, maintains Union, Friend-

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Book 2. Friendship, and Correspondence amongst Men; that by which Countrys, as well as private Familys, flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great and worthy, must perish, and go to ruin; that single Quality, thus beneficial to all Society, and to Mankind in general, is found equally a Happiness and Good to each Creature in particular; and is that by which alone Mancan be happy, and without which he can

never but be miserable.

AND, thus, VIRTUE is the Good, and VICE the Ill of every one.

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


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MORALISTS,

A

Philosophical Rhapsody.

BEING

A RECITAL of certain.

Conversations on Natural and Moral Subjects.

-Inter Sylvas Academi quarere Verum. Horat. Ep. 2. Lib. 2.

Publish'd in the Year M. DCC. IX.

Vol. II.

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THE MORALISTS, &c.

PART I.

oblaids a powibly signification to this earlies we have PHILOCLES to PALEMON.



HO that had never heard your Character, PALEMON, cou'd imagine that a Genius fitted for the greatest Affairs, and form'd a-midst Courts

and Camps, shou'd have so violent a Turn towards Philosophy and the Schools? Who cou'd believe that one of your Rank and Credit in the fashionable World, shou'd

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Part 1. shou'd be so thorowly conversant in the learned one, and deeply interested in the Affairs of a People so disagreeable to the reigning Humour of the Age?

I Believe truly, You are the only well-bred Man who wou'd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle of good Company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your Coach together, in the Park. How you cou'd reconcile the Objects there, to such Subjects as these, was unaccountable. I cou'd only conclude, that either you had an extravagant Passon for Philosophy, to quit so many Charms for it; or that some of those tender Charms had an extravagant Effect, which sent you to Philosophy for Relies.

In either case I pity'd you; thinking it a milder Fate, to be, as I truly was, for my own part, a more indifferent Lover. 'Twas better, I told you, to admire Beauty and Wisdom a little more moderately.' Twas better to ingage so cautiously as to be sure of coming off with a whole Heart, and a Fancy as strong as ever towards all the pretty Entertainments and Diversions of the World. For these, methought, were things one wou'd not willingly part with, for a fine Romantick Passion

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in

Passion of one of those Gentlemen whom Sect. 1. they call'd Virtuoso's.

THE Name I took to belong in common to your Lover and Philosopher. No matter what the Object was; whether Poetry, Musick, Philosophy, or the Fair. All that were enamour'd in any way, were in the same Condition. You might perceive it (I told you) by their Looks, their Admiration, their profound Thought-sulness, their waking ever and anon as out of a Dream, their talking still of one thing, and scarce minding what they said on any other Subject.—Sad Indications!—

Bu't all this Warning serv'd not to deter you. For you, Palemon, are one of the Adventurous, whom Danger rather animates than discourages. And now nothing will satisfy you but to have our Philosophical Adventures recorded. All must be laid before you, and sum'd in one compleat Account; to remain, it seems, as a Monument of that unseasonable Conversation, so opposite to the reigning Genius of Gallantry and Pleasure.

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I MUST own, indeed, 'tis become fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks in every Company, and mix the Discourses M 4 fes

Part 1. fes of State-Affairs with those of Pleafure and Entertainment. However, 'tis certain we approve of no fuch Freedom in PHILOSOPHY. Nor do we look upon PHILO-Politicks to be of her Province, or in the SOPHY. least related to her. So much have we Moderns degraded her, and ftrip'd her of her chief Rights.

> You must allow me, PALEMON. thus to bemoan Philosophy; fince you have forc'd me to ingage with her at a time when her Credit runs fo low. We have immur'd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have fet her fervilely to fuch Works as those in the Mines. Empiricks, and Pedantick Sophists are her chief Pupils. The School-Syllogism, and the Elixir, are the choicest of her Products. So far is the from producing Statefmen, as of old, that hardly any Man of Note in the Publick cares to own the leaft Obligation to her. If some few maintain their Acquaintance, and come now and then to her Recesses, 'tis as the Disciple of Quality came to his Lord and Master; fecretly, and by Night.

Morals.

But as low as Philosophy is reduc'd; if Morals be allow'd belonging to her, Politicks must undeniably be hers. For to understand the Manners and Constitutions of Men in common, 'tis neces-

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fary to study Man in particular, and know Sect. 1. the Creature, as he is in himself, before we consider him in Company, as he is interested in the State, or join'd to any City or Community. Nothing is more familiar than to reason concerning Man in his Consederate State and National Relation; as he stands ingag'd to this or that Society, by Birth or Naturalization: Yet, to consider him as a Citizen or Commoner of the World, to search his Pedegree in Nature, and view his End and Constitution in it, must pass, it seems, for some intricate or over-refin'd Speculation.

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IT may be properly alledg'd perhaps, as a Reason for this general Shyness in Moral Inquirys; that the People to whom it has principally belong'd to handle thefe Subjects, have done it in fuch a manner as to put the better Sort out of countenance with the Undertaking. The appropriating this Concern to mere Scholafticks, has brought their Fashion and Air into the very Subject. There are formal Set-Places, where, we reckon, there is enough faid and taught on the Head of these graver Subjects. We can give no quarter to any thing like it in good Company. The least mention of such matters gives us a disgust, and puts us out of humour. If Learning comes a-cross us, we count it Pedantry; if Morality, 'tis Preach-ONE ing.

Part 1.
Language.

ONE must own this however as a real Difadvantage of our modern Conversations; that by fuch a scrupulous Nicety they lose those Masculine Helps of Learning and found Reason. Even the Fair Sex, in whose Favour we pretend to make this Condescension, may with reason defpife us for it, and laugh at us for aiming at their peculiar Softness. 'Tis no Compliment to them, to affect their Manners, and be effeminate. Our Sense, Language, and Style, as well as our Voice, and Perfon, shou'd have something of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughness, by which our Sex is distinguish'd. And whatever Politeness we may pretend to, 'tis more a Disfigurement than any real Refinement of Discourse, to render it thus delicate. content their a mer

Style.

No Work of Wit can be esteem'd perfect without that Strength and Boldness of Hand, which gives it Body and Proportions. A good Piece, the Painters say, must have good Muscling as well as Colouring and Drapery. And surely no Writing or Discourse, of any great moment, can seem other than enervated, when neither strong Reason, nor Antiquity, nor the Records of Things, nor the natural History of Man, nor any thing that can be call'd Knowledg, dares accompany it; except perhaps in some ridiculous Habit, which

which may give it an Air of Play and Sect. 1. Dalliance.

THIS brings to my Mind a Reason I have often fought for; Why we Moderns, who abound so much in Treatifes and Effays, are so sparing in the way of * DIA- DIA-LOGUE; which heretofore was found LOGUE. the politest and best way of managing even the graver Subjects. The truth is: 'twou'd be an abominable Falshood and belying of the Age, to put so much good Sense together in any one Conversation, as might hold out steddily, and with plain Coherence, for an hour's time, till any one Subject had been rationally examin'd.

To lay Colours, to draw, or describe. against the Appearance of Nature and Truth, is a Liberty neither permitted the Painter nor the Poet. Much less can the Philosopher have such a Privilege; especially in his own Case. If he represents his Philosophy as making any Figure in Conversation; if he triumphs in the Debate, and gives his own Wisdom the advantage over the World's; he may be liable

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^{*} See above Treatise III. Part 1. §. 3. And below, MISC. V. chap. 2.

Part 1. to found Raillery, and possibly be made a Fable of.

A Fable.

'Tis faid of the Lion, that being in civil Conference with the Man, he wifely refus'd to yield the Superiority of Strength to him, when instead of Fact, the Man produc'd only certain Figures and Reprefentations of human Victorys over the Lion-kind. These Master-pieces of Art the Beaft discover'd to be wholly of human Forgery: and from these he had good right to appeal. Indeed had he ever in his life been witness to any fuch Combats as the Man represented to him in the way of Art; possibly the Example might have mov'd him. But old Statues of a HERCULES, a THESEUS, or other Beaft-Subduers, cou'd have little power over him, whilft he neither faw nor felt any fuch living Antagonist capable to dispute the Field with him.

WE need not wonder, therefore, that the fort of Moral Painting, by way of Dialogue, is so out of fashion; and that we see no more of these Philosophical Portraitures, now-a-days. For where are the Originals? Or what tho you (PALE-MON) or I, by chance, have lighted on such a one; and pleas'd our-selves with the Life? Can you imagine it should make a good Picture?

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YOU know too, that in this Acu-Acadedemick Philosophy, which I am to present mists. you with, there is a certain way of Queftioning and Doubting, which no-wife futes the Genius of our Age. Men love to take Party instantly. They can't bear being kept in fuspence. The Examination torments'em. They want to be rid of it, upon the eastest terms. 'Tis as if Men fancy'd themselves drowning, whenever they dare trust to the Current of They feem hurrying away, Reason. they know not whither; and are ready to catch at the first Twig. There they chuse afterwards to hang, tho ever fo infecurely, rather than trust their Strength to bear em above Water. He who has got hold of an Hypothesis, how slight soever, is satisfy'd. He can presently answer every Objection, and, with a few Terms of Art, give an account of every thing without trouble.

'Tis no wonder if in this Age the Phi-Alchymists. losophy of the Alchymists prevails so much: since it promises such Wonders, and requires more the Labour of Hands than Brains. We have a strange Fancy to be Creators, a violent Desire at least to know the Knack or Secret by which Nature does all. The rest of our Philosophers do but

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Part 1. aim at that in Speculation, which our Alchymists aspire to in Practice. For with fome of these it has been actually under deliberation how to make Man, by other Mediums than Nature has hitherto provided. Every Sect has a Recipe. When you know it, you are Master of Nature: you solve all her Phanomena: you see all her Designs, and can account for all her Operations. If need were, you might, perchance too, be of her Laboratory, and work for her. At least one wou'd imagine the Partizans of each modern Sect had this Conceit. They are all ARCHI-MEDES's in their way; and can make a World upon easier Terms than he offer'd to move one.

Dogma-

In short; there are good Reasons for our being thus superficial, and consequently thus dogmatical in Philosophy. We are too lazy and esseminate, and withal a little too cowardly, to dare doubt. The decisive way best becomes our Manners. It sutes as well with our Vices as with our Superstition. Which-ever we are fond of, is secur'd by it. If in favour of Religion we have espous'd an Hypothesis, on which our Faith we think depends; we are superstitiously careful not to be loosen'd in it. If, by means of our ill Morals, we are broken with Religion; 'tis the same Case still: We are as much afraid

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afraid of Doubting. We must be sure to Sect. I. say, "It cannot be;" and "Tis Demon-" strable: For otherwise Who knows? And "not to know, is to yield!"—

Thus we will needs know every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing. Of all Philosophy, therefore, how absolutely the most disagreeable must that appear, which goes upon no establish'd Hypothesis, nor presents us with any flattering Scheme, talks only of Probabilitys, Sufpence of Judgment, Inquiry, Search, and Caution not to be impos'd on, or deceiv'd? This is that Academick Discipline in which Antients. formerly * the Youth were train'd: when not only Horsemanship and Military Arts had their Publick Places of Exercise; but Philosophy too had its Wrestlers in repute. Reason and Wit had their Academy, and underwent this Trial; not in a formal way, apart from the World; but openly, among the better fort, and as an Exercise of the genteeler kind. This the greatest Men were not asham'd to practise, in the Intervals of Publick Affairs, in the highest Stations and Employments, and at the latest hour of their Lives. Hence that way of DIALOGUE, and Patience of Debate and Reasoning, of which we have

^{*} Above, Treatise III. page 333, &c. and Notes.

Part 1. scarce a Resemblance left in any of our Conversations, at this season of the World.

CONSIDER then, PALEMON, what our Picture is like to prove : and how it will appear; especially in the Light you have unluckily chosen to set it. For who wou'd thus have confronted Philosophy with the Gaiety, Wit, and Humour of the Age?——If this, however, can be for your Credit, I am content. The Project is your own. 'Tis you who have match'd Philosophy thus unequally. Therefore leaving you to answer for the Success, I begin this inauspicious Work, which my ill Stars and you have affign'd me; and in which I hardly dare ask Succour of the Muses, as Poetical as I am oblig'd to shew my-felf in this Enterprize.

SECT. II.

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"OWRETCHED State of Mankind!—Haples Nature, thus
"to have err'd in thy chief Workman"fhip!—Whence sprang this fatal
"Weakness? What Chance or Destiny
"shall we accuse? Or shall we mind
"the Poets, when they sing thy Tragedy
"(PROMETHEUS!) who with thy stoln
"Celestial Fire, mix'd with vile Clay,
"didst

" didst mock Heaven's Countenance, and Sect. 2.

" in abusive Likeness of the Immortals \(\square\) " mad'st the Compound Man: that

" mad'st the Compound MAN; that "wretched Mortal, ill to himself, and

" Cause of Ill to all."

WHAT say you, PALEMON, to this Rant, now upon second thoughts? Or have you forgot 'twas just in such a romantick Strain that you broke out against Human Kind, upon a Day when every thing look'd pleasing, and the Kind it-self (I thought) never appear'd fairer, or made a better shew?

But 'twas not the whole Creation you thus quarrel'd with: Nor were you fo out of conceit with all Beauty. The Verdure of the Field, the distant Prospects, the gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form'd by a fetting Sun, had Charms in abundance, and were able to make impression on you. Here, PALEMON, you allow'd me to admire as much as I pleas'd; when at the same instant, you wou'd not bear my talking to you of those nearer Beautys of our own Kind, which I thought more natural for Men at our Age to admire. Your Severity however cou'd not filence me upon this Subject. I continu'd to plead the Cause of the Fair, and advance their Charms above all those other Beautys of Nature. And when you took ad-Vol. II. vantage

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Part 1. vantage from this Opposition, to shew how little there was of Nature, and how much of Art in what I admir'd, I made the best Apology I cou'd; and fighting for Beauty, kept the Field as long as there was one Fair-one present.

Gallantry.

Considering how your Genius flood inclin'd to Poetry, I wonder'd most to find you on a sudden grown so out of conceit with our Modern Poets, and Galante Writers; whom I quoted to you as Authoritys in behalf of the Fair Sex, and their Prerogative. You acknowledg'd it to be true indeed, what had been observ'd by some late Wits; "That Gale" LANTRY was of a modern Growth." And well it might be so, you thought, without dishonour to the Antients; who understood Truth and Nature too well to admit so ridiculous an Invention.

'Twas in vain, therefore, that I held up this Shield in my defence. I did my Cause no service, when in behalf of the Fair I pleaded all the fine things that are said usually, in this romantick way, to their advantage. You attack'd the very Fortress of Gallantry, ridicul'd the Point of Honour, with all those nice Sentiments and Ceremonials which belong to it. You damn'd even our Favourite Novels; those dear sweet natural Pieces, writ most of 'em

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'em by the Fair Sex themselves. In short, Sect. 2. this whole Order and Scheme of Wit you condemn'd absolutely, as false, monfrom, and Gothick; quite out of the way of Nature, and fprung from the mere Dregs of Chivalry and Knight-Errantry. For at a time when this Mystery of Gallantry carry'd along with it the Notion of doughty Knighthood; when the Fair were made Witnesses, and, in a manner, Partys to Feats of Arms, enter'd into all the Points of War and Combat, and were won by dint of Launce and manly Prowels; twas not altogether absurd (you thought) on fuch a foundation as this, to pay em Homage and Adoration, make em the Standard of Wit and Manners, and bring Mankind under their Laws. But in a Country where no She-Saints are worship'd by any Authority from Re-ligion, 'twas as impertinent and sensless, as it was profane, to deify the Sex, raise 'em to a Capacity above what Nature had allow'd, and treat 'em with a Respect which in the natural way of Love they themselves were the aptest to complain of.

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INDEED as for the Moral Part, 'twas most extraordinary (you said) to see the Licentiousness this foppish courtly Humour had establish'd in the World. What such a statering way of Address to all the Sex in common cou'd mean; you knew Yol. II.

Part 1. not; unless it were to render 'em wholly common indeed, and make each Fair-one apprehend that the Publick had a right to her; and that Beauty was too communicative and divine a Thing, to be made a Property, and confin'd to One at once.

MEAN while our Company began to leave us. The Beau-Monde, whom you had been thus feverely cenfuring, drew off apace: for it grew late. I took notice that the approaching Objects of the Night were the more agreeable to you, for the Solitude they introduc'd; and that the Moon and Planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only proper Company for a Man in your Humour. For now you began to talk with much Satisfaction of natural Things, and of all Orders of Beautys, MAN only excepted. Never did I hear a finer Description than you made of the Order of the Heavenly Luminarys, the Circles of the Planets, and their attendant Satellites. And you who wou'd allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminarys in the Circles which just now we mov'd in; you, PALEMON, who feem'd to overlook the Pride of that Theatre, began now to look out with Ravishment on this other, and triumph in the new Philosophical Scene of Worlds unknown. Here, when you had pretty unknown.

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well spent the first Fire of your Imagina-Sect. 2. tion, I wou'd have got you to reason more calmly with me upon that other Part of the Creation, your own Kind; to which (I told you) you discover'd so much A-Misan-version, as wou'd make one believe you a thropy. compleat TIMON, or Man-hater.

" CAN you then, O PHILOCLES, (faid you in a high strain, and with a moving air of Passion) " Can you be-" lieve me of that Character? Or can " you think it of me in earnest, that be-" ing MAN, and conscious of my Na-" ture, I shou'd have yet so little of Hu-" manity, as not to feel the Affections of " a Man? Or feeling what is natural to-" wards my Kind, that I shou'd hold " their Interest light, and be indifferently " affected with what affects or feriously " concerns them? Am I fo ill a Lover " of my Country? Or is it that you find me indeed so ill a Friend? For what " are all Relations else? What are the " Ties of private Friendship, if that to " Mankind be not obliging? Can there " be yet a Bond in Nature, if That be "none? O PHILOCLES! Believe me " when I fay I feel it one, and fully prove " its Power within me. Think not that "I wou'd willingly break my Chain: " Nor count me fo degenerate or unna-"tural, as whilft I hold this Form, and

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Part 1." wear a human Heart, that I shou'd throw off Love, Compassion, Kindness, and not befriend Mankind. But O what Treacherys! what Disorders! And how corrupt is all !- Did you not observe e'en now, when all this Space 66 was fill'd with goodly Rows of Company, how peaceful all appear'd? What Charms there are in publick Companys! What Harmony in Courts and Courtly Places! How pleas'd is every Face! How courteous and humane the general Carriage and Behaviour !-66 Who that thus faw us Mankind, and faw no more, wou'd not believe our Earth a very Heaven? What Foreigner (the Inhabitant, suppose, of some near Planet) when he had travel'd hither, and furvey'd this outward Face of things, wou'd think of what lay hid " beneath the Mask? --- But let him " stay a while. Allow him leisure; till " he has gain'd a nearer View, and fol-" lowing our diffoly'd Affemblys to their " particular Revesses, he has the power of " feeing 'em in this new Aspect. --- Here " he may behold those Great Men of the " Ministry, who not an hour ago in pub-" lick appear'd fuch Friends, now plot-" ting craftily each other's Ruin, with the "Ruin of the State it-felf, a Sacrifice to " their Ambition. Here he may fee too

" those of a softer kind, who knowing

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" not Ambition, follow only Love. Yet Sect. 2. " (PHILOCLES) who wou'd think it?

AT these words, you may remember I discover'd the foolish Lightness of my Temper, and laugh'd aloud; which I cou'd hardly hope you wou'd have pardon'd, but that I freely told you the true reason. It was not for want of being affected with what you spoke. I only imagin'd a more particular Cause had provok'd you, when having pass'd over the Ambitious, you were coming full-charg'd against the People of a softer Passion. At first, I look'd on you as deeply in the Spleen: But now I concluded you in Love, and so unhappily ingag'd as to have reafon to complain of Infidelity. " thought I, has mov'd PALEMON thus. " Hence the fad World! Here was that " Corruption, and those Disorders he la-" mented!"

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AFTER I had beg'd pardon for my cause of rude Mirth, which had the good fortune III. however to make some Change in your Humour; we fell naturally into cool Reasoning about the Nature and Cause of ILL in general: "Thro what Continugency, what Chance; by what fatal New cessity, what Will, or what Permission it came upon the World; or being come N 4." once,

Part 1. " once, shou'd still subsist." This * Inquiry, which with slight Reasoners is easily got over, stuck hard, I found, with one of your close Judgment and Penetration. And this insensibly led us into a nice Criticism of NATURE; whom you sharply arraign'd for many Absurditys you thought her guilty of, in relation to Mankind, and his peculiar State.

FAIN wou'd I have perfuaded you to think with more Equality of NATURE, and to proportion her Defects a little better. My Notion was, that the Grievance lay not altogether, in one part, as you plac'd it; but that every thing had its share of Inconvenience. Pleasure and Pain, Beauty and Deformity, Good and Ill feem'd to me every-where interwoven; and one with another made, I thought, a pretty Mixture, agreeable enough, in the main. 'Twas the fame, I fancy'd, as in fome of those rich Stuffs, where the Flowers and Ground were oddly put together, with fuch irregular Work, and contrary Colours, as look'd ill in the Pattern, but mighty natural and well in the Piece.

But you were still upon Extremes. Nothing wou'd serve to excuse the Faults fli

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^{*} Treatife IV. in the Beginning.

or Blemishes of this Part of the Creation, Sect. 2. MANKIND; even the all besides were fair, without a Blemish. The very Storms and Tempests had their Beauty in your account, those alone excepted which arose in Human Breasts. 'Twas only for this turbulent Race of Mortals you offer'd to accuse Nature. And I now found why you had been fo transported with the Story of PROMETHEUS. You wanted fuch an Operator as this for Mankind: And you were tempted to wish the Story cou'd have been confirm'd in modern Divinity; that clearing the Supreme Powers of any Concern or Hand in the ill Workmanship, you might have the liberty of inveighing against it, without Profaneness.

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This however, I told you, was but a flight Evasion of the Religious Poets among the Antients. 'Twas easy to answer every Objection by a Prometrheus: as, "Why had Mankind originally so much Folly and Perverseness?" Why so much Pride, such Ambition, and strange Appetites? Why so many Plagues, and Curses, entailed on him and his Posterity?"—Prometheus was the Cause. The Plastick Artist, with his unlucky hand, solv'd all. "Twas His Contrivance (they said) and He was to answer for it." They reckon'd it a fair Game, if they cou'd gain a single Remove,

Part 1. Remove, and put the Evil Cause farther off. If the People ask'd a Question, they Cause of told'em a Tale, and fent 'em away fatiffy'd. None but a few Philosophers wou'd be fuch Bufy-bodys (they thought) as to look beyond, and ask a fecond Quef-Race of Mortals you offer moit

> AND in reality, continu'd I, 'tis not to be imagin'd how ferviceable a Tale is, to amuse others besides mere Children; and how much easier the Generality of Men are paid in this Paper-Coin, than in Sterling Reason. We ought not to laugh so much at the Indian Philosophers, who to satisfy their People how this huge Frame of the World is supported, tell 'em 'tis by an Elephant. And the Elephant how? ---- A shrewd Question! but which by no means shou'd be answer'd. 'Tis here only that our Indian Philosophers are to blame. They shou'd be contented with the Elephant, and go no further. But they have a Tortoile in referve; whose Back, they think, is broad enough. So the Tortoise must bear the new Load: And thus the matter stands worse than before.

THE Heathen Story of PROMETHEUS was, I told you, much the same with this Indian one: only the Heathen Mythologitts were fo wife as not to go beyond the first Remove. A fingle PROMETHEUS

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was enough to take the Weight from Sect. 2. Jove. They fairly made Jove a Stander-by. He resolv'd, it seems, to be Neuter; and see what wou'd come of this notable Experiment; how the dangerous Man-moulder wou'd proceed; and what wou'd be the Event of his Tamperring. - Excellent Account, to fatisfy the Heathen Vulgar! But how, think you, wou'd a Philosopher digest this? "For the Gods (he wou'd fay presently)
"either cou'd have hinder'd PROME-" THEUS'S Creation, or they cou'd not. " If they cou'd, they were answerable " for the Consequences; if they cou'd " not, they were no longer Gods, being " thus limited and controul'd. And whe-" ther PROMETHEUS were a Name for " Chance, Destiny, a Plastick Nature, or " an Evil Demon; whatever was defign'd " by it, 'twas still the same Breach of "OMNIPOTENCE."

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THAT such a hazardous Assair as this of Creation shou'd have been undertaken by those who had not perfect Foresight as well as Command, you own'd was neither wise nor just. But you stood to Foresight. You allow'd the Consequences to have been understood by the Creating Powers, when they undertook their Work: and you deny'd that it wou'd have been better for them to have omitted it; tho they

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Part 1. they knew what wou'd be the Event.

"Twas better still that the Project shou'd be executed, whatever might become of Mankind, or how hard so ever such a Creation was like to fall on the generality of this miserable Race.

"For 'twas impossible, you thought, but Heaven must have acted still for the best. So that even from this Misery and Ill of Man, there was undoubtedly some Good arising; something which over-ballanc'd all, and made sull amends."

THIS was a Confession I wonder'd indeed how I came to draw from you: And foon afterwards I found you fomewhat uneafy under it. For here I took up your own part against you, and setting all those Villanys and Corruptions of Human Kind in the fame light you had done just before, I put it upon you to tell, where possibly cou'd be the Advantage or Good arifing hence; or what Excellence or Beauty cou'd redound from those Tragical Pictures you your-felf had drawn fo well after the Life. Whether it must not be a very strong Philosophical Faith, which shou'd persuade one that those dismal Parts you fet to view were only the necessary Shades of a fine Piece, to be reckon'd among the Beautys of the Creation:

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upon that Maxim as very fit for Heaven, which I was fure you did not approve at all in Mankind; "To do ILL, that GOOD "might follow."

THIS, I said, made me think of the manner of our modern PROMETHEUS'S, the Mountebanks, who perform'd fuch Wonders of many kinds, here on our earthly Stages. They cou'd create Diseases, and make Mischief, in order to heal, and to refore. But shou'd we assign such a Practice as this to Heaven? Shou'd we dare to make fuch Empiricks of the Gods, and fuch a Patient of poor Nature? "Was "this a reason for Nature's Sickliness? " Or how else came she (poor Innocent!) " to fall fick, or run aftray? Had she been " originally healthy, or created found at " first; she had still continu'd so. 'Twas " no Credit to the Gods to leave her de-" stitute, or with a Flaw which wou'd " cost dear the mending, and make them "Sufferers for their own Work."-

I Was going to bring Homer to witness for the many Troubles of Jove, the Death of Sarpedon, and the frequent Crosses Heaven met with, from the Fatal Sisters. But this Discourse, I saw, displeas'd you. I had by this time plainly discover'd my Inclination to Scep-

TICISM

Part I. TICISM. And here not only Religion Scepticism. was objected to me, but I was reproach'd too on the account of that Gallantry which I had fome time before defended. Both were join'd together in the Charge you made against me, when you faw I adher'd to nothing: but was now as ready to declaim against the Fair, as I had been before to plead their Cause, and defend the Moral of Lovers. This, you faid, was my constant way in all Debates: I was as well pleas'd with the Reafon on one side, as on the other: I never troubl'd my-felf about the Success of the Argument, but laugh'd still, whatever way it went; and even when I convinc'd others, never feem'd as if I was convinc'd myfelf.

I Own'd to you, Palemon, there was Truth enough in your Charge. For above all things I lov'd Ease; and of all Philosophers those who reason'd most at their Ease, and were never angry or disturb'd; as those call'd Scepticks, you own'd, never were. I look'd upon this kind of Philosophy as the prettiest, agreeablest, roving Exercise of the Mind that cou'd be. The other kind, I thought, was painful and laborious; "To keep "always in the Limits of one Path; to drive always at a Point; and hold pre cisely to what Men, at a venture, call'd "The

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"THE TRUTH: A Point, in all appea- Sect. 2. " rance, very unfixt, and hard to afcer-" tain." Besides, my Way hurt no body. I was always the first to comply on any occasion; and for Matters of Religion, was further from Profaneness and erroneous Doctrine than any one. I cou'd never have the Sufficiency to shock my Spiritual and Learned Superiours. I was the furthest from leaning to my own Underitanding: nor was I one who exalted Reason above Faith, or insisted much upon what the Dogmatical Men call Demonstration, and dare oppose to the Sacred Mysterys of Religion. And to shew you (continu'd I) how impossible 'tis for the Men of our fort ever to err from the Catholick and Establish'd Faith, pray consider; That whereas Others pretend to fee with their own Eyes, what is properest and best for 'em in Religion; We, for our parts, pretend not to fee with any other than those of our Spiritual Guides. Neither do we prefume to judg those Guides our-felves; but submit to them, as they are appointed us by our just Superiours, In short, you who are Rationalists, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilft you believe little or nothing: We for our parts know nothing, and believe all. ... to all ANAH Fancy is only to try what I can

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Part 1.

HERE I ended; and in return, you only ask'd me coldly, "Whether with "that fine Scepticism of mine, I "made no more distinction between Sin"cerity and Infincerity in Actions, than I

" cerity and Infincerity in Actions, than I did between Truth and Falshood, Right

" and Wrong, in Arguments?"

I Durst not ask what your Question drove at. I was afraid I saw it too plainly; and that by this loose way of talking, which I had learnt in some fashionable Conversations of the World, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst fort of Scepticism, such as spar'd nothing; but overthrew all Principles Divine and Moral.

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FORGIVE me (said I) good PALE-MON: you are offended, I see, and not without cause. But what if I shou'd endeavour to compensate my Sceptical Misbehaviour, by using a known Sceptick Privilege, and asserting strenuously the Cause I have hitherto oppos'd? Do not imagine that I dare aspire so high as to defend Reveal'd Religion, or the Holy Mysterys of the Christian Faith. I am unworthy of such a Task, and shou'd profane the Subject. 'Tis of mere Philosophy I speak: And my Fancy is only to try what I can muster

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can ster muster up thence, to make head against Sect. 3. the chief Arguments of Atheism, and reestablish what I have offer'd to loosen in the System of Theism.

" Whatever your Thoughts are, Philo-Your Project, said you, bids fair to Deism. reconcile me to your Character, which I was beginning to mistrust. For as averse as I am to the Cause of Theism, or Name of DEIST, when taken in a fense exclufive of Revelation; I consider still that, instrictness, the Root of all is THEISM; and that to be a fettled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good THEIST. For Theism can only be opposed to Polytheism, or Atheism. Nor have I patience to hear the Name of DEIST (the highest of all Names) decry'd, and fet in opposition to Christianity. " As if our Religion " was a kind of Magick, which depended " not on the Belief of a fingle Supreme "Being. Or as if the firm and rational " Belief of fuch a Being, on Philosophi-" cal Grounds, was an improper Qualifi-" cation for believing any thing further." Excellent Presumption, for those who naturally incline to the Disbelief of Revelation, or who thro Vanity affect a Freedom of this kind!

Bur let me hear (continu'd you) whether in good Earnest, and thorow Sincerity, you intend to advance any thing in Yol. II. O favour

Part 1. favour of that Opinion which is fundamental to all Religion; or whether you Deism. delign only to divert your-felf with the Subject, as you have done hitherto? " Whatever your Thoughts are, Philo-" CLES, Iam refolv'd to force 'em from " you. You can no longer plead the Un-" furableness of the Time or Place to such " grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is " over with the Day. Our Company " have long fince quitted the Field. And " the folemn Majesty of such a Night as "this, may justly fute with the pro-" foundest Meditation, or most serious " Discourse."

THUS, PALEMON, you continu'd to urge me; till by necessity I was drawn into the following Vein of Philosophical Enthusiasm.

Idolom SECT. III.

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YOU shall find then, said I (taking a grave Air) that it is possible for me to be serious; and that it is probable I am growing so, for good and all. Your Over-seriousness a while since, at such an unseasonable Time, may have driven me perhaps into a contrary Extreme, by opposition to your melancholy Humour. But I have now a better Idea of that Melancholy

the humorous Turn you were pleas'd to give it, I am perfuaded it has a different Foundation from any of those fantastical Causes I then assign'd to it. "Love, Love." doubtless, is at the bottom: but a not bler Love than such as common Beautys inspire."—

Here, in my Turn, I began to raise my Voice, and imitate the solemn way you had been teaching me. "Knowing as you are, continu'd I, well-knowing and experienc'd in all the Degrees and Orders of Beauty, in all the mysterious Beauty." Charms of the particular Forms; you rise to what is more general; and with a larger Heart, and Mind more comprehensive, you generously seek that which is highest in the kind. Not captivated by the Lineaments of a fair Face, or the well-drawn Proportions of a human Body, you view the Life it-self, and embrace rather the Mind which adds the Lustre, and renders chiefly amiable.

"No R is the Enjoyment of such a sin-society."

"gle Beauty sufficient to satisfy such an aspiring Soul. It seeks how to combine more Beautys, and by what Coalition."

"of these, to form a beautiful Society."

It views Communitys, Friendships, Re-Vol. II.

O 2 "lations,

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Part 1. " lations, Dutys; and confiders by what " Harmony of particular Minds the ge-" neral Harmony is compos'd, and Com-" mon-Weal establish'd.

"Nor fatisfy'd even with Publick " Good in one Community of Men, it " frames it-felf a nobler Object, and with " enlarg'd Affection feeks the Good of Man-Virtue. " kind. It dwells with Pleasure amidst " that Reason, and those Orders on which " this fair Correspondence and goodly In-" terest is establish'd. Laws, Constitu-" tions, Civil and Religious Rites, all " that civilizes or polishes rude Mankind, " the Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Mo-" rals, Virtue; the flourishing State of "human Affairs, and the Perfection of " human Nature; these are its delightful " Prospects, and this the Charm of Beau-" ty which attracts it.

Universe.

sic lations,

"STILL ardent in this Pursuit (such " is its Love of Order and Perfection) it " rests not here; nor satisfys it-self with " the Beauty of a Part; but extending " further its communicative Bounty, feeks " the Good of All, and affects the Interest " and Prosperity of the Whole. True to " its native World and higher Country, " 'tis here it feeks Order and Perfection; " wishing the best, and hoping still to " find a just and wise Administration.

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Sect. 3.

"And fince all Hope of this were vain GOD.

"and idle, if no Universal Mind presided;

"since without such a supreme Intelli-

" gence and providential Care, the dif-" tracted Universe must be condemn'd to

" fuffer infinite Calamitys; 'tis here the " generous Mind labours to discover that

" healing Cause by which the Interest of

" the Whole is securely establish'd, the

"Beauty of Things, and the universal

" Order happily fustain'd.

"THIS, PALEMON, is the Labour III natural of your Soul: and This its Melancho-and moral.

" ly; when unfuccessfully pursuing the fupreme Beauty, it meets with dark-

" ning Clouds which intercept its Sight.
" Monsters arise, not those from Libyan

" Defarts, but from the Heart of Man " more fertile; and with their horrid Af-

" pect cast an unseemly Resection upon

"NATURE. She, helpless (as she is thought) and working thus absurdly, is

"contemn'd, the Government of the

"World arraign'd, and DEITY made

by Man; avog inches ours laborate to

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"Much is alledg'd in answer, to "show why Nature errs, and how she came thus impotent and erring from an "warming Hand Part I done the errs."

"unerring Hand. But I deny she errs;

and when she feems most ignorant or

O 3 "perverse

perverse in her Productions, I assert her Part 1." even then as wife and provident, as in Ill natural and moral. her goodlieft Works. For 'tis not then that Men complain of the World's Order, or abhor the Face of Things, when they fee various Interests mixt and interfering; Natures subordinate, of different kinds, oppos'd one to another, and in their different Operations fubmitted, the higher to the lower. Tis on the contrary, from this Order of in-66 feriour and funeriour Things, that we admire the * World's Beauty, founded thus on Contrarietys: whilf from fuch " various and difagreeing Principles, a " Universal Concord is establish'd.

"Thus in the several Orders of Ter"restrial Forms, a Resignation is required,
"a Sacrifice and mutual yielding of Na"tures one to another. The Vegetables
"by their Death sustain the Animals:
"and Animal-Bodys dissolved enrich the
"Earth, and raise again the Vegetable
"World. The numerous Infects are re"duc'd by the superiour Kinds of Birds
"and Beasts: and these again are check'd
"by Man; who in his turn submits to
"other Natures, and resigns his Form a
"Sacrifice in common to the rest of Things.

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^{*} See MISC. V. chap. 1. towards the end, what is cited in the Notes from the antient Author on the World.

"And if in Natures so little exalted or Sect. 3.
"pre-eminent above each other, the Sa"crifice of Interests can appear so just;
"how much more reasonably may all inferiour Natures be subjected to the superiour Nature of the World! That World,
"PALEMON, which even now transported you, when the Sun's fainting
"Light gave way to these bright Constel-

" lations, and left you this wide System

" to contemplate. " to contemplate.

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"HERE are those Laws which ought " not, nor can fubmit to any thing be-" low. The Central Powers, which hold " the lasting Orbs in their just Poize and " Movement, must not be controul'd to " fave a fleeting Form, and rescue from " the Precipice a puny Animal, whose " brittle Frame, howe'er protected, must " of it-felf fo foon dissolve. The am-" bient Air, the inward Vapours, the " impending Meteors, or whatever else " is nutrimental or preservative of this " Earth, must operate in a natural Course: " and other Conflitutions must submit to " the good Habit and Constitution of the " all-fustaining Globe.

"LET us not therefore wonder, if
by Earthquakes, Storms, pestilential
Blasts, nether or upper Fires, or Floods,
the animal Kinds are oft afflicted, and
O 4 "whole

Part 1." whole Species perhaps involv'd at once in common Ruin: But much less let Ill natural " in common Ruin: But much less let and moral." us account it strange, if either by outward Shock, or some interiour Wound from hostile Matter, particular Animals " are deform'd even in their first Concep-" tion, when the Disease invades the Seats of Generation, and feminal Parts " are injur'd and obstructed in their accu-" rate Labours. 'Tis then alone that monstrous Shapes are seen: Nature still " working as before, and not perverfly or " erroneoully; not faintly, or with feeble " Endeavours; but o'erpower'd by a su-" periour Rival, and by another Nature's " justly conquering Force. O milled and

"Nor need we wonder, if the inte"riour Form, the Soul and Temper, par"takes of this occasional Deformity, and
"sympathizes often with its close Partner.
"Considering the Strictness of this Rela"tion, who can wonder, if from a Body
"originally impure, corrupt, distorted, a
"like Soul arises? Who is there can won"der either at the Sicknesses of Sense, or
"the Depravity of Minds inclosed in such
"frail Bodys, and dependent on such
"pervertible Organs?

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Good.

[&]quot;HERE then is that Solution you re"quire: and hence those seeming Ble"mishes cast upon Nature. Nor is there
"ought

" ought in this but what is natural and Sect. 3. "good. 'Tis Good that is predominant; " and every corruptible and mortal Na" ture by its Mortality and Corruption
" yields only to fome better, and all in
" common to that best and highest Nature,
" which is incorruptible and immortal."

I SCARCE had ended these Words, e'er you broke out in admiration; asking what had befall'n me, that of a sudden I had thus chang'd my Character, and enter'd into Thoughts which must certainly, you suppos'd, have some Foundation in me, since I cou'd express them with such seeming Affection as I had done.

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O, SAID I, PALEMON! that it had been my fortune to have met you the other day, just at my Return out of the. Country, from a Friend whose Conversation had in one day or two made such an Impression on me, that I shou'd have suted you to a Miracle. You wou'd have thought indeed that I had been cur'd of my Scepticism and Levity, so as never to have rally'd more, at that wild rate, on any Subject, much less on these which are so serious.

TRULY, said you, I cou'd wish I had met you rather at that time, or that those good

Part 1. good and ferious Impressions of your Friend had without interruption lasted with you till this moment.

WHATEVER they were, I told you,
PALEMON, I had not so lost 'em neither,
but I cou'd easily, as you saw, revive 'em
on occasion; were I not asraid. Asraid!
said you. For whose sake, good PhiLocles, I intreat you? For mine, or
your own? For both, reply'd I. For
the I was like to be perfectly cur'd of my
Scepticism; 'twas by what I thought worse,
Enthusiass. You never knew
a more agreeable Enthusiasm. You never knew

WERE he my Friend (faid you) I shou'd hardly treat him in so free a manner. Nor shou'd I, perhaps judg that to be Enthusiasm which you so freely term so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure him. Nor can I be fatisfy'd till I hear surther of that serious Conversation for which you tax him as Enthusiastick.

I Must confess (said I) he had nothing of that savage Air of the vulgar Enthusiastick Kind. All was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleasing Transports of those antient Poets you are often charm'd with, than after the sierce unsociable way of modern

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modern Zealots; those starch'd gruff Gen-Section tlemen, who guard Religion as Bullys do a Miftress, and give us the while a very indifferent Opinion of their Lady's Merit and their own Wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be inspected by others, nor care themselves to examine in a fair light. But here I'll answer for it; there was nothing of Difguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as Nature her-felf. Twas Nature he was in love with : 'Twas Nature he fung: And if any one might be faid to have a natural Mistress, my Friend certainly might, whose Heart was thus ingag'd. But Love, I found, was every where the fame. And tho the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created very noble; yet Liberty, I thought, was finer than all: And I who never car'd to ingage in other Loves of the least continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of this which had fuch a power with my poor Friend, as to make him appear the perfecteft En-THUSIAST in the world, ill Humour only excepted. For this was fingular in him, "That tho he had all of the Enthusiast, " he had nothing of the Bigot. He heard " every thing with Mildness and Delight; " and bore with me when I treated all " his Thoughts as visionary; and when, " Sceptick-like, I unravel'd all his Syf-" tems."

HERE

modern Zealots; those flerched gruff Go

Part I.
Entbusiast.

HERE was that Character and Description which so highly pleas'd you, that you wou'd hardly fuffer me to put an end to it. Twas impossible, I found, to give you fatisfaction, without reciting the main of what pass'd in those two Days between my Friend and Me, in our Country-Retirement. Again and again I bid you beware: "You knew not the danger of this Philo-" sophical Passion; nor consider'd what you " might possibly draw upon your-felf, " and make me the Author of. I was " far enough engag'd already: and you " were pushing me further, at your own "hazard" yray caw bnuot fame. And the the Obied

ALL I cou'd say made not the least impression on you. But rather than proceed any further this night, I engag'd, for your sake, to turn Writer, and draw up the Memoirs of those two Philosophical Days; beginning with what had pass'd this last Day between our-selves; as I have accordingly done (you see) by way of Introduction to my Story.

BY this time, being got late to Town, fome hours after the latest of our Company, you set me down at my own Lodging; and thus we bad Good-night.

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PHILOCLES to PALEMON.

dilant Country, which prefenced a poin

A FTER such a Day as Yesterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awak'd the next Morning, to find my-self under positive Engagements of proceeding in the same Philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms than ever. For 'twas no longer the agreeable Part of A Companion that I had now to bear. Your Conversation, PALEMON, which had hitherto supported me, was at an end. I was now alone; confin'd to my Closet; oblig'd to meditate by my-self; and reduc'd to the hard Circumstances of an Author, and Historian, in the difficultest Subject.

But here, methought, propitious Heaven, in some manner, assisted me. For if Dreams were, as Homer teaches, sent from the Throne of Jove; I might conclude

Part 3 clude I had a favourable one, of the true fort, towards the Morning-light; which, as I recollected my-felf, gave me a clear and perfect Idea of what I desir'd so earnestly to bring back to my Memory.

I FOUND my-felf transported to a distant Country, which presented a pompous rural Scene. It was a Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adorn'd with antient Wood, and at its foot a River and well-inhabited Plain: beyond which the Sea appearing, clos'd the Prospect.

No fooner had I confider'd the Place, than I discern'd it to be the very same where I had talk'd with THEOCLES the fecond Day I was with him in the Country. I look'd about to fee if I cou'd find my Friend; and calling THEOCLES! I awak'd. But so powerful was the Impression of my Dream, and so perfect the Idea rais'd in me, of the Person, Words, and Manner of my Friend, that I cou'd now fancy my-felf philosophically inspir'd, as that ROMAN Sage by his AGERIA, and invited, on this occasion, to try my Historical Muse. For justly might I hope for fuch Assistance in behalf of THE-OCLES, who fo lov'd the Mufes, and was, I thought, no less belov'd by them.

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Sect. 1.

TO RETURN therefore to that original rural Scene, and that Heroick GE NIUS, the Companion and Guide of my first Thoughts in these profounder Subjects: I found him the first Morning with his belov'd Mantuan Muse, roving in the Fields: where, as I had been inform'd at his House, he was gone out, after his usual way, to read. The moment he faw me. his Book vanish'd, and he came with friendly haste to meet me. After we had embrac'd, I discover'd my Curiosity to know what he was reading; and ask'd, " if it were of a fecret kind, to which I " cou'd not be admitted?" On this he shew'd me his Poet; and looking pleafantly, Now tell me truly, faid he, PHI-LOCLES, did you not expect some more mysterious Book than this? I own'd I did; confidering his Character, which I took to be of so contemplative a kind. And do you think, faid he, that without being contemplative, one can truly relish these Diviner Poets? Truly (said I) I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the World, to read VIRGIL or Ho-RACE.

You have nam'd Two, faid he, who Retirecan hardly be thought so very like; tho ment. they ment.

Part 2. they were Friends, and equally good Poets. Yet joining 'em, as you are pleas'd to do, I wou'd willingly learn from you, whether in your opinion there be any Difpolition fo fitted for reading 'em, as that in which they writ themselves. In this I am fure they both join'd heartily; to love Retirement: when for the fake of fuch a Life and Habit as you call contemplative. they were willing to facrifice the highest Advantages, Pleafures, and Favour of a Court. But I will venture to fay more in favour of Retirement: " That not only " the best Authors, but the best Company, " require this seasoning." Society it-self cannot be rightly enjoy'd without some Abstinence and separate Thought. All grows infipid, dull, and tirefom, without the help of some Intervals of Retirement. Say, PHILOCLES, whether You your-felf have not often found it fo? Do you think those Lovers understand the Interests of their Loves, who by their goodwill wou'd never be parted for a moment? Or wou'd they be discreet Friends, think you, who wou'd chuse to live together on fuch Terms? What Relish then must the World have (that common World of mix'd and undistinguish'd Company) without a little Solitude; without stepping now and then aside, out of the Road and beaten Track of Life, that tedious Circle of Noise and Show, which forces weary'd

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weary'd Mankind to seek relief from every Sect. 1.

Satisfaction is inconfiant. The By your Rule, faid I, THEOCLES, there shou'd be no such thing as Happiness or Good in Life, fince every Enjoyment wears out fo foon; and growing painful, is diverted by some other thing; and that again by some other; and so on. I am fure, if Solitude be as a Remedy or Diversion to any thing in the World, there is nothing but what may ferve as Diversion to Solitude; which wants it more than any thing besides. And thus there can be no Good which is regular or constant. Happiness is a thing out of the way, and never to be found but in wandring. I be staff norming of

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O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, I rejoice Happiness. to find you in the pursuit of Happiness and Good: however you may wander. Nay, tho you doubt whether there be that Thing; yet if you reason, 'tis sufficient; there is hope still. But see how you have unawares engag'd your-self! For if you have destroy'd all Good, because in all you can think of, there is nothing will constantly hold so; then you have set it as a Maxim (and very justly in my Opinion) "That "Nothing can be Good but what is Constant."

Vol. II. A Ba P. Dan et I Own,

Part 2.

Happiness.

Good.

I Own, faid I, that all I know of worldly Satisfaction is inconstant. The Things which give it, are never at a stay: and the Good it-felf, whatever it be, depends no less on Humour than on Fortune. For that which Chance may often spare, Time will not. Age, Change of Temper, other Thoughts, a different Passion, new Engagements, a new Turn of Life, or Conversation, the least of these are fatal, and alone fufficient to destroy Enjoyment. Tho the Object be the same, the Relish changes, and the short-liv'd Good expires. But I shou'd wonder much if you cou'd tell me any thing in Life that was not of as changeable a Nature, and subject to the same common Fate of Satiety and Difgust.

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Pleasure.

I FIND then, reply'd he, that the current Notion of Good is not sufficient to satisfy you. You can afford to scepticize, where no one else will so much as hesitate. For almost every one philosophizes dogmatically on this Head. All are positive in this, "That our real Good is PLEASURE."

"Is they wou'd inform us "Which (faid "I) or What fort," and afcertain once the very Species and distinct Kind; such as must

must constantly remain the same, and equally Sect. 1. eligible at all times; I shou'd then perhaps be better fatisfy'd. But when Will and Pleasure are synonymous; when every thing that pleases us is call'd PLEASURE, and we never chuse or prefer but as we please, 'tis trifling to say, " Pleasure is our Good." For this has as little meaning as to fay, " We chuse what we think eligible:" and, "We are pleas'd with what de-" lights or pleases us." The Question is, "Whether we are rightly pleas'd, and " chuse as we shou'd do?" For as highly pleas'd as Children are with Baubles, or with whatever affects their tender Senses; we cannot in our Hearts fincerely admire their Enjoyment, or imagine 'em Possessors of any extraordinary Good. Yet are their Senses, we know, as keen and susceptible of Pleasure as our own. The same Reflection is of force as to mere Animals. who in respect of the Liveliness and Delicacy of Sensation, have many of 'em the advantage of us. And as for some low and fordid Pleasures of Human Kind; shou'd they be ever so lastingly enjoy'd, and in the highest credit with their Enjoyers; I shou'd never afford 'em the name of Happiness or Good.

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Wou'd you then appeal, faid he, from the immediate Feeling and Experience of Vol. II. P 2 one Part 2. one who is pleas'd, and fatisfy'd with what Pleasure. he enjoys Rond buoil De comin lla la sant ne berrer farisft'd. But when Will and

Most certainly I shou'd appeal, said I. For is there that fordid Creature on earth, who does not prize his own Enjoyment? Does not the frowardest, the most rancorous distemper'd Creature do as much? Is not Malice and Crueky of the highest relish with some Natures? Is not a hoggish Life the height of some Mens Wifnes? You wou'd not ask me furely to enumerate the feveral Species of Sensations, which Men of certain Tastes have adopted, and own'd for their chief Pleasure and Delight. For with some Men even Diseases have been thought valuable and worth the cheriffing, mereby for the Pleasure found in allaying the Ardor of an irritating Sensation. And to these absurd Epicures those other are near a-kin, who by fludy'd Provocatives raife unnatural Thirst and Appetite, and to make way for fresh Repletion, prepare Emeticks, as the last Desert; the sooner to renew the Feast. 'Tis said, I know, proverbially, "That Tastes are different, and " must not be disputed." And I remember fome fuch Motto as this plac'd once on a Devise, which was found sutable to the Notion. A Fly was represented feeding on a certain Lump. The Food, however 900

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was no Absurdity in the case. But shou'd you shew me a brutish or a barbarous Man thus taken up, and folac'd in his Pleasure; shou'd you shew me a Sot in his solitary Debauch, or a Tyrant in the Exercise of his Cruelty, with this Motto over him, to forbid my Appeal; I shou'd hardly be brought to think the better of his Enjoyment: Nor can I possibly suppose that a mere fordid Wretch, with a base abject Soul, and the best Fortune in the World, was ever capable of any real Enjoyment.

By this Zeal, reply'd THEOCLES, which you have shewn in the resuting a wrong Hypothesis, one wou'd imagine you had in reality some Notion of a right; and began to think that there might possibly be such a thing at last as Good.

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THAT there is something nearer to Good, and more like it than another, I am free, said I, to own. But what real Good is, I am still to seek, and must therefore wait till you can better inform me. This I only know; "That either "All Pleasure is Good, or only Some." If All, then every kind of Sensuality must be precious and desirable: If Some only, then we are to seek, what Kind; and discover,

Part 2. cover, if we can, what it is that distinguishes between one Pleasure and another; and makes one indifferent, forry, mean; another valuable, and worthy. And by this Stamp, this Character, if there be any fuch, we must define Good; and not by Pleasure it-self; which may be very great, and yet very contemptible. Nor can any one truly judg the Value of any immediate Senfation, otherwise than by judging first of the Situation of his own Mind. For that which we esteem a Happiness in one Situation of Mind, is otherwise thought of in another. Which Situation therefore is the justest, must be consider'd; " How " to gain that Point of Sight, whence pro-" bably we may best discern; and How " to place our-selves in that unbias'd " State, in which we are fittest to pro-" nounce."

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, if this be unfeignedly your Sentiment; if it be possible you shou'd have the Fortitude to with-hold your Assent in this Assair, and go in search of what the meanest of Mankind think they already know so certainly; 'tis from a nobler Turn of Thought than what you have observ'd in any of the modern Scepticks you have convers'd with For if I mistake not, there are hardly anywhere at this day a fort of People more peremp

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peremptory, or who deliberate less on the Sect. 1. choice of Good. They who pretend to fuch a Scrutiny of other Evidences, are the readiest to take the Evidence of the greatest Deceivers in the World, their own Passions. Having gain'd, as they think, a Liberty from some seeming Constraints of Religion, they suppose they employ this Liberty to Perfection, by following the first Motion of their Will, and assenting to the first Dictate or Report of any anticipating * Fancy, any foremost Opinion or Conceit of Good. So that their Privilege is only that of being perpetually amus'd; and their Liberty that of being impos'd on in their most important Choice. I think one may fay with affurance, " That the " greatest of Fools is he who imposes on " himself, and in his greatest Concern " thinks certainly he knows that which he " has least study'd, and of which he is " most profoundly ignorant." He who is ignorant, but knows his Ignorance, is far wifer. And to do justice to these fashionable Men of Wit; they are not all of 'em, indeed, so insensible as not to perceive fomething of their own Blindness and Abfurdity. For often when they ferioufly reflect on their past Pursuits and Engagements, they freely own, " That for what " remains of Life, they know not whe-

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^{*} Above, Treatise III. page 320, &c.

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Part 2." ther they shall be of a piece with themPleasure. "felves; or whether their Fancy, Humour,
" or Passion will not hereafter lead em to
" a quite different Choice in Pleasure,
" and to a Disapprobation of all that ever
" they enjoy'd before."—Comfortable
Resection!

To bring the Satisfactions of the Mind, continu'd he, and the Enjoyments of Reason and Judgment under the Denomination of PLEASURE, is but a Collusion, and a plain receding from the common Notion of the word. They deal not fairly with us, who in their Philosophical hour, admit that for Pleasure, which at an ordinary time, and in the common Practice of Life, is so little taken for such. The Mathematician who labours at his Problem, the Bookish Man who toils, the Artist who endures voluntarily the greatest Hardships and Fatigues; none of these are said " To follow Pleasure." Nor will the Men of Pleasure by any means admit 'em to be of their number. The Satisfactions which are purely mental, and depend only on the Motion of a Thought; must in all likelihood be too refin'd for the Apprehensions of our modern Epicures, who are fo taken up with Pleasure of a more substantial kind. They who are full of the Idea of fuch a sensible solid Good, can have but a slender Fancy for the mere fairitual and intellectual fort. riner

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fort. But'tis this latter they fet up and Sect. 1. magnify upon occasion; to fave the Ignominy which may redound to 'em from the former. This done, the latter may take its chance: Its Use is presently at an end. For 'tis observable, that when the Men of this fort have recommended the Enjoyments of the Mind under the Title of Pleafure; when they have thus dignify'd the Word, and included in it all that is mentally good or excellent, they can afterwards fuffer it contentedly to slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar Sense; whence they rais'd it only to serve a Turn. When Pleasure is call'd in question, and attack'd, then Reason and Virtue are call'd in to her Aid, and made principal parts of her Constitution. A complicated Form appears, and comprehends strait all that is generous, honest, and beautiful in human Life. But when the, Attack is over, and the Objection once folv'd, the Specter vanishes: Pleasure returns again to her former Shape: She may e'en be Pleasure still, and have as little concern with dry fober Reason, as in the nature of the thing, and according to common Understanding, she really has. For if this rational fort of Enjoyment be admitted into the Notion of Good, how is it possible to admit withal that kind of Senfation which in effect is rather opposite to this Enjoyment? 'Tis certain that in respect

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Pleasure the Eagerness and Irritation of mere Pleasure and Pain. Sure, is as disturbing as the Importunity and Vexation of Pain. If either throws the Mind off its Biass, and deprives it of the Satisfaction it takes in its natural Exercise and Employment; the Mind in this Case must be Sufferer as well by one as by the other. If neither does this; there is no harm on either side.—

By the way, faid I, interrupting him; As fincere as I am in questioning "Whe"ther PLEASURE be really Good;" I am not such a Sceptick as to doubt "Whe"ther PAIN be really III."

WHATEVER is grievous, reply'd he, can be no other than ILL. But that what is grievous to one, is not fo much as troublesom to another; let Sportsmen, Soldiers, and others of the hardy Kinds be witness. Nay, that what is Pain to one, is Pleasure to another, and so alternately, we very well know: fince Men vary in their Apprehension of these Sensations, and on many occasions confound one with the other. Has not even Nature her-self, in some respects, as it were blended 'em together, and (as a wife Man faid once) " join'd the Extremity of " one so nicely to the other, that it absolutely

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" lutely runs into it, and is undistingui-Sect. 1.
" shable?"

IN FINE then, faid I, If Pleasure and Pain be thus convertible and mix'd; if, according to your Account, " That " which is now Pleasure, by being strain'd " a little too far, runs into Pain, and Pain " when carry'd far, creates again the " highest Pleasure, by mere Cessation, and " a kind of natural Succession; If some " Pleasures to some are Pains, and some " Pains to others are Pleasures:" All this, if I mistake not, makes still for my Opinion, and shows That there is nothing you can affign which can really stand as GOOD. For if Pleasure be not GOOD, Good. nothing is. And if Pain be ILL (as I must necessarily take for granted) we have a shrewd Chance on the ill side, indeed, but none at all on the better. So that we may fairly doubt, " Whe-" ther LIFE it-self be not mere Mise-" ry;" fince Gainers by it we can never be: Losers we may sufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our Lives. Accordingly, what our English Poetess says of Good, shou'd be just and proper: "'Tis Good not to be born." - And thus for any thing of Good which can be expected in Life, we may e'en "Beg pardon of Na-"ture; and return her Present on her " hands,

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ty of absoately Part 2. " hands, without waiting for her Call."
For what shou'd hinder us? or What are we the better for Living?

THE Query, faid he, is pertinent. But why fuch Dispatch, if the Case be doubtful? This, furely (my good PHILO-CLES!) is a plain Transgression of your Sceptical Bounds. We must be sufficiently Dogmatical to come to this Determination. 'Tis a deciding as well concerning Death as Life; "What possibly may be hereaf-" ter, and What not." Now to be affur'd that we can never be concern'd in any thing bereafter, we must understand perfectly what it is that concerns or engages us in any thing present. We must truly know our-selves, and in what this SELF of ours confifts. We must determine against Pre-existence, and give a better reafon for our having never been concern'd in ought before our Birth, than merely " Because we remember not, nor are con-" scious." For in many Things we have been concern'd to purpose, of which we have now no Memory or Consciousness remaining. And thus we may happen to be again and again, to perpetuity, for any reason we can show to the contrary. All is Revolution in us. We are no more the felf-same Matter, or System of Matter, from one day to another. What Suc-

cession there may be hereafter, we know

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not; fince even now, we live by Succession, Sect. 1. and only perish and are renew'd. Tis in Good. vain we flatter our-felves with the Affurance of our Interest's ending with a certain Shape or Form. What interested us at first in it, we know not; any more than how we have fince held on, and continue still concern'd in such an Assemblage of fleeting Particles. Where belides, Futurity. or in What else we may have to do, perchance, in time to come, we know as little; nor can tell how Chance or Providence. hereafter, may dispose of us. And if Providence be in the case, we have still more reason to consider how we undertake to be our own Disposers. It must needs become a Sceptick above all Men to helitate in Matters of Exchange. And the he acknowledges no prefent Good or Enjoyment in Life, he must be sure, however, of bettering his Condition, before he attempts to alter it. But as yet, PHILOCLES, even this Point remains undetermin'd between us: "Whether in Good. " this present Life there be not such a "thing as real Good."

BE you therefore (said I) my Instructor, sagacious THEOCLES! and inform me "What that GOOD is, or Where, "which can afford Contentment and Sa-"tissaction always alike, without varia-"tion Part 2. "tion or diminution." For the on fome Occasions, and in some Subjects, the Mind may possibly be so bent, and the Passion so wrought up, that for the time no bodily Sufferance or Pain can alter it; yet this is what can feldom happen, and is unlikely to last long: fince without any Pain or Inconvenience, the Passion in a little time does its own work, the Mind relaxes with its Bent, and the Temper weary'd with Repetition finds no more Enjoyment, but runs to something new.

HEAR then! faid THEOCLES. For tho I pretend not to tell you at once the Nature of this which I call Good; yet I am content to shew you fomething of it, in your-felf, which you will acknowledg to be naturally more fix'd and constant, than any thing you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my Friend! if ever you were weary of doing good to those you lov'd? Say when you ever found it Friendship. unpleasing to serve a Friend? Or whether when you first prov'd this generous Pleafure, you did not feel it less than at this present; after so long Experience? Believe me, PHILOCLES, this Pleasure is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do good, but it came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, or Gratitude, or Bounty

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Bounty practis'd but with increasing Joy, Sect. 1. which made the Practifer still more in love with the fair Act. Answer me, Philo-Friendship Cles, you who are such a Judg of Beau-private, ty, and have so good a Taste of Pleasure; Is there any thing you admire, so fair as Friendship? or any thing so charming as a generous Action? What wou'd it be therefore, if all Life were in reality but one continu'd Friendship, and cou'd be made one such intire Act? Here surely wou'd be that six'd and constant Good you sought. Or wou'd you look for any thing beyond?

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PERHAPS not, said I. But I can never, surely, go beyond this, to seek for a Chimera, if this Good of yours be not thorowly chimerical. For tho a Poet may possibly work up such a single Action, so as to hold a Play out; I can conceive but very faintly how this high Strain of Friendship can be so manag'd, as to fill a Life. Nor can I imagine where the Object lies of such a sublime Heroick Passion.

CAN any Friendship, said he, be so Heroick, as that towards Mankind? Do you think the Love of Friends in general, and of one's Country, to be nothing? or that particular Friendship can well subsist without such an enlarg'd Affection, and Sense of Obligation to Society? Say (if possible) you are a Friend, but hate your Country.

private,

Part 2. Country. Say, you are true to the Interest Friendship of a Companion, but false to that of Society. Can you believe your-felf? Or will you lay the Name aside, and refuse to be call'd the Friend, fince you renounce the Is there any thing you admire, 109 RAM

or any thing to charming as

THAT there is fomething, faid I, due to Mankind, is what I think will not be disputed by one who claims the Name of Friend. Hardly indeed cou'd I allow the Name of Man to one who never cou'd call or be call'd Friend. But he who justly proves himself a Friend, is MAN enough; nor is he wanting to Society. A fingle Friendship may acquit him. He has deferv'd a Friend, and is Man's Friend; tho not in strictness, or according to your high moral Sense, the Friend of Mankind. For to fay truth, as to this fort of Friendship; it may by wifer Heads be efteem'd perhaps more than ordinarily Manly, and even Heroick, as you affert it: But for my part, I fee fo very little Worth in Mankind, and have so indifferent an Opinion of the Publick, that I can propose little Satisfaction to my-felf in loving either.

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Do you, then, take Bounty and Gratitude to be among the Acts of Friendship and Good-Nature? Undoubtedly: For they are the chief. Suppose then, Gratitude. that the oblig'd Person discovers in the Obliger

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Obliger several Failings; does this ex-Sect. 1. clude the Gratitude of the former? Not in the least. Or does it make the Exertife of Gratitude less pleasing? I think rather the contrary. For when depriv'd of other means of making a Return, I shou'd rejoice in that fure way of shewing my Gratitude to my Benefactor, by bearing his Failings as a Friend. as to Bounty: Tell me, I befeech you, is Bounty. it to those only who are deserving that we shou'd do good? Is it only to a good Neighbour, or Relation, a good Father, Child, or Brother? Or does Nature, Reafon, and Humanity better teach us, to do good still to a Father, because a Father; and to a Child, because a Child; and fo to every Relation in Human Life? I think, faid I, this last is rightest.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, consider then what it was you said, when you objected against the Love of Mankind because of Human Frailty; and seem'd to scorn the Publick, because of its Missfortunes. See if this Sentiment be consistent with that Humanity which elsewhere you own and practise. For where can Generosity exist, if not here? Where can we ever exert Friendship, if not in this chief Subject? To what shou'd we be true or Love of grateful in the World, if not to Mankind, Mankind. and that Society to which we are so deep-Vol. II.

Part 2. ly indebted? What are the Faults or Blemishes which can excuse such an Omission, or in a grateful Mind can ever les-

Goodbreeding.

fion, or in a grateful Mind can ever leffen the Satisfaction of making a grateful kind Return? Can you then out of Goodbreeding merely, and from a Temper natural to you, rejoice to shew Civility, Courteousness, Obligingness, seek Objects of Compassion, and be pleas'd with every Occurrence where you have power to do fome Service even to People unknown? Can you delight in fuch Adventures abroad in foreign Countrys, or in the cafe of Strangers here at home; to help, affift, relieve all who require it, in the most hospitable, kind, and friendly manner? And can your Country, or what is more, your KIND, require less Kindness from you, or deserve less to be consider'd, than even one of these Chance-Creatures?-O PHILOCLES! how little do you know the Extent and Power of Good-Nature, and to what an Heroick pitch a Soul

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Represent and Power of Good-Nature, and to what an Heroick pitch a Soul may rife, which knows the thorow Force of it, and distributing it rightly, frames in it-felf an equal, just, and universal Friendship!

JUST as he had ended these Words, a Servant came to us in the Field, to give notice of some Company, who were come with the Intention, as we supposed, to dine

or here? Where can we ever

dine with us. So we walk'd home-wards. Sect. 1. I told The ocles, going along, that I fear'd I shou'd never make a good Friend or Lover after his way. As for a plain natural Love of one single Person in either Sex, I cou'd compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex universal sort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the Individual, but not the Species. This Mossical was too Mysterious; too Metaphysical Love. an Object for me. In short, I cou'd love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image.

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How! reply'd THEOCLES, can you never love but in this manner? when yet I know that you admir'd and lov'd a Friend long e'er you knew his Person. Or was PALEMON'S Character of no Force, when it engag'd you in that long Correspondence which preceded your late. The Fact personal Acquaintance? (said I) I must, of necessity, own to you. And now, methinks, I understand your Mystery, and perceive how I must prepare for it: For in the same manner as when I first began to love PALEMON, I was forc'd to form a kind of material Object, and had always fuch a certain Image of him, ready-drawn, in my Mind, whenever I thought of him; fo I must endeavour to order it in the Case before us: if possibly by your help I can raise any fuch Vol. II.

Part 2. fuch Image, or Specter, as may represent this odd Being you wou'd have me love.

METHINKS, said he, you might have the same Indulgence for NATURE or MANKIND, as for the People of old ROME; whom, notwithstanding their Blemishes, I have known you in love with, many ways; particularly under the Representation of a beautiful Youth call'd Genius of the GENIUS of the People. For I reacountry, member, that viewing once some Pieces of Antiquity, where the People were thus represented, you allow'd 'em to be no disagreeable Object.

Nature.

INDEED, reply'd I, were it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as you speak of, whether it stood for Mankind or Nature, it might probably have its essect; and I might become perhaps a Lover after your way: But more especially, if you cou'd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to sancy of this Genius, that it cou'd be "sensible of my Love, and ca-" pable of a Return." For without this, I shou'd make but an ill Lover, tho of the persectest Beauty in the World.

Tis enough, faid THEOCLES; I accept the Terms: And if you promise to love, I will endeavour to show you that BEAUTY

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BEAUTY which I count the perfectest, Sect. 2. and most deserving of Love; and which will not fail of a Return. To-morrow, when the Eastern Sun (as Poets describe) with his first Beams adorns the Front of yonder Hill; there, if you are content to wander with me in the Woods you fee, we will purfue those Loves of ours, by favour of the Silvan Nymphs: and invoking first the Genius of the Place, we'l try to obtain at least some faint and distant View of the Sovereign GENIUS and First Genius of Beauty. This if you can come once to the World. contemplate, I will answer for it, that all those forbidden Features and Deformitys, whether of Nature or Mankind, will vanish in an instant, and leave you that Lover I cou'd wish .- But now, enough!-Let us to our Company; and change this Conversation for some other more sutable to our Friends and Table.

SECT. II.

ner lo. Elfeyou had f

YOU fee here, PALEMON, what a Foundation is laid for the Enthusiasms I told you of; and which, in my Opinion (I told you too) were the more dangerous, because so very odd, and out of the way. But Curiosity had seiz'd you, I perceiv'd, as it had done me before. For after this first Conversation, I must own, I long'd for

Part 2. for nothing fo much as the next day, and the appointed Morning-Walk in the Woods.

WE had only a Friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we difcours'd of News and indifferent things, till I who had my Head ftill running upon those other Subjects, gladly laid hold of formething dropt by chance concerning Friendship. Friendship; and faid, That for my own part, truly, the I once thought I had known Friendship, and really counted myfelf a good Friend during my whole Life; yet I was now perfuaded to believe myfelf no better than a Learner: since THEocles had almost convinced me, "That " to be a Friend to any one in particular, "'twas necessary to be first a Friend to Mankind." But how to qualify myfelf for such a Friendship, was, methought, no little difficulty. Add I bus thered mo of

INDEED, said THEOCLES, you have given us a very indifferent Character of your-self, in saying so. If you had spoken thus of the Friendship of any Great Man at Court, or perhaps of a Court it-self, and had complain'd "How hard it was "for you to succeed, or make Interest with such as governed there; "we should have concluded in your behalf, that there were such Terms to be comply'd with, as were unworthy of you. But "To

"To deserve well of the Publick," and Sect. 2.

"To be justly stil'd the Friend of Man-virtue.

kind," requires no more than to be

Good and Virtuous; Terms which for one's
own sake one wou'd naturally covet.

How comes it then, said I, that even motives. these good Terms themselves are so ill accepted, and hardly ever taken but upon further Terms? For VIRTUE, by it-self, is thought but an ill Bargain: and I know sew, even of the Religious and Devout, who take up with it any otherwise than as Children do with Physick; where the Rod and Sweetmeat are the potent Motives.

THEY are Children indeed, reply'd THEOCLES, and shou'd be treated so, who need any Force or Persuasion to do what conduces to their Health and Good. But, where, I beseech you, are those forbidding Circumstances which shou'd make Virtue go down so hardly? Is it not, among other things, that you think yourself by this means precluded the fine Tables and costly Eating of our modern Epicures; and that perhaps you fear the being reduc'd to eat always as ill as now, upon a plain Dish or two, and no more?

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This, I protested, was injuriously suppos'd of me. For I wish'd never to eat Q 4 otherwise Part 2. otherwise than I now did, at his Table; which, by the way, had more resemblance (I thought) of Epicurus's, than those which now-a-days preposterously pass'd under his name. For if his Opinion might be taken, the highest Pleafures in the World were owing to Temperance, and moderate Use.

Tempe-

IF then the merest Studier of Pleasure, (answer'd THEOCLES) even EPICU-Rus himself, made that favourable Report of Temperance, so different from his modern Disciples; if he cou'd boldly say, "That with such Fare as a mean Garden " afforded, he cou'd vie even with the " Gods for Happiness;" how shall we fay of this part of Virtue, that it needs be taken upon Terms? If the immediate Practice of Temperance be thus harmless; are its Consequences injurious? Does it take from the Vigour of the Mind, confume the Body, and render both the one and the other less apt to their proper Exercises, " the Enjoyments of Reason or " Sense, or the Employments and Offices " of Civil Life?" Or is it that a Man's Circumstances are the worse for it, as he stands towards his Friends, or Mankind? Is a Gentleman in this sense to be pity'd, " As One burdenfom to himself, and o-" thers; One whom all Men will naturally " shun, as an ill Friend, and a Corrupter other wife

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" of Society and Good Manners?"-Shall Sect. 2. we confider our Gentleman in a publick Trust, and see whether he is like to succeed best with this restraining Quality; or whether he may be more rely'd on, and thought more incorrupt, if his Appetites are high, and his Relish strong towards that which we call Pleasure? Shall we confider him as a Souldier, in a Campain, or Siege; and advise with our-felves how we might be best defended, if we had occasion for such a one's Service? "Which " Officer wou'd make the best for the " Souldiers; Which Souldier for the Offi-" cers; or Which Army for their Coun-" try?" What think you of our Gentleman, for a Fellow-Traveller? Wou'd he, as a temperate Man, be an ill Choice? Wou'd it indeed be more eligible and delightful "To have a Companion, who, "in any shift or necessity, wou'd prove the " most ravenous, and eager to provide in " the first place for himself, and his own " exquisite Sensations?"—I know not what to fay where Beauty is concern'd. Perhaps the amorous Galants, and exquisite Refiners on this fort of Pleafure, may have fo refin'd their Minds and Tempers, that, notwithstanding their accustom'd Indulgence, they can, upon occasion, renounce their Enjoyment, rather than violate Honour, Faith, or Justice.—And thus, at last, there will be little Virtue or Worth afcrib'd

Part 2. ascrib'd to this patient sober Character.

"The dull temperate Man is no fitter to be trusted than the elegant luxurious one.

"Innocence, Youth, and Fortune may be as well committed to the Care of this latter Gentleman. He wou'd prove as good an Executor, as good a Trustee, as good a Guardian, as he wou'd a Friend.

"The Pamily which entrusted him wou'd be secure; and no Dishonour, in any likelihood, wou'd happen from the homest Man of Pleasure."

THE Seriousness with which THEocles spoke this, made it the more pleasant; and set our other Company upon faying a great many good things on the fame Subject, in commendation of a temperate Life. So that our Dinner by this time being ended, and the Wine, according to Cuftom, plac'd before us; I found ftill we were in no likelihood of proceeding to a Debauch. Every one drank only as he fancy'd, in no Order or Proportion, and with no regard to circular Healths or Pledges: A Manner which the sociable Men of another Scheme of Morals wou'd have cenfur'd, no doubt, as a heinous Irregularity, and Corruption of Good-Feltheir Enjoyment, rather than viol.qualqualnone, Faith, or Indice .- And thus, at

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cono au col lao uragua T fichem Sed. 2. I Own (faid I) I am far from thinking TEMPERANCE to disagreeable a Character. As for this part of Virtue, I think there is no need of taking it on other Terms, than the mere Advantage of being fav'd from Intemperance, and from the Defire of things unnecessary in ha made repredent it to your-felt with a thomand

How! faid THEOCLES, are you thus far advanc'd? And can you carry this Temperance so far as to Estates and Honours, by opposing it to Avarice and Ambition? Nay, then truly, you may be faid to have fairly embark'd your-felf in this Cause. You have pass'd the Channel, and are more than half-Seas over. There remains no further Scruple in the case of Virtue, unless you will declare your-self a Coward, or conclude it a Happiness to be born one. For if you can be temperate withal towards LIFE, and think it not fogreat a business, whether it be of fewer or more Years; but fatisfy'd with what you have liv'd, can rife a thankful Gueft from a full liberal Emertainment; Is not this the Sum of all? the finishing Stroke and very Accomplishment of Virtue? In this Temper of Mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for our-felves as Heroick a Character as we please? What is there either Good, Generous, or Great, that does not naturally flow from fuch a modest

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Part 2. modest TEMPERANCE? Let us once gain this simple plain-look'd Virtue, and fee whether the more shining Virtues will not follow. See what that Country of the Mind will produce, when by the wholesom Laws of this Legislatress it has obtain'd LIBER- its Liberty! You, PHILOCLES, who are TT. fuch an Admirer of Civil Liberty, and can civil. represent it to your-felf with a thousand feveral Graces and Advantages; can you imagine no Grace or Beauty in that original Native Liberty, which fets us free from fo many in-born Tyrannys, gives us the Privilege of our-felves, and makes us our own, and Independent? A fort of Property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which fecures us our Lands, or Revenues.

> Virtues unlets you will declare wourself I Shou'd think, faid he (carrying on his Humour) that one might draw the Picture of this Moral Dame to as much advantage as that of her Political Sifter; whom you admire, as describ'd to us " in " her AMAZON-Dreft, with a free manly " Air becoming her; her Guards the " Laws, with their written Tables, like " Bucklers, furrounding her; Riches, " Traffick, and Plenty, with the Cornu-" copia, serving as her Attendants; and " in her Train the Arts and Sciences, like " Children, playing." The rest of the Piece is easy to imagine: " Her Triumph « over

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" over Tyranny, and lawless Rule of Sect. 2. " Lust and Passion."—But what a Triumph wou'd her Sifter's be! What Monfters of favage Passions wou'd there appear fubdu'd! " There fierce Ambition, " Lust, Uproar, Mis-rule, with all the " Fiends that rage in Human Breafts, " wou'd be fecurely chain'd. And when " Fortune her-self, the Queen of Flatterys, " with that Prince of Terrors, Death, " were at the Chariot-wheels, as Cap-" tives; how natural wou'd it be to fee " Fortitude, Magnanimity, Justice, Honour, and all that generous Band attend as " the Companions of our inmate Lady "LIBERTY! She, like fome new-born "Goddess, wou'd grace her Mother's " Chariot, and own her Birth from hum-" ble Temperance, that nursing Mother of " the Virtues; who like the Parent of "the Gods (old Reverend CYBELE) " wou'd properly appear drawn by rein'd "Lions, patient of the Bit, and on her " Head a Turret-like Attire: the Image " of defensive Power, and Strength of

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" Mind."

BY this Picture THEOCLES, I found, had given Entertainment to the Company; who from this rough Draught of his, fell to designing upon the same Subject, after the antient manner; till PRODUCUS

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Part 2. DICUS and CEBES, and all the Antients were exhaufted. " Luft and Paffon,"___

S be! What I VIRTUE. GENTLEMEN, said I, the Descriptions you have been making, are, no doubt, the finest in the world: But after all, when you have made Virtue as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will bring you an authentick Picture of another kind, where we shall see this Triumph in Reverse; " VIRTUE her-felf a Captive in her " turn; and by a proud Conqueror tri-" umph'd over, degraded, spoil'd of all " her Honours, and defac'd; so as to re-" tain hardly one fingle Feature of real "Beauty." Sil bild INTERSI.

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" Goddels, wou'd grace her M I OFFER'D to go on further, but cou'd not, being so violently decry'd by my two Fellow-Guests; who protested they wou'd never be brought to own so detestable a Picture: And one of 'em (a formal fort of Gentleman, somewhat advanc'd in Years) looking earnestly upon me, faid, in an angry Tone, " That he had hither-" to, indeed, conceiv'd fome hopes of " me; notwithstanding he observ'd my " Freedom of Thought, and heard me quo-" ted for such a passionate Lover of Li-" berty: But he was forry to find that my " Principle of Liberty extended in fine to " a Liberty from all Principles" (so he expres'd himself) " And none, he thought, " but

"but a Libertine in Principle wou'd ap-Sect. 2.
"prove of fuch a Picture of Virtue, as

" only an Atheist cou'd have the impu-

" dence to make."

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post to Vitue though be Regretore THEOCLES the while fat filent; tho he faw I minded not my Antagonist, but kept my Eye fix'd steddily on himself, expecting to hear what he wou'd fay. At last, fetching a deep Sigh, O PHILO-CLES, faid he, how well you are Mafter of that Cause you have taken on you to defend! How well you know the way to gain advantage to the worst of Causes, from the imprudent Management of those who defend the best !--- I dare not, for my own share, affirm to you, as my worthy Friends have done, "That 'tis the " Atheist alone can lay this load on Virtue, " and picture her thus difgracefully."— No—There are other officious and lefs fuspected Hands that do her perhaps more injury, the with a better colour.

THAT Virtue shou'd, with any Shew of Reason, be made a Victim (continu'd he, turning himself to his Guests) must have appear'd strange to you, no doubt, to hear afferted with such assurance as has been done by Philocles. You cou'd conceive no tolerable ground for such a Spectacle. In this revers'd Triumph you expected perhaps to see some foreign Conqueror

Part 2. queror exalted; as either Vice it-felf, of Pleasure, Wit, spurious Philosophy, or some false Image of Truth or Nature. Little

Religion

were you aware that the cruel Enemy opend Virtue. pos'd to Virtue shou'd be RELIGION it-felf! But you will call to mind, that even innocently, and without any treacherous delign, Virtue is often treated fo, by those who wou'd magnify to the utmost the Corruption of Man's Heart; and in exposing, as they pretend, the Falshood of Human Virtue, think to extol Religion. How many Religious Authors, how many Sacred Orators turn all their edge this way, and strike at Moral Virtue as a kind of Step-Dame, or Rival to RELIGION! - " Morality must not be nam'd; Nature

" has no pretence; Reason is an Enemy; " Common Justice but Folly; and Virtue Mi-

" fery. Who wou'd not be vicious, had

" he his Choice? Who wou'd forbear, but

" because he must? Or who wou'd value

" Virtue, but for Hereafter?-

TRULY, faid the old Gentleman (interrupting him) if this be the Triumph of Religion, 'tis fuch as her greatest Enemy, I believe, wou'd scarce deny her: and I must still be of Opinion (with PHILO-CLES's leave) that it is no great fign of Tenderness for Religion, to be so zealous in honouring her at the cost of Virtue.

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For V P.c. 1998 Conver himself fully noon thefe Subjects:

PERHAPS fo, faid I. Yet that there are many fuch Zealots in the World, you will acknowledg. And that there is a certain Harmony between this Zeal and what you call Atheism, THEOCLES, you Atheism. hear, has allow'd. - But let us hear him out; if perhaps he will be so free as to discover to us what he thinks of the generality of our Religious Writers, and their Method of encountring their common Enemy, the Atheist. This is a Subject which possibly may need a better clearing. For 'tis notorious that the chief Oppofers of Atheism write upon contrary Principles to one another, so as in a manner to confute themselves. Some of 'em hold zealously for Virtue, and are Realists in the Point. Others, one may fay, are only MORAnominal Moralists, by making Virtue no-LISTS, thing in it-felf, a Creature of Will only, or Real. a mere Name of Fashion. 'Tis the same, in Natural Philosophy: Some take one Natura. Hypothesis, and some another. I shou'd lists. be glad to discover once the true Foundation; and fee, at last, who they are that effectually refute their other Antagonists as well as the Atheifts, and rightly affert the joint-Cause of Virtue and Religion.

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HERE, PALEMON, I had my Wish.
For by degrees I ingag'd THEOCLES to
Vol. II. R discover

Part 2. discover himself fully upon these Subjects;

which serv'd as a Prelude to those we were to ingage in, the next Morning; for the approach of which I so impatiently long'd. If his Speculations prov'd of a rational kind, this previous Discourse (I knew) wou'd help me to comprehend 'em; if but pleasing Fancys, this wou'd help me however to please my-self the better with 'em.

HERE then began his Criticism of Authors; which grew by degrees into a continu'd Discourse. So that had this been at a University, Theoches might very well have pass'd for some grave Divinity-Professor, or Teacher of Ethicks, reading an Afternoon-Lecture to his Pupils.

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Divinity.

happy Cause that cou'd have the benefit of such Managers as shou'd never give their Adversarys any handle of advantage against it. I cou'd wish that in the Cause of Religion we had reason to boast as much. But since 'tis not impossible to write ill even in the best of Causes, I am inclin'd to think this great one of Religion may have run at least an equal hazard with any other; since those who write in desence of it are apt generally to use so much

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exempt from the fear of Censure or Criticism in their own Person. Their Adversary is well secur'd and silenc'd to their hand. They may safely provoke him to a Field where he cannot appear openly, or as a profess'd Antagonist. His Weapons are private, and can often reach the Cause without offence to its Maintainers; whilst no direct Attack robs them of their imaginary Victory. They conquer for themselves, and expect to be approved still for their Zeal, however the Cause it-self may have suffered in their hands.

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PERHAPS then, faid I, (interrupting him) it may be true enough, what was faid once by a Person who seem'd zealous for Religion, "That none writ well against "the Atheists but the Clerk who drew the Atheist." Warrant for their Execution."

If this were the true Writing, reply'd he, there wou'd be an end of all Dispute or Reasoning in the Case. For where Force is necessary, Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean while must be laid aside: For there is no Enforcement of Reason but by Reason. And therefore if Atheists are to be reason'd with, at all; they are to be reason'd with, like other Vol. II. R 2 Men;

Part 2. Men; since there's no other way in nature to convince em.

This I own, faid I, seems rational and just: But I'm afraid that most of the devout People will be found ready to abandon the patient, for the more concise Method. And the perhaps Force without Reason may be thought somewhat hard, yet your other way of Reason without Force, I am apt to think, wou'd meet with sewer Admirers.

But perhaps, reply'd THEOCLES, 'tis a mere Sound that troubles us. Word or Name of Atheist may possibly occasion some Disturbance, by being made to describe two Characters so very different as His who absolutely denies, and His who only doubts. Now he who doubts, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness, and wish to be convinc'd. He who denies, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an Opinion against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society. 'Tis eafily feen that one of these Persons may bear a due respect to the Magistrate and Laws, tho not the other; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former is punishable by Man, will be hard to fay; unless the Magistrate had dominion over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power to exercise

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Punishment. exercise an Inquisition within the inmost Sect. 3.
Bosoms and secret Thoughts of Men.

I APPREHEND you, faid I. And by your account, as there are two forts of People who are call'd Atheists, so there are two ways of Writing against them, which may be fitly us'd apart, but not fo well jointly. You wou'd fet aside mere Menaces, and separate the Philosopher's Work from the Magistrate's; taking it for Magigranted, that the more discreet and sober strate. part of Unbelievers who come not under the dispatching Pen of the Magistrate. can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one of Philosophy. Now the Language of the Magistrate, I must confess, has little in common with that of Philosophy. Nothing can be more unbecoming the Magisterial Authority than a Philosophical Stile: and nothing can be more unphilosophical than a Magisterial one. A Mixture of these must needs spoil And therefore, in the Cause before us, " If any one besides the Magi-" strate can be said to write well; 'tis HE " (according to your account) who writes " as becomes Philosophy, with Freedom " of Debate, and Fairness towards his " Adversary."

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ALLOW it, reply'd he. For what can be more equitable? Nothing. But R 3 will

And may this Method of writing be justly practised in it? Undoubtedly it may. And for a Proof, we have many Instances in Antiquity to produce. The Freedom philosophy. taken in this Philosophical way was never esteemed injurious to Religion, or prejudicial to the Vulgar: since we find it to have been a Practice both in Writing and Converse among the Great Men of a Virtuous and Religious People; and that even those who officiated at the Altars, and were the Guardians of the publick Worship, were Sharers in these free Debates.

if I presume to say, that still this reaches not the Case before us. We are to consider Christian Times, such as are now present. You know the common Fate of Jealous of those who dare to appear fair Authors. What was that Pious and Learned Man's Case, who writ the Intellectual System of the Universe? I confess it was pleasant enough to consider, that tho the whole World were no less satisfy'd with his Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity in the Cause of Deity; yet was he accus'd of giving the upper hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their Reasons, and those of their Adversarys, fairly together. And among other Writings of this kind, you may remember how a certain

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tain Fair INQUIRY (as you call'd it) Sect. 3. was receiv'd, and what offence was taken at it.

I Am forry, faid THEOCLES, it prov'd fo. But now indeed you have found a way which may, perhaps, force me to discourse at large with you on this head; by entering the Lists in defence of a Friend unjustly censur'd for this Philosophical Liberty.

I CONFEST to THEOCLES and the Company, that this had really been my Aim: And that for this reason alone I made my-self the Accuser of this Author; "Whom I here actually charg'd, as I did all those other moderate calm Writers, with no less than Profaneness, for reasoning so unconcernedly and patiently, "without the least shew of Zeal or Pas-

" fion, upon the Subject of a Deity, and " a future State."

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rin AND I, on the other side, reply'd THEocles, am rather for this patient way of Reasoning, and will endeavour to clear my Friend of this Imputation; if you can have patience enough to hear me out, in an Affair of such a compass.

WE all answer'd for our-selves, and he began thus.

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Part 2.

OF THE many Writers ingag'd in the Defence of Religion, it feems to me that the greatest part are imploy'd, either in supporting the Truth of the Christian Faith in general, or in refuting fuch particular Doctrines as are esteem'd Innovations in the Christian Church. There are not, 'tis thought, many Persons in the World who are loose in the very Grounds and Principles of all Religion: And to fuch as these we find, indeed, there are not many Writers who purposely apply themselves. They may think it perhaps a mean Labour, and fcarce becoming them, to argue fedately with fuch as are almost universally treated with Detestation and Horrour. But as we are requir'd by our Religion to have Charity for all Men, fo we cannot furely avoid having a real Concern for those whom we apprehend to be under the worst of Errors, and whom we find by Experience to be with the greatest difficulty reclaim'd. Neither ought they perhaps in prudence to be treated with fo little regard, whose Number, however fmall, is thought to be rather increasing; and this too among the People of no defpicable Rank. So that it may well deferve some Consideration, "Whether in " our Age and Country the same Remedys " may ferve, which have hitherto been " try'd;

" try'd; or whether some other may not Sect. 3. " be prefer'd, as being sutable to Times

" of less Strictness in Matters of Religion,

" and Places less subject to Authority."

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THIS might be enough to put an Author upon thinking of fuch a way of reafoning with these deluded Persons, as in his Opinion might be more effectual for their Benefit, than the repeated Exclamations and Invectives with which most of the Arguments us'd against them are commonly accompany'd. Nor was it so abfurd to imagine that a quite different Method might be attempted; by which a Writer might offer Reason to these Men with fo much more Favour and Advantage, as he appear'd un-prepoffess'd, and willing to examine every thing with the greatest Unconcern and Indifference. For to fuch Persons as these, 'tis to be fear'd, 'twill always appear, " That what was never " question'd, was never prov'd: and That " whatever Subject had not, at some time " or other, been examin'd with perfect " Indifference, was never rightly examin'd, " nor cou'd rightly be believ'd." And in a Treatise of this kind, offer'd as an Essay or Inquiry only, they wou'd be far from finding that Impartiality and Indifference which is requisite; if instead of a Readiness to comply with whatever Consequences such an Examination as this, and the Courfe 266

Part 2. Course of Reasoning brought forth, the Author shou'd shew a previous Inclination to the Consequences only on one fide, and an Abhorrence of any Conclusion on the other.

> be enough to pay as OTHERS therefore, in different Circumstances, may perhaps have found it necessary, and becoming their Character, to shew all manner of Detestation both of the Persons and Principles of these Men. Our Author, on the contrary, whose Character exceeds not that of a Lay-man, endeavours to shew Civility and Favour, by keeping the fairest Measures he possibly can with the Men of this fort; allowing 'em all that he is able; and arguing with a perfect Indifference, even on the Subject of a Deity. He offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw Conclusions from his Principles: having this one chief Aim and Intention; " How, in the first place, to " reconcile these Persons to the Principles " of Virtue; That, by this means, a Way " might be laid open to Religion; by re-" moving those greatest, if not only Ob-" ftacles to it, which arise from the Vices " and Passions of Men."

Fundamental Princi-

'Trs upon this account he endeavours chiefly to establish Virtue on Principles, by which he is able to argue with those

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who are not as yet induc'd to own a Sect. 3. God, or Future State. If he cannot do thus much, he reckons he does nothing. For how can Supreme Goodness be intelligible to those who know not what Goodness it-felf is? Or how can Virtue be underflood to deferve Reward, when as yet its Merit and Excellence is unknown? We begin furely at the wrong end, when we wou'd prove MERIT by Favour, and ORDER by a Deity.—This our Friend feeks to redrefs. For being, in respect of VIRTUE, what you lately call'd a Realist; he endeavours to fhew, " That It is really " fomething in it-felf, and in the nature " of Things: not arbitrary or factitious " (if I may so speak) not constituted " from without, or dependent on Custom, " Fancy, or Will; not even on the Supreme " Will it-felf, which can no way govern " it; but being necessarily good, is govern'd " by it, and ever uniform with it." And notwithstanding He has thus made VIR-TUE his chief Subject, and in some meafure independent on Religion, yet I fancy he may possibly appear at last as high a Divine as he is a Moralist.

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I Wou'd not willingly advance it as a Theists, Rule, "That those who make only a Nominal, "Name of VIRTUE, make no more of "DEITY, and cannot without Affecta-

" tion defend the Principles of Religion:"

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Part 2. But this I will venture to affert; "That Theifts, "whoever fincerely defends VIRTUE, Nominal, "and is a Realist in MORALITY, must Real. "of necessity, in a manner, by the same

"Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very a

" Realist in DIVINITY."

ALL Affectation, but chiefly in Philosophy, I must own, I think unpardonable. And you, Philocles, who can give no quarter to ill Reasoning, nor endure any unsound or inconsistent Hypothesis; you will be so ingenuous, I dare say, as to reject our modern Deism, and challenge those who assume a Name to which their Philosophy can never in the least intitle em.

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COMMEND me to honest EPICURUS, who raises his DEITYS alost in the imaginary Spaces; and setting 'em apart out of the Universe and Nature of Things, makes nothing of 'em beyond a Word. This is ingenuous, and plain dealing: For this every one who philosophizes may easily understand.

THE same Ingenuity belongs to those Philosophers whom you, PHILOCLES, seem inclin'd to savour. When A SCEPTICK questions, "Whether a real Theo-"logy can be rais'd out of Philosophy alone, without the help of Revelation;" He does

does no more than pay a handsom Com-Sect. 3. pliment to Authority and the receiv'd Religion. He can impose on no-one who reasons deeply: since whoever does so, will easily conceive, that at this rate Theology must have no Foundation at all. For Revelation it-self, we know, is sounded on the Acknowledgment of a Divine Existence: And 'tis the Province of Philosophy alone to prove what Revelation does but suppose.

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I Look on it, therefore, as a most unfair way, for those who wou'd be Builders, and undertake this Proving part, to lay fuch a Foundation as is unfufficient to bear the Structure. Supplanting and Undermining may, in other Cases, be fair War: But in Philosophical Disputes, 'tis not allowable to work underground, or as in Sieges by the Sap. Nothing can be more unbecoming than to talk magisterially and in venerable Terms of " A Supreme NA-TURE, an Infinite Being, and A DEI-TY;" when all the while a Providence is never meant, nor any thing like Order or the Government of a Mind admitted. For when these are understood, and real Divinity acknowledg'd; the Notion is not dry, and barren; but fuch Confequences are necessarily drawn from it, as must set us in Action, and find Employment for our strongest Affections. All the Dutys of Part 2. of RELIGION evidently follow hence; Theifts, and no exception remains against any of Nominal, those great Maxims which Revelation has Real. establish'd.

Now whether our Friend be unfeignedly and fincerely of this latter fort of real Theologists, you will learn best from the Consequences of his Hypothesis. You will observe, whether instead of ending in mere Speculation, it leads to Practice: And you will then surely be satisfy'd, when you see such a Structure rais'd, as with the Generality of the World must pass at least for high Religion, and with some, in all likelihood, for no less than Enthusiasm.

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Divine Love.

FOR I appeal to you, PHILOCLES, whether there be any thing in Divinity which you think has more the Air of Enthusiasm than that Notion of Divine Love, fuch as separates from every thing worldly, fensual, or meanly interested? A Love which is simple, pure, and unmix'd; which has no other Object than merely the Excellency of that Being it-felf, nor admits of any other Thought of Happiness, than in its single Fruition. Now I dare presume you will take it as a fubftantial proof of my Friend's being far enough from Irreligion, if it be shewn that he has espous'd this Notion, and thinks of making out this

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this high Point of Divinity, from Argu-Sect. 3. ments familian even to those who oppose Religion lie and the

and as Early false, for fo much as aiming ACCORDING therefore to his Hypothesis, he wou'do in the first place, by way of prevention, declare to you, That tho the Disinterested Love of God were the most excellent Principle; yet he knew very well, that by the indifferent Zeal of some devout well-meaning People it had been firetch'd too far, perhaps even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm; as formerly among the Myflicks of the antient Myflicks. Church, whom thefe of latter days have follow'd. On the other hand, that there were those who in opposition to this devout Mystick way, and as profes'd Enemys to what they call Enthusiasm, had so far exploded every thing of this ecstatick kind, as in a manner to have given up Devotion; and in reality had left fo little: of Zeal, Affection, or Warmth, in what they call their Rational Religion, as to make them much suspected of their Sincerity in any. For tho it be natural enough (he wou'd tell you) for a mere political Writer to ground his great Argument for Religion on the necessity of fuch a Belief as that of a future Reward and Punishment; yet, if you will take his Opinion, 'tis but an ill Token of Sincerity in Religion, and in the Christian Religion

more

Part 2. more especially, to reduce it to such a Philosophy as will allow no room to that other Principle of Love; but treats all of that kind as Enthusiasm, for so much as aiming at what is call'd Disinterestedness, or teaching the Love of God or Virtue for God or

HERE, then, we have two forts of People (according to my Friend's account) who in these opposite Extremes expose Religion to the Infults of its Adverfarys. For as on one hand, 'twill be found difficult to defend the Notion of that highrais'd Love, espous'd with so much warmth by those devout Mysticks; so on the other hand, 'twill be found as hard a Task, upon the Principles of these cooler. Men, to guard Religion from the Imputation of Mercenariness, and a slavish Spirit. For how shall one deny, that to ferve God by Compulsion, or for Interest merely, is Servile and Mercenary? Is it not evident, that the only true and liberal Service paid either to that Supreme Being, or to any other Superiour, is that " which " proceeds from an Esteem or Love of the " Person serv'd, a Sense of Duty or Gra-" titude, and a Love of the dutiful and " grateful Part, as good and amiable, in " it-felf?" And where is the Injury to Religion, from fuch a Concession as this?

Or what Detraction is it from the Belief

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RELI-GION, liberal, illiberal.

of an After-Reward or Punishment, to Sect. 3. own "That the Service caus'd by it, is "not equal to that which is voluntary " and with Inclination, but is rather difin-" genuous and of the flavish kind?" Is it not still for the Good of Mankind and of the World, that Obedience to the Rule of Right shou'd some way or other be paid; if not in the better may, yet at least in this imperfect one? And is it not to be shewn, "That altho this Service of Fear " be allow'd ever so low or base: yet RE-"LIGION Still being a Discipline, and " Progress of the Soul towards Perfection, " the Motive of Reward and Punishment Rewards " is primary and of the highest moment and Pu-" with us; till fuch time as being capa-" ble of more fublime Instruction, we " are led from this servile State, to the " generous Service of Affection and Love?"

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To this it is that in our Friend's Opinion we ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour "That the Excellence of the "Object, not the Reward or Punishment, "shou'd be our Motive: But that where "throthe Corruption of our Nature, the "former of these Motives is found insufficient to excite to Virtue, there the Supplemental hatter shou'd be brought in aid, and on Motives." no account be undervalu'd or neglected."

Vol. II. S Now

After-Reward or Pughanent.

Part 2.

Now this being once establish'd, how can RELIGION be any longer subject to the Imputation of Mercenarine ? But thus we know Religion is often charg'd. "Godliness, say they, is great Gain: nor " is God devoutly serv'd for nought."-Is this therefore a Reproach? Is it confess'd there may be a better Service, a more generous Love? - Enough, there needs no more. On this Foundation our Friend prefumes it easy to defend RELIGION, and even that devoutest Part, which is efteem'd fo great a Paradox of Faith. For if there be in Nature such a Service as that of Affection and Love, it remains then only to consider of the Object, whether there be really that Supreme One we suppose. For if there be Divine Excellence in Things; if there be in Nature a Supreme Mind or DEITY; we have then an Object confummate, and comprehensive of all that is Good or Excellent. And this Object, of all others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most ingaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment. Now that there is fuch a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I may fay fo) by its wife and perfect Order must evince. This Order, if indeed perfect, excludes all real ILL. And that it really does to, is what our Author fo earnestly maintains, by solving the best WORL as o The

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he can those untoward Phenomena and ill Sect. 3. Signs, taken from the Course of Providence, in the seemingly unequal Lot of Virtue in this World.

'Trs true; tho the Appearances hold ever so strongly against Virtue, and in favour of Vice, the Objection which arises hence against a DEITY may be easily remov'd, and all fet right again on the supposal of a Future State. This to a Future Christian, or one already convinc'd of state. great a Point, is fufficient to clear every dark Cloud of Providence. For He needs not be over-and-above follicitous as to the Fate of VIRTUE in this World, who is secure of Hereafter. But the case is otherwife as to the People we are here to encounter. They are at a loss for Providence, and feek to find it in the World. The Aggravation of the appearing Diforders in worldly Affairs, and the blackest-Representation of Society and Human Nature, will hardly help 'em to this View. Twill be difficult for 'em to read Providence in such Characters. From so uncomely a Face of things below, they will prefume to think unfavourably of all above. By the Effects they fee, they will be inclin'd to judg the Cause, and by the Fate of Virtue to determine of a Providence. But being once convinc'd of Or-Previous der and a Providence as to things prefent, Proof. they VOL. II. S 2

dence.

Part 2. they may foon be fatisfy'd even of a Future A Provi- State. For if Virtue be to it-felf no small Reward, and Vice in a great measure its ORDER. own Punishment; we have a folid ground to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, lead us to conceive a further Building. We apprehend a larger Scheme, and eafily refolve our-felves why Things were not compleated in this State; but their Accomplishment referv'd rather to fome further period. For had the Good and Virtuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous in this Life; had Goodness never met with Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under a Cloud; where had been the Trial, Victory, or Crown of Virtue? Where had the Virtues had their Theater, or whence their Names? Where had been Temperance or Self-denial? Where Patience, Meekneß, Magnanimity? Whence, have these their being? What Merit, but from Hardship? What Virtue without a Conflict, and the Encounter of fuch Encmys as arise both within, and from abroad? a face of thinks below they will

But as many as are the Difficultys which Virtue has to encounter in this World, her Force is yet superiour. Expos'd as she is here, she is not however abandon'd or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above Pity, tho not Vac

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above our Wiffies: and as happy as we Sect. 3. fee her here, we have room for further Hopes in her behalf. Her prefent Portion is fufficient to shew Providence already ingag'd on her fide. And fince there is fuch Provision for her here, fuch Happiness and fuch Advantages even in this Life; how probable must it appear, that this Providential Care is extended yet further to a succeeding Life, and perfected Hereafter ? nivsrl wd , as M. vas sads when

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elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of the This is what, in our Friend's obinion, may be faid in behalf of a Future State, to those who question Revelation. 'Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Pro-Recapituvidence must be prov'd from what we see lation. of Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern'd. All must not be refer'd to a Hereafter. For a disorder'd State, in which all present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontroul'd and Virtue neglected, represents a very Chaos, and reduces us to the belov'd Atoms, Chance and Confusion of the Atheifts.

WHAT therefore can be worse done in the Cause of a Deity, than to magnify Disorder, and exaggerate (as some zea-

and who lesk immes this wife in

Part 2. lous People do) the Misfortunes of Virtue, fo far as to render it an unhappy Choice with respect to this World? They err widely who propose to turn Men to Future

State.

the Thoughts of a better World, by making 'em think fo ill of this. For to declaim in this manner against Virtue to those of a looser Faith, will make 'em the less believe a Deity, but not the more a Future State. Nor can it be thought fincerely that any Man, by having the most elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of the Happiness it creates, was ever the less in-Favourers clin'd to the Belief of a Future State. of the Opi- On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as those who are Favourers of Vice are always the least willing to hear of a future Existence; so those who are in love

with Virtue, are the readiest to embrace

that Opinion which renders it so illustrious, and makes its Cause triumphant.

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where Virgie is concern'd. All me Antients. Thus it was, that among the Antients the great Motive which inclin'd fo many of the wifest to the Belief of this Doctrine unreveal'd to 'em, was purely the Love of Virtue in the Persons of those Great Men, the Founders and Preservers of Societys, the Legislators, Patriots, Deliverers, Heroes, whose Virtues they were defirous shou'd live and be immortaliz'd. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making this Belief more engaging among Snot

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among the Good and Virtuous than the Sect. 3. Love of Friendship, which creates in 'em Friendship. a defire not to be wholly separated by Death, but that they may enjoy the same bless'd Society hereafter. How is it posfible, then, that an Author shou'd, for exalting Virtue merely, be deem'd an Enemy to a Future State? How can our Friend be judg'd false to Religion, for defending a Principle on which the very Notion of God and Goodne & depends? For this he fays only, and this is the Sum of all : " That by building a Future conclusion. " State on the Ruins of Virtue, RELI-"GION in general, and the Cause of a " Deity is betray'd; and by making Re-" wards and Punishments the principal " Motives to Duty, the Christian Reli-" gion in particular is overthrown, and " its greatest Principle, that of Love, re-" jected and expos'd."

Upon the whole then, we may justly as well as charitably conclude, that it is truly our Author's Design, in applying himself with so much Fairness to the Men of looser Principles, to lead 'em into such an Apprehension of the Constitution of Mankind and of human Affairs, as might form in 'em a Notion of Order in Things, and draw hence an Acknowledgment of that Wisdom, Goodness, and Beauty, which is Supreme; that being S 4

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Part 2 thus far become Profelytes, they might be conclusion prepar'd for that Divine Love which our Religion wou'd teach 'em, when once they shou'd embrace its Precepts, and form themselves to its sacred Character.

exalting Vir genmerely, be deem'd and THUS, continu'd he, I have made my Friend's Apology; which may have shewn him to you perhaps a good Moralist; and, I hope, no Enemy to Religion. But if you find still that the Divine has not appear'd fo much in his Character as I promis'd, I can never think of fatisfying you in any ordinary way of Converfation. Shou'd I offer to go further, I might be ingag'd deeply in Spiritual Affairs, and be forc'd to make some new Model of a Sermon upon his System of Divinity. However, I am in hopes, now that in good earnest Matters are come well-nigh to Preaching, you will acquit me for what I have already perform'd.

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as well as charicably conclude, that in

JUST as he had made an end of speaking, came in some Visitants, who took
us up the remaining part of the Afternoon in other Discourses. But these being oven, and our Strangers gone (all but
the old Gentleman, and his Friend, who had
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din'd with us) we began a-new with Sect. 1.
THEOCLES, by laying claim to his Ser. 1.
mon, and intreating him, again and again, to let us hear him, at large, in his
Theological way.

This he complain'd was perfecuting him: As you have feen Company, faid he, often perfecute a reputed Singer, not out of any Fancy for the Musick, but to fatisfy a malicious fort of Curiofity, which ends commonly in Confure and Diflike.

However it might be, we told him we were resolved to persist. And I afford our Companions, that if they would second me heartily in the manner I intended to press him; we should easily get the better.

In revenge then, said he, I will comply on this condition; That fince I am to sustain the part of the Divine and Preaches, it shall be at Philocles's cost; who shall bear the Part of the Insidel, and stand for the Person preach'd to.

Truly, faid the old Gentleman, the Part you have propos'd for him is so natural and sutable, that I doubt not but he will be able to act it without the least Pain. I cou'd wish rather, that you had spar'd

Part 2 spar'd your-self the Trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper Character. He wou'd have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your Discourse by his perpetual Cavils. Therefore since we have had Entertainment enough by way of Dialogue, I desire the Law of Sermon may be strictly observed; and "That "there be no answering to whatever is armon'd or advanc'd."

I CONSENTED to all the Terms, and told THEOCLES I wou'd stand his Mark willingly: And besides, if I really were that Insidel he was to suppose me, I shou'd count it no Unhappiness; since I was sure of being so thorowly convinc'd by him, if he wou'd vouchsafe to undertake me.

facisfy a malicious fort of Cariofin

THEOCLES then propos'd we shou'd walk out; the Evening being sine, and the free Air suring better (as he thought) with such Discourses, than a Chamber.

that bear the Parrof the Infilel, and frand

ACCORDINGLY we took our Evening-Walk in the Fields, from whence the laborious Hinds were now retiring. We fell naturally into the Praises of a Country-Life; and discours'd a while of Husbandry, and the Nature of the Soil. Our Friends began to admire some of the Plants

Plants which grew here to great Perfec- Sect. 4. tion. And it being my fortune (as having acquir'd a little Infight into the nature of Simples) to fay formething they mightily approv'd, upon this Subject, THEOCLES immediately turning about to me; "O my " ingenious Friend!" faid he, "whose Rea-" fon, in other respects, must be allow'd so " clear and happy; How is it possible that " with fuch Infight, and accurate Judg-" ment in the Particulars of Natural Be-" ings and Operations, you shou'd no bet-" ter judg of the Structure of Things in " general, and of the Order and Frame of "NATURE? Who better than your-felf " can shew the Structure of each Plant " and Animal-Body, declare the Office of " every Part and Organ, and tell the Uses, organiza-" Ends, and Advantages to which they tion. " ferve? How therefore, shou'd you " prove so ill a Naturalist in this WHOLE, " and understand so little the Anatomy of " the World and Nature, as not to discern " the same Relation of Parts, the same " Confistency and Uniformity in the Uni-" verse! poods ind I do non and ?

"Some Men perhaps there are of so confus'd a Thought, and so irregularly form'd within themselves, that 'tis no more than natural for them to find fault, and imagine a thousand Inconsistences and Defects in this wider Constitution.

"Twas

Part 2. " Twas not, we may prefume, the Aim or Interest of the Universal Nature, to " render every private one infallible, and " without defect I was not its Inten-" rion to leave us without fome Pattern " of Imperfection; fuch as we perceive " in Minds like thefe. But you, my " Friend, are Mafter of a nobler Mind. "You are conscious of better Order with-" in and can fee Workmanship and Ex-" actness in your-felf, and other innumera-" ble Plyts of the Creation. Can you an-" fwer it to your felf, allowing thus " much, not to allow all? Can you in-" duce your-felf ever to believe or think, " that where there are Parts fo variously " united, and confpiring fitly within WHOLE" themselves, the Whole it-felf shou'd have and Parts. " neither Union nor Coherence; and "where inferiour and private Natures " are found to perfect, the Universal One " Thou'd want Perfection, and be efteem'd " like whatfoever can be thought of, most " monstrous, rude, and imperfect? Confifency and Uniformity in the Unit

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"STRANGE! That there shou'd be "in Nature the Idea of an Order and "Persection, which NATURE her-self wants! That Beings which arise from Nature shou'd be so persect, as to discover Impersection in her Constitution; "and be wise enough to correct that Wise dom by which they were made!

" Nothing furely is more strongly " imprinted on our Minds, or more close-

" ly interwoven with our Souls, than the

" Idea or Sense of Order and Proportion. Proportion.

" Hence all the Force of Numbers, and "those powerful Arts founded on their " Management and Use. What a diffe-

" rence there is between Harmony and " Discord! between compos'd and order-

" ly Motion, and that which is ungo-" vern'd and accidental! between the re-

" gular and uniform Pile of fome noble

" Architect, and a Heap of Sand or " Stones! and between an organiz'd Bo-

" dy, and a Mist or Cloud driven by the complete, acrossing to one and bridge"

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" Now as this Difference is imme-" diarely perceiv'd by a plain Internal " Sensation, fo there is withal in Reason

"this account of it; That whatever

" Things have Order, the fame have Unity Union.

" of Design, and concur in one, are Parts " of one WHOLE, or are, in themselves,

" intire Systems. Such is a Tree, with all " its Branches; an Animal, with all its

"Members; an Edifice, with all its exte-

"riour and interiour Ornaments. What "else is even a Tune or Symphony, or any

" excellent Piece of Musick, but a certain

" System of proportion'd Sounds?

Part 2.

" Now in this which we call the "UNIVERSE, whatever the Perfection " may be of any particular Systems; or whatever single Parts may have Pro-" portion, Unity, or Form within them-" felves; yet if they are not united all " in general, in ONE System, but are, in " respect of one another, as the driven " Sands, or Clouds, or breaking Waves; " then there being no Coherence in the " Whole, there can be infer'd no Order, " no Proportion, and confequently no Pro-" ject or Design. But if none of these "Parts are independent, but all apparent-" ly united, then is the WHOLE a System " compleat, according to one Simple, Con-" sistent, and Uniform Design.

"Here then is our main Subject, in"fisted on: That neither Man, nor any
"other Animal, tho ever so compleat a
"System of Parts, as to all within, can be
"allow'd in the same manner compleat,
"as to all without; but must be consider'd
"as having a further relation abroad to
"the System of his Kind. So even this
"System of his Kind to the Animal-System;
"this to the World (our Earth;) and
"this again to the bigger World, and to
"the Universe.

Animal-System.

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fish was animalivated of convenience any fish "All things in this World are united. System of For as the Branch is united with the the World. " Tree, so is the Tree as immediately with "the Earth, Air, and Water, which feed " it. As much as the fertile Mould is " fitted to the Tree, as much as the strong " and upright Trunk of the Oak or Elm " is fitted to the twining Branches of the "Vine or Ivy; fo much are the very " Leaves, the Seeds, and Fruits of these "Trees fitted to the various Animals: " These again to one another, and to the " Elements where they live, and to which " they are, as Appendices, in a manner fit-" ted and join'd; as either by Wings for the " Air, Fins for the Waters, Feet for the " Earth, and by other correspondent in-" ward Parts of a more curious Frame and "Texture. Thus in contemplating all on " Earth, we must of necessity view All in "One, as holding to one common Stock. "Thus too in the System of the bigger "World. See there the mutual Dependency " of Things! the Relation of one to ano-" ther; of the Sun to this inhabited Earth, " and of the Earth and other Planets to the Sun! the Order, Union, and Co-"herence of the Whole! And know (my ingenious Friend) That by this Survey

"you will be oblig'd to own the UNIVER-Universal
"SAL SYSTEM, and coherent Scheme of System.

"Things, to be establish'd on abundant "Proof,

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Part 2." Proof, capable of convincing any fair " and just Contemplator of the Works of "Nature. For fcarce wou'd any-one, till " he had well furvey'd this universal Scene, 4 believe a Union thus evidently demon-" strable, by such numerous and power-" ful Instances of mutual Correspondency " and Relation, from the minutest Ranks " and Orders of Beings to the remotest " Spheres. our rount of year so out

Appea-

" Now, in this mighty UNION, if vance of Ill " there be fuch Relations of Parts one to " another as are not eafily discover'd; if " on this account the End and Use of "Things does not every where appear, "there is no wonder; fince 'tis no more "indeed than what must happen of ne-" ceffity: Nor cou'd Supreme Wisdom " have otherwise order'd it. For in an "Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mind " which fees not infinitely, can fee nothing " fully: And fince each Particular has re-" lation to all in general, it can know no "perfect or true Relation of any Thing, "in a World not perfectly and fully and of the dareh and other Enwons"

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Salution.

the Sunt the Order, Union, and Co-"THE same may be consider'd in any " diffected Animal, Plant, or Flower; where he who is no Anatomist, nor "vers'd in Natural History, fees that the " many Parts have a relation to the Whole; " for

" for thus much even a flight View af- Sect. 4. " fords: But he who like you, my

" Friend, is curious in the Works of Na-

" ture, and has been let into a Knowledg

" of the Animal and Vegetable Worlds, " he alone can readily declare the just Re-

" lation of all these Parts to one another,

" and the feveral Uses to which they

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" But if you wou'd willingly enter Example.

" further into this Thought, and consider

" how much we ought not only to be fa-"tisfy'd with this our View of Things,

" but even to admire its Clearness; ima-

" gine only some Person intirely a Stran-

" ger to Navigation, and ignorant of the

" Nature of the Sea or Waters, how great his Aftonishment wou'd be, when find-

" his Altonilhment would be, when find" ing himself on board some Vessel, an-

" choring at Sea, remote from all Land-

" Prospect, whilst it was yet a Calm, he

"view'd the ponderous Machine firm and

" motionless in the midst of the smooth

"Ocean, and consider'd its Foundations beneath, together with its Cordage,

"Masts, and Sails above. How easily

"wou'd he fee the Whole one regular

"Structure, all things depending on one

"another; the Uses of the Rooms below, the Lodgments, and Conveniences of

"Men and Stores? But being ignorant

"of the Intent or Delign of all above,
You. II. T "wou'd

" wou'd he pronounce the Masts and Cor-"dage to be useless and cumbersom, and " for this reason condemn the Frame, and " despise the Architett? O my Friend! "let us not thus betray our Ignorance; " but consider where we are, and in what " a Universe. Think of the many Parts " of the vast Machine, in which we have " fo little inlight, and of which it is im-". possible we shou'd know the Ends and "Uses; when instead of seeing to the " highest Pendants, we see only some lower " Deck, and are in this dark Cafe of " Flesh, confin'd even to the Hold, and " meanest Station of the Vessel.

Mind.

" Now having recogniz'd this uniform " consistent Fabrick, and own'd the Uni-" versal System, we must of consequence Universal " acknowledg a Universal MIND; which " no ingenious Man can be tempted to " difown, except thro the Imagination of h Disorder in the Universe, its Seat. For " can it be suppos'd of any one in the " World, that being in some Defart far " from Men, and hearing there a perfect " Symphony of Mufick, or feeing an ex-" act Pile of regular Architecture arifing " gradually from the Earth in all its Or-" ders and Proportions, he shou'd be per-" fuaded that at the bortom there was no " Design accompanying this, no secret " Spring of Thought, no active Mind?

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" Wou'd

"Wou'd he, because he saw no Hand, Sect. 4." deny the Handy-Work, and suppose " that each of these complear and perfect "Systems were fram'd, and thus uni-"ted in just Symmetry, and conspiring " Order, either by the accidental blowing of the Winds, or rolling of the Sands?

"WHAT is it then shou'd so disturb Disturour Views of Nature, as to destroy bance, " that Unity of Delign and Order of a " Mind, which otherwise wou'd be so ap-" parent? All that we see of the Hea-" vens or Earth, demonstrates Order and "Perfection; so as to afford the noblest "Subjects of Contemplation to Minds, " like yours, enrich'd with Sciences and " Learning. All is delightful, amiable, " rejoicing, except with relation to Man Human only, and his Circumstances, which Affairs.

" feem unequal. Here the Calamity and "Ill arises; and hence the Ruin of this goodly Frame. All perishes on this account; and the whole Order of the "Universe, elsewhere so firm, intire, and " immovable, is here o'erthrown, and lost by this one View; in which we refer

" all things to our-selves: submitting the Selfishness." Interest of the Whole to the Good and

" Interest of so small a Part.

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"Bur how is it you complain of the unequal State of Man, and of the few T 2 Vol. II.

Part 2." Advantages allow'd him above the " Beafts? What can a Creature claim " fo little differing from 'em, or that me-" rits fo little above 'em, except by Wis-" dom and Virtue, to which so few con-" form? Man may be virtuous; and by being fo, is happy. His Merit is Re-" ward. By Virtue he deserves; and in " Virtue only can meet his Happiness de-Virtue and " ferv'd. But if even Virtue it-self be un-Vice. " provided for, and Vice more prosperous " be the better Choice; if this (as you " suppose) be in the Nature of Things, " then is all Order in reality inverted, and "Supreme Wisdom lost: Impersection " and Irregularity being, after this man-" ner, undoubtedly too apparent in the " Moral World.

Their Power, Effett.

" HAVE you then, e'er you pronounc'd " this Sentence, consider'd of the State of " Virtue and Vice with respect to this Life " merely; fo as to fay, with affurance, "When, and How far, in what particu-"lars, and how circumstantiated, the one " or the other is Good or Ill? You who "are skill'd in other Fabricks and Com-"positions, both of Art and Nature, have you consider'd of the Fabrick of the A Mind. "Mind, the Constitution of the Soul, the " Connexion and Frame of all its Passions " and Affections; to know accordingly the Order and Symmetry of the Part,

Advan.

" and how it either improves or fuffers; Sect. 4.

" what its Force is, when naturally preImproveferv'd in its found State; and what be-ment.

" comes of it, when corrupted and a-"bus'd? Till this (my Friend!) be well

" examin'd and understood, how shall we " judg either of the Force of Virtue, or

" Power of Vice? Or in what manner

" either of these may work to our Happi-

" ness or Undoing?

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"HERE therefore is that INQUIRY " we shou'd first make. But who is there " can afford to make it as he ought? If " happily we are born of a good Nature; " if a liberal Education has form'd in us " a generous Temper and Disposition, Temper. " well-regulated Appetites, and worthy " Inclinations, 'tis well for us; and fo " indeed we esteem it. But who is there " that endeavours to give these to him-" felf, or to advance his Portion of Hap-" piness in this kind? Who thinks of " improving, or fo much as of preferving " his Share, in a World where it must of " necessity run so great a hazard, and " where we know an honest Nature is so " eafily corrupted? All other things re-" lating to us are preferv'd with Care, " and have fome Art or Oeconomy be-" longing to 'em; this which is nearest " related to us, and on which our Hap-

" piness depends, is alone committed to

" Chance:

Part 2." Chance: And Temper is the only thing " ungovern'd, whilft it governs all the " ferv'd in its found State; and willian

Appetites.

"Thus we inquire concerning what is good and futable to our Appetites; but what Appetites are good and futable to us, is no part of our Examina-"tion. We inquire what is according to Interest, Policy, Fashion, Vogue; but it " feems wholly strange, and out of the

" way, to inquire what is according to NA-"TURE. The Ballance of EUROPE, of

"Trade, of Power, is strictly fought af-" ter; while few have heard of the Bal-

" lance of their Passions, or thought of " holding these Scales even. Few are ac-

" quainted with this Province, or know-

" ing in these Affairs. But were we more " fo (as this Inquiry wou'd make us) we

shou'd then see Beauty and Decorum

" here, as well as elsewhere in Nature;

" and the Order of the Moral World " won'd equal that of the Natural, By

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"this the Beauty of VIRTUE would ap-

" pear; and hence (as has been shewn)
" the Supreme and Sovereign BEAUTY,

" the Original of all that is Good or "Amiable, harmon and fire or mirel"

" Bur lest I shou'd appear at last too " like an Enthusiast, I chuse to express " my Sense, and conclude this Philosophical Sermon

Ballance.

Virtue. Deity.

"Sermon in the Words of one of those an-Sect. 4." tient Philologists, whom you are us'd to

" esteem. For Divinity it-felf, fays he, is

" surely beauteous, and of all Beautys the brightest; the not a beauteous Body, but

" that from whence the Beauty of Bodys is

" derivid: Not a beauteous Plain, but that

" from whence the Plain looks beautiful. The River's Beauty, the Sea's, the Heaven's,

" and Heavenly Constellation's, all flow from

" hence as from a Source Eternal and Incor-

" ruptible. As Beings partake of this, they

" are fair, and flourishing, and happy: As " they are lost to this, they are deform'd, pe-

" nili'd, and lost. "rod alol sas ad liw

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WHEN THEOCLES had thus spoken, he was formally complimented by our Two Companions. I was going to add something in the same way: but he presently stop'd me, by saying, he shou'd be scandaliz'd, if instead of commending him, I did not, according to my Character, chuse rather to criticize some part or other of his long Discourse.

Is it must be so then, reply'd I; in the sirst place, give me leave to wonder that, instead of the many Arguments commonly brought for proof of a Deity, you make use only of one single-one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in custo-

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Part 2. mary Form, of a First Cause, a First Being, and a Beginning of Motion: How clear the Idea was of an Immaterial Substance; And how plainly it appear'd, that at fome time Matterand or other Matter must have been created. But Thought. as to all this, you are filent. As for what is faid, of " a Material unthinking Sub-" stance being never able to have pro-" duc'd an immaterial thinking one;" I readily grant it: but on the condition, that this great Maxim of Nothing being ever made from Nothing, may hold as well on my fide as my Adverfary's: And then I suppose that whilst the World endures, he will be at a loss how to affign a Beginning to Matter; or how to fuggest a Possibility of annihilating it. The spiritual Men may, as long as they please, represent to us, in the most eloquent manner, "That Matter consider'd in a thousand " different Shapes, join'd and disjoin'd,
" vary'd and modify'd to Eternity, can " never, of it-felf, afford one fingle "Thought, never occasion or give rife " to any thing like Sense or Knowledg." Their Argument will hold good against a DEMOCRITUS, an EPICURUS, any of the elder or latter Atomists. But it will be turn'd on them by an examining Academist: and when the two Substances

are fairly fet afunder, and confider'd apart, as different kinds; 'twill be as strong Sense, and as good Argument, to

fay

fay as well of the immaterial Kind; Sect. 4.

"That do with it as you please, modify

"it a thousand ways, purify it, exalt it,

"fublime it, torture it ever so much, or

"rack it, as they say, with thinking;

"you will never be able to produce or

"force the contrary Substance out of it."

The poor Dregs of sorry Matter can no more be made out of the simple pure Substance of immaterial Thought, than the high Spirits of Thought or Reason can be extracted from the gross Substance of heavy Matter. So let the Dogmatists make of this Argument what they can.

But for your part, continu'd I; you have flated the Question, 'tis not about what was First, or Foremost; but what is Instant, and Now in being. " For if " DEITY be now really extant; if by any " good Token it appears that there is at " this present a Universal Mind; 'twill ea-" fily be yielded there ever was one."-This is your Argument. — You go (if I may fay fo) upon Fact, and wou'd prove that things actually are in such a state and condition, which if they really mere, there wou'd indeed be no dispute left. Your UNION is your main Support. Yet how is it you prove this? What Demonstration have you given? What have you so much as offer'd at, beyond bare Probability? So far are you from demonstrating

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Part 2 ting any thing, that if this uniting Scheme be the chief Argument for Deity (as you tacitly allow) you feem rather to have demonstrated, "That the Case it-self is " incapable of Demonstration," For, "How, fay you, can a narrow Mind fee 4 All Things?"—And yet if, in reality, It fees not All, It had as good fee Nothing. The demonstrable part is still as far behind. For grant that this All, which lies within our view or knowledg, is orderly and united, as you suppose: This mighty All is but a Point still, a mere Nothing, compar'd to what remains. Atheistical "Tis but a separate By-World (we'll say) Hypothesis. " of which perhaps there are, in the wide " Waste, Millions besides, as horrid and " deform'd, as this of ours is regular and

"proportion'd. In length of Time, a"midft the infinite Hurry and Shock of
"Prince this final and World his acci-

"Beings, this fingle odd World, by accident, might have been struck out, and a

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" cast into some Form (as among infinite

" Chances, what is there that may not happen?) But for the rest of Matter,

"'tis of a different hue. Old Father

"CHAOS (as the Poets call him) in these wild Spaces, reigns absolute, and

" upholds his Realms of Darkness. He

" presses hard upon our Frontier: and one day, belike, shall by a furious In-

" road recover his lost Right, conquer his "Rebel-

"Rebel-State, and re-unite us to primi- Sect. 4. " tive Discord and Confusion."

THIS, faid I, THEOCLES! (concluding my Discourse) is all I dare offer in oppolition to your Philosophy. I imagin'd, indeed, you might have given me more Scope: But you have retrench'd yourfelf in narrower Bounds. So that to tell you truth, I look upon your Theology to be hardly to fair or open as that of our Divines in general. They are strict, it's true, as to Names; but allow a greater Latitude in Things. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-Charge, a downright questioning of Deity: But in return, they give always fair play against NATURE, NATURE and allow her to be challeng'd for her arraign'd. Failings. She may freely err, and we as freely censure. Deity, they think, is not accountable for her: Only she for herfelf. But you are straiter, and more precife in this point. You have unnecessarily brought Nature into the Controverfy, and taken upon you to defend her Honour fo highly, that I know not whether it may be fafe for me to question her.

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LET not this trouble you, reply'd THEOCLES: but be free to censure Nature; whatever may be the Consequence. Tis only my Hypothesis can suffer. If I defend it ill, my Friends need not be fcandaliz'd.

Part 2. daliz'd. They are fortify'd, no doubt, with stronger Arguments for a Deity, and can well employ those Metaphysical Weapons, of whose Edge you seem so little apprehensive. I leave them to dispute this Ground with you, whenever they think sit. For my own Arguments, if they can be supposed to make any part of this Defence, they may be look'd upon only as distant Lines, or Outworks, which may easily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the Body of the Place.

NOT WITHSTANDING, then, faid I, that you are willing I shou'd attack NATURE in Form, I chuse to spare her in all other Subjects, but MAN only. How comes it, I intreat you, that NATURE in this noblest of Creatures, and worthiest her Care, she shou'd appear so very weak and impotent; whilst in mere In Brutes. Brutes, and the irrational Species, she acts with so much Strength, and exerts such hardy Vigour? Why is she spent so soon in feeble Man, who is found more subject to Diseases, and of sewer years than many of the wild Creatures? They range secure; and proof against all the

Injurys of Seasons and Weather, want no help from Art, but live in careless Ease,

discharg'd of Labour, and freed from

aritude in Tainos. He

the cumbersom Baggage of a necessitous human

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ous nan human Life. In Infancy more helpful, Sect. 4. vigorous in Age, with Senses quicker, and more natural Sagacity, they pursue their Interests, Joys, Recreations, and cheaply purchase both their Food and Maintenance; cloth'd and arm'd by Nature her-self; who provides them both a Couch and Mansion. So has Nature order'd for the rest of Creatures. Such is their Hardiness, Robustness, Vigour. Why not the same for Man?—

AND do you stop thus short, said THEOCLES, in your Expostulation? Methinks'twere as easy to proceed, now you are in the way; and instead of laying claim to some Few Advantages of other Creatures, you might as well stand for All, and complain "That Man, for Nature in "his part, shou'd be any thing less than a Consummation of all Advantages and Privileges which Nature can afford." Ask not merely, Why Man is naked, why unhoof'd, why slower-footed than the Beasts? Ask, "Why he has not Wings also for the Air, Fins for the Water, and so on; that he might take posses."

Not fo, faid I, neither. This would be to rate him high indeed! As if he were, by Nature, LORD of All: which is more than I allow.

TIS

Part 2.

'Tis enough, reply'd he, that this is yielded. For if we allow once a Subor-dination in his Case; if Nature her-self be not for MAN, but Man for NATURE; then must Man, by his good leave, submit to the Elements of NATURE, and not the Elements to him. Few of these are at all fitted to him; and none perfectly. If he be left in Air, he falls headlong; for Wings were not affign'd him. In Water he foon finks. In Fire he confumes. Within Earth he fuffocates. -

As for what Dominion he may naturally have in other Elements, faid I, my concern truly is not very great in his behalf; since by Art he can even exceed the Advantages Nature has given to other Creatures: But for the Air, methinks it had been wonderfully obliging in Nature to have allow'd him Wings.

Volatiles.

AND what wou'd he have got by it, reply'd THEOCLES? For consider what an Alteration of Form must have ensu'd. Observe in one of those wing'd Creatures, whether the whole Structure be not made subservient to this purpose, and all other Advantages facrific'd to this fingle Anatomy. Operation. The Anatomy of the Creature shews it, in a manner, to be all Wing: its chief Bulk being compos'd of

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two exorbitant Muscles, which exhaust Sect. 4 the Strength of all the other, and engross (if I may say so) the whole Occonomy of the Frame. 'Tis thus the aerial Racers are able to perform to rapid and ftrong a Motion, beyond comparison with any other kind, and far exceeding their little hare of Strength elfewhere : these Parts of theirs being made in fuch Superiour proportion, as in a manner to flarve their Companions. And in Man's Architecture, of fo different an Order, were the flying Engines to be affix'd; must not the other Members suffer, and the multiply'd Parts starve one another? What think you of the Brain in this Partition? The Brain. Is it not like to prove a Starveling? Or wou'd you have it be maintain'd at the fame high rate, and draw the chief Nourishment to it-felf, from all the rest?

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I Understand you, said I, Theocles (interrupting him:) The Brain
certainly is a great Starver, where it abounds; and the thinking People of the
World, the Philosophers and Virtuoso's especially, must be contented (I find) with
a moderate Share of bodily Advantages,
for the sake of what they call Parts and Parts.
Capacity in another Sense. The Parts, it
seems, of one kind agree ill in their Oeconomy with the Parts of the other. But
to make this even on both sides, let us
turn

Part 2. turn the Tables; and the Case, I suppose, will stand the same with the Milo's of the Age, the Men of bodily Prowess and Dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar sort, such as Wrestlers, Vaulters, Racers, Hunters; what shall we say of our sine-bred Gentlemen, our Riders, Fencers, Dancers, Tennis-Players, and such like? 'Tis the Body surely is the Starver here: and if the Brain were such a terrible Devourer in the other way; the Body and Bodily Parts seem to have their Reprisals in this Rank of Men.

Ballance.

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IF then, said he, the Case stands thus between Man and Man, how must it stand between Man and a quite different Creature? If the BALLANCE be so nice, that the least thing breaks it, even in Creatures of the same Frame and Order; of what fatal effect must it be to change the Order it-felf, and make some essential Alteration in the Frame? Consider therefore how it is we cenfure Nature in these and fuch-like Cases. "Why, says one, was " I not made by Nature strong as a Horse? "Why not hardy and robust as this " Brute-Creature? or nimble and active as that other?"—And yet when uncommon Strength, Agility, and Feats of Body are fubjoin'd, even in our own Species, fee what befals! So that for a Person thus in love with an Athletick MILO-NEAN

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thinks, and more modest in him, to change the Expostulation, and ask, "Why was I not made in good earnest a very BRUTE?" For that wou'd be more sutable.

vom Chraffer. And were I not affaid of I Am apt indeed, faid I, to think that the Excellence of MAN lies fomewhat different from that of a Brute: and that fuch amongst us as are more truly Men, shou'd naturally aspire to Manly Qualitys, and leave the Brute his own. But Nature, I fee, has done well to mortify us in this particular, by furnishing us with fuch flight Stuff, and in fuch a tender Frame, as is indeed wonderfully commodious to support that Man-Excellence of Thought and Reason; but wretchedly scanty and ineffectual for other Purposes. As if it were her very Design, "To hinder us from aspiring ridiculously "to what was misbecoming our Cha-" racter."

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I SEE, said THEOCLES, you are not one of those timerous Arguers who tremble at every Objection rais'd against their Opinion or Belief, and are so intent in upholding their own side of the Argument, that they are unable to make the least Concession on the other. Your Wit allows you to divert your-self with whatever oc-

Part 2. curs in the Debate: And you can pleafantly improveeven what your Antagonist brings as a Support to his own Hypothesis. This indeed is a fairer fort of Practice than what is common now-a-But 'tis no more than futable to your Character. And were I not afraid of fpeaking with an Air of Compliment, in the midst of a Philosophical Debate; I fhou'd tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of your SCEPTI-CISM, in opposition to a kind of Bigot-Scepticks; who forfeit their Right to the Philosophick Character, and retain hardly fo much as that of the Gentleman or Good-Companion. But to our Argument. onover heehele

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Distribu-

Such then, continu'd he, is the admirable Distribution of NATURE, her adapting and adjusting not only the Stuff or Matter to the Shape and Form, and even the Shape it-felf and Form to the Circum-Stance, Place, Element, or Region; but also the Affections, Appetites, Sensations, mutually to each other, as well as to the Matter, Form, Action, and all besides: " All manag'd for the best, with perfect " Frugality and just Reserve: profuse to " none, but bountiful to all: never em-" ploying in one thing more than enough; " but with exact Occonomy retrenching " the fuperfluons, and adding Force to "what is principal in every thing." And

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is not Thought and Reason prin-Sect. 4. for these? no saving for this part of his part. Engine? Or wou'd he have the same Stuff or Matter, the same Instruments or Organs serve alike for different purposes, and an Ounce be equivalent to a Pound? -It cannot be. What Wonders, then, can he expect from a few Ounces of Blood in such a narrow Vessel, fitted for so small a District of Nature? Will he not rather think highly of that NATURE, which has thus manag'd his Portion for him, to best advantage, with this happy Reserve (happy indeed for him, if he knows and uses it!) by which he has so much a better Use of Organs than any other Crea-Reason. ture? by which he holds his Reason, is a Man, and not a Beast?

Bur * Beasts, said I, have Instincts, Instinct. which Man has not.

TRUE, said he, they have indeed Perceptions, Sensations, and Pre-sensations (if I may use the Expression) which Man, for Animals. his part, has not in any proportionable degree. Their Females, newly pregnant, and before they have bore Young, have a clear Prospect or Pre-sensation of their State which

^{*} Above, Treatife IV. p. 92, 93, &c. & 131, 132.
And below, MISC. IV. chap. 2.
Vo L. II. U 2 is

Part 2 is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they pre-ponderate? How many at once comprehend? The Seafons of the Year, the Country, Climate, Place, Aspect, Situation; the Basis of their Building, the Materials, Architecture; the Diet and Treatment of their Offspring; in short, the whole Oeconomy of their Nursery: and all this as perfectly at first, and when unexperienc'd, as at any time of their Life afterwards. And " Why

Human

" not this, fay you, in Human Kind?"
Nay, but on the contrary, I ask "Why " this? Where was the Occasion or Use? "Where the Necessity? Why this Sagacity for Men? Have they not what is " better, in another kind? Have they " not Reason and Discourse? Does not " this instruct them? What need then of the other? Where wou'd be the pru-" dent Management at this rate? Where " the Referve?"

THE Toung of most other Kinds, continu'd he, are instantly helpful to themfelves, fensible, vigorous, know to shun Danger, and seek their Good: A human Infant is of all the most helpless, weak, And wherefore shou'd it not have been thus order'd? Where is the loss in such a Species? Or what is Man the worse for this Defect; amidst such large Supplys?

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Supplys? Does not this Defect engage him Sect. 4. the more strongly to Society, and force society. him to own that he is purposely, and not by Accident, made rational and sociable, and can no otherwise increase or sublist. than in that focial Intercourse and Com-munity which is his Natural State? Is not both conjugal Affection, and natural Affection to Parents, Duty to Magistrates, Love of a common City, Community, or Country, with the other Dutys and Social Parts of Life, deduc'd from hence, and founded in these very Wants? What can be happier than fuch a Deficiency, as is the occasion of so much Good? What better than a Want so abundantly made up, and answer'd by so many Enjoyments? Now if there are still to be found among Mankind fuch as even in the midst of these Wants seem not asham'd to affect a Right of Independency, and deny themselves to be by Nature sociable; where wou'd their Shame have been, had Nature otherwise supply'd these Wants? What Duty or Obligation had been ever thought of? What Respect or Reverence of Parents, Magistrates, their Country, or their Kind? Wou'd not their full and felf-fufficient State more strongly have determin'd them to throw off Nature, and deny the Ends and Author of their Creation?

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Supplys? Does not this Defect engage him

Part 2.

WHILST THEOCLES argu'd thus concerning NATURE, the old Gentleman, my Adversary, express'd great Satisfaction in hearing me, as he thought, refuted, and my Opinions expos'd. For he wou'd needs believe these to be strongly my Opinions, which I had only started as Objections in the Discourse. He endeavour'd to reinforce the Argument by many particulars from the common Topicks of the School-men and Civilians. He added withal, "That it was better for me to declare my Sentiments openly: for he was sure I had strongly imbib'd that Principle, that * the State of Nature was a State of War."

State of Nature.

That it was no State of Government, or publick Rule, reply'd I, you your-felf allow. I do so. Was it then a State of Fellomship, or Society? No: "For "when Men enter'd first into Society, "they pass'd from the State of Nature into "that new one which is founded upon "Compact." And was that former State a tolerable one? Had it been absolutely intolerable, there had never been any such. Nor cou'd we properly call that a State, which cou'd not stand or endure for the least time. If Man therefore cou'd endure to live without Socie-

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^{*} Above, Treatise II. p. 109, &c.

ty; and if it be true that he astually Sect. 4. liv'd fo, when in the State of Nature; how can it be faid "That he is by Nature fo"ciable?"

THE old Gentleman seem'd a little disturb'd at my Question. But having recover'd himself, he said in answer, "That "Man indeed, from his own natural In-" clination, might not have been mov'd to "associate; but rather from some particular Circumstances."

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You fee, faid he to the old Gen-His Nature then, faid I, was not fo very good, it feems; fince having no natural Affection, or friendly Inclination belonging to him, he was fore'd into a focial State, against his Will: And this, not from any Necessity in respect of outward Things (for you have allow'd him a tolerable Subfiftence) but from fuch Inconveniences as arose chiefly from himself, and his own malignant Temper and Principles. And indeed 'twas no wonder that Creatures who were naturally thus unfociable, shou'd be as naturally mischievous and troublefom. If, according to their Nature, they cou'd live out of Society, with fo little Affection for one another's Company, 'tis not likely that upon occafion they wou'd spare one another's Perfons. If they were fo fullen as not to meet for Love, 'tis more than probable they ipeaking

Part 2. they wou'd fight for Interest. And thus state of from your own Reasoning it appears, Nature. "That the State of Nature must in all likelihood have been little different from

" a State of WAR."

HE was going to answer me with some sharpness, as by his Looks appear'd; when THEOCLES interposing, desir'd, That as he had occasion'd this Dispute, he might be allow'd to try if he cou'd end it, by fetting the Question in a fairer Light. You see, said he to the old Gentleman, what Artifice PHILOCLES made use of, when he engag'd you to allow, that the State of Nature and that of Society were perfectly diffinct. But let us question him now in his turn, and see whether he can demonstrate to us, "That " there can be naturally any Human State " which is not focial." (some illustration signess as arofe chiefly from himself, and

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WHAT is it then, faid the old Gentleman, that we call the State of Nature?

Not that imperfect rude Condition of Mankind, said THEOCLES, which some imagine; but which, if it ever were in Nature, cou'd never have been of the least continuance, or any way tolerable, or sufficient for the Support of human Race. Such a Condition cannot indeed so properly be call'd a State. For what if speaking

fpeaking of an Infant just coming into Sect. 4. the World, and in the moment of the Birth, I shou'd fancy to call this a State; wou'd it be proper?

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Just such a State, therefore, was that which we suppose of Man, e'er yet he enter'd into Society, and became in truth a Human Creature. 'Twas the Rough-Draught of Man, the Essay or first Effort of Nature, a Species in the Birth, a Kind as yet unform'd; not in its natural State, but under Violence, and still restless, till it attain'd its natural Perfection.

eary defer in a Shell, declare him thill a

AND thus, faid THEOCLES (addreffing still to the old Gentleman) the Case must necessarily stand, even on the supposal "That there was ever such a "Condition or State of Men, when as " yet they were unaffociated, unacquain-"ted, and confequently without any "Language or Form of Art." But, "That it was their natural State, to live "thus feparately," can never without Abfurdity be allow'd. For fooner may you divest the Creature of any other Feeling or Affection, than that towards Society and his Likeness. Allowing you, however, the Power of divesting him at pleafure; Allowing you to reduce even whole Nature.

Part 2. Parts and Members of his present Frame; state of would you transform him thus, and call him still a Man? Yet better might you do this indeed, than you could strip him of his natural Affections, separate him from all his Kind, and inclosing him like some solitary Insect in a Shell, declare him still a Man. So might you call the human Egg, or Embrio, the Man The Bug which breeds the Butterfly is more properly a Fh, the without Wings, than this imaginary Creature is a Man. For the his outward Shape were human, his Passions, Appetites, and Organs must be wholly different. His whole inward Make must be revers'd, to fit him for fuch a recluse Occonomy, and separate Subsistence.

A R p chair sind on A To explain this a little further, continu'd he: Let us examine this pretended State of Nature; how and on what Foundation it must stand. " For either Man " must have been from Eternity, or not. "If from Eternity, there cou'd be no " primitive or original State, and conse-" quently no State of Nature, but fuch as " we see at present before our eyes. If " not from Eternity, he arose either all at " once (and consequently he was at the ve-" ry first as he is now) or by degrees, thro " feveral Stages and Conditions, to that " in which he is at length fettled, and has " continu'd for fo many Generations." Parts

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4.1998 and thing can be call'd natural in the Cale; For instance, let us suppose he sprang, as the old Poets feign'd, from a big-belly d Oak: and then belike he might resemble more a Man-Drake than a MAN. Let us suppose him at hill with little more of Life than is discover'd in that Plant which they call the Sensitive. But when the Mother-Oak had been some time deliver'd, and the falle Birth by some odd Accident or Device was wrought into Form; the Members were then fully display'd, and the Organs of Sense began to unfold themfelves. "Here fprang an Ear: there " peep'd an Eye. Perhaps a Tail too came "in Company. For what Superfluitys " Nature may have been charg'd with, " at first, is difficult to determine. They " dropt off, it feems, in time; and hap-" pily have left things, at last, in a good posture, and (to a wonder!) just in " they (bou'd be " left harbourd is b'accept

This furely is the lowest View of the Original Affairs of Human Kind. For if A PROVIDENCE, and not CHANCE, gave Man his Being, our Argument for his social Nature must surely be the stronger. But admitting his Rise to be, as we have describ'd, and as a certain fort of Philosophers wou'd needs have it; Nature has then had no Intention at all, no Meaning or Design in this whole Matter. So how

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Part 2. any thing can be call'd natural in the Case;

State of how any State can be call'd a State of NaNature. ture, or according to Nature, one more than
another, I know not.

more a Men Linde than a MAN. LET us go on however, and on their Hypothesis consider, Which State we may best call Nature's own, " She has by Acci-" dent, thro many Changes and Chances, " rais'd a Creature, which springing at " first from rude Seeds of Matter, pro-" ceeded till it became what it now is; " and arriv'd where for many Generations " it has been at a ftay." In this long Procession (for I allow it any length whatever) I ask, "Where was it that " this State of Nature cou'd begin?" The Creature must have endur'd many Changes: and each Change, whilft he was thus growing up, was as natural, one as another. So that either there must be reckon'd a hundred different States of Nature; or if one, it can be only that in which Nature was perfect, and her Growth compleat. Here where She rested, and attain'd her End, here must be her State, or no-where.

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Cou'd she then rest, think you, in that desolate State before Society? Cou'd she maintain and propagate the Species, such as it now is, without Fellowship or Community? Shew it us in fact any where,

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where, amongst any of our own Kind. Sect. 4. For as for Creatures which may much resemble us in outward Form, if they differ yet in the least part of their Constitution, if their Inwards are of a different Texture, if their Skin and Pores are otherwife form'd or harden'd; if they have other Excrescences of Body, another Temper, other natural inseparable Habits or Affections, they are not truly of our Kind. If, on the other hand, their Constitution be as ours; their natural Parts or inward Facultys as strong, and their bodily Frame as weak as ours; If they have Memory, and Senses, and Affections, and a Use of Organs as ours: 'tis evident they can no more by their good-will abstain from Society, than they can possibly preserve themselves without it.

AND here (my Friends!) we ought to remember what we discours'd a while since, and was advanc'd by Philocles himself, concerning the * Weakness of human Bodys, and the necessitous State of Man, in respect of all other Creatures; "His long and helpless Infancy, his feeble and defenceless Make, by which he is more sitted to be a Prey himself, than live by Prey on others." Yet 'tis impossible for him to subsist like any of those

^{*} Supra, page 300.

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MINISTO PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

Part 2 grazing Kinds. He must have better Provision and choicer Food than the raw Herbage; a better Couch and Covering than the bare Earth or open Sky. How many Conveniences of other kinds does he stand in need of? What Union and strict Society is requir'd between the Sexes, to preferve and nurse their growing Offspring? This kind of Society will not, furely, be deny'd to MAN, which to every Beaft of Prey is known proper, and natural. And can we allow this Social Part to Man, and go no further? Is it possible he shou'd pair, and live in Love and Fellowship with his Partner and Offspring, and remain still wholly wild, and speechless, and without those Arts of Storing, Building, and other Oeconomy, as natural to him furely as to the Beaver, or to the Ant, or Bee? Where, therefore, shou'd He break off from this Society, if once begun? For that it began thus, as early as Generation, and grew into a Houshold and Occonomy, is plain. Must not this have grown foon into a Tribe? and this Tribe into a Nation? Or tho it remain'd a Tribe only; was not this still a Society for mutual Defence and common Interest? In short, if Generation be natural, if Natural Affection and the Care and Nurture of the Offspring be natural, Things standing as they do with Man, and the Creature being of that Form and Constitution

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" ciety must be also natural to him;" And "That out of Society and Community "he never did, or ever can subsist."

liders that Wolons are to Holmes In conclusion, faid he (addressing still to the two Companions) I will venture to add a word in behalf of PHILOCLES: That fince the Learned have fuch a fancy for this Notion, and love to talk of this imaginary State of Nature, I think 'tis even Charity to speak as ill of it as we possibly can. Let it be a State of WAR. Rapine, and Injustice. Since 'tis unfocial, let it e'en be as uncomfortable and as frightful as 'tis possible. To speak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tempt Men to turn Hermites. Let it, at least, be look'd on as many degrees worse than the worst Government in being. The greater Dread we have of Anarchy, the better Country-men we shall prove, and value more the Laws and Constitution under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous Violences of fuch an unnatural State. In this I agree heartily with those Transformers of Human Nature, who confidering it abstractedly and apart from Government or Society, represent it under monstrous Visages of Dragons, Leviathans, and I know not what devouring Creatures. They wou'd have done well however, to have express'd

Part 2. themselves more properly in their great

State of Maxim. For to say in disparagement of
Nature. Man, "That he is to Man a Wolf," ap-

Man, "That he is to Man a Wolf," appears fomewhat abfurd, when one confiders that Wolves are to Wolves very kind and loving Creatures. The Sexes strictly join in the Care and Nurture of the Young: and this Union is continu'd still between 'em. They howl to one another, to bring Company; whether to hunt, or invade their Prey, or affemble on the Discovery of a good Carcase. Even the Swinish Kinds want not common Affection, and run in Herds to the Affistance of their diffress'd Fellows. The meaning therefore of this famous Sentence (if it has any meaning at all) must be, " That Man is " naturally to Man, as a Wolf is to a tamer "Creature:" As, for instance, to a Sheep. But this will be as little to the purpose as to tell us, " That there are different Spe-" cies or Characters of Men; That all " have not this Wolfish Nature, but That " one half at least are naturally innocent " and mild." And thus the Sentence comes to nothing. For without belying Nature, and contradicting what is evident from natural History, Fact, and the plain Course of Things, 'tis impossible to assent to this ill-natur'd Proposition, when we have even done our best to make tolerable fense of it. - But such is Mankind. And even here HUMAN NATURE shews itfelf.

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felf, such as it is; not perfect, or absorbed, such successful, the rightly tending, and mov'd by proper and just Principles. 'Tis here, therefore, in Philosophy, as in the common Conversations of the World. As fond as Men are of Company, and as little able to enjoy any Happine's out of it, they are yet strangely addicted to the way of Satyr. And in the same manner as a malicious Censure crastily worded, and pronoune'd with Assurance, is apt to pass with Mankind for shrewd Wit; so a virulent Maxim in bold Expressions, the without any Justness of Thought, is readily received for true Philipson Phy.

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SECT. V.

IN these Discourses the Evening ended; and Night advancing, we returned home from our Walk. At Supper, and afterwards for the rest of that Night, Theocles said little. The Discourse was now managed chiefly by the two Companions, who turned it upon a new fort of Philosophy; such as you will excuse me (good Palemon!) if I pass over with more haste.

THERE was much faid, and with great miracles. Learning, on the Nature of Spirits and Prodiges. Apparitions; of which the most astonishing Vol. II. X Accounts

Part 2. Accounts were the most ravishing with our Friends: who endeavour'd to exceed one another in this admirable way; and perform'd to a miracle in raising one another's Amazement. Nothing was fo charming with them, as that which was disagreeing and odd: nothing so soothing as that which mov'd Horrour. In short, whatever was rational, plain, and eafy, bore no relish; and nothing came amis that was but cross to Nature, out of Sort and Order, and in no Proportion or Harmony with the rest of Things. Monstrous Births, Prodigys, Enchantments, Elementary Wars, and Convulsions were our chief Entertainment. One wou'd have thought that in a kind of Rivalship between PRO-VIDENCE and NATURE, the latter Lady was made to appear as homely as poffible; that her Deformitys might recommend and fet off the Beautys of the former. For to do our Friends Justice, I must own I thought their Intention to be fincerely religious. But this was not a Face of Religion I was like to be enamour'd with It was not from hence I fear'd being made enthusiastick, or superstitious. If ever I became so, I found it wou'd rather be after THEOCLES'S manner. The Monuments and Church-yards were not fuch powerful Scenes with me, as the Mountains, the Plains, the folemn Woods and Groves; of whose Inhabitants I chose much rather to hear,

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* Se & 3. Vo hear, than of the other. And I was rea- Sect. 5. dier to fancy Truth in those Poetical Fictions which THEOCLES made use of, than in any of his Friends ghaftly Storys, fo pompoully fet off, after the usual way, in a lofty Tone of Authority, and with an assuming Air of Truth.

You may imagine, PALEMON, that Scepticijm. my * Scepticism, which you so often reproach me with, cou'd not well forfake me here: Nor cou'd it fail to give diffurbance to our Companions, especially to the grave Gentleman who had clash'd with me some time before. He bore with me a while; till having lost all patience, One must certainly, said he, be Master of no small share of Assurance, to hold out against the common Opinion of the World, and deny things which are known by the Report of the most considerable part of Mankind.

This, faid I, is far from being my case. You have never yet heard me deny any thing; tho I have question'd many. If I suspend my Judgment, 'tis because I have less Sufficiency than others. There are People, I know, who have so great a regard to every Fancy of their own, that

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^{*} See MISC. II. Ch. 2. And MISC. V. Ch. 1, they

Part 2. they can believe their very Dreams. But I who cou'd never pay any fuch deference to my fleeping Fancys, am apt fometimes to question even my waking Thoughts, and examine, " Whether these are not Dreams too;" fince Men have a Faculty of dreaming fometimes with their Eyes open. You will own 'tis no small pleasure with Mankind to make their Dreams pass for Realitys; and that the Love of Trath is, in reality, not half so prevalent as this Passion for Novelty and Surprise, join'd with a Defire of making Impression, and being admir'd. However I am so charitable still, as to think there is more of innocent Delugion Imposture. than voluntary Imposture in the World: and that those who have most impos'd on Mankind, have been happy in a certain Faculty of impoling first upon themselves; by which they have a kind of Salvo for their Confciences, and are so much the more successful, as they can act their Part more naturally, and to the life. Nor is it so great a Riddle, that Mens Dreams shou'd sometimes have the good fortune of passing with 'em for Truth; when we consider, that in some Cases, that which was never fo much as dreamt of, or related as Truth, comes afterwards to be believ'd by one who has often told it.

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So that the greatest Impostor in the World, reply'd he, at this rate may be allow'd sincere.

bounds of on A blo to ball out both Section As to the main of his Imposture, faid I, Impossure. perhaps he may; notwithstanding some pious Frauds made use of between whiles. in behalf of a Belief thought good and wholesom. And so very natural do I take this to be, that in all Religions, except the True, I look upon the greatest Zeal to be accompany'd with the strongest Inclination to deceive. For the Design and End being the Truth, 'tis not customary to hefitate or be ferupulous about the Choice of Means. Whether this be true or no. I appeal to the Experience of the last Age: in which 'twill not be difficult to find very remarkable Examples where Imposture and Zeal, Bigotry and Hypocrify have liv'd together, in one and the fame Character.

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re I am to much warn d a LET this be as it will, reply'd he, I am forry, upon the whole, to find you of fuch an incredulous Temper.

raught me. And this laundion I am

'Tis just, said I, that you shou'd pity me as a Sufferer, for losing that Pleasure which I fee others enjoy. For what stronger Pleasure is there with Mankind, or what do they earlier learn or longer retain, than the Love of hearing and relating Wonderthings strange and incredible? How won-ment. derful a thing is the Love of wondering, and of raising Wonder! 'Tis the Delight of Children to hear Tales they shiver at,

Part 2. and the Vice of Old Age to abound in strange Storys of Times past. We come into the World wondering at every thing; ment. and when our Wonder about common things is over, we feek fomething new to wonder at. Our last Scene is to tell Wonders of our own, to all who will believe'em. And amidst all this, 'tis well if TRUTH comes off, but moderately tainted,

> 'Tis well, reply'd he, if with this moderate FAITH of yours, you can believe any Miracles whatever.

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No matter, faid I, how incredulous I am of modern Miracles, if I have a right Faith in those of former times, by paying the deference due to Sacred Writ. 'Tis credulity. here I am so much warn'd against Credulity, and enjoin'd never to believe even the greatest Miracles which may be wrought, in opposition to what has been already taught me. And this Injunction I am fo well fitted to comply with, that I can fafely engage to keep still in the same Faith, and promise never to believe amis.

> But is this a Promise which can well be made?

> IF not, and that my Belief indeed does not absolutely depend upon my-self, how am I accountable for it? I may be justly punish'd

punish'd for Actions, in which my Will Sect. 5. is free; but with what Justice can I be challeng'd for my Belief, if in this I am not at my liberty? If Credulity and Incredulity are Defects only in the Judgment; and the best-meaning Person in the world may err on either side, whilst a much worse Man, by having better Parts, may judg far better of the Evidence of things: how can you punish him who errs, unless you wou'd punish Weakness, and say, 'tis just for Men to suffer for their Unhappiness, and not their Fault?

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I Am apt to think, said he, that very few of those who are punish'd for their Incredulity, can be said to be Sufferers for their Weakness.

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I, that Simplicity and Weakness is more the Character of the Credulous than of the Unbelieving; yet I see not, but that even this way still we are as liable to suffer by our Weakness, as in the contrary Case by an over-refin'd Wit. For if we cannot command our own Belief, how are we secure against those salse Prophets, and their deluding Miracles, of which we have such Warning given us? How are we safe from Heresy and salse Religion? Credulity being that which delivers us up to all Impostures of this sort, and which X 4

Credulity.

Part 2. actually at this day holds the Pagan and Mahometan World in Error and blind Sur perstition. Either therefore there is no Punishment due to wrong Belief, because we cannot believe as we will our felves; or if we can, why fhou'd we not promife never to believe amis? Now in respect of Miracles to come, the furest way never to believe amiss, is never to believe at all. For being fatisfy'd of the Truth of our Religion by past Miracles, so as to need no other to confirm us; the Belief of new may often do us harm, but can never do us good. Therefore as the truest Mark of a believing Christian is to feek after no Sign or Miracle to come y for the fafest Station in Christianity is his who can be mov'd by nothing of this kind, and is thus Miracle-proof. For if the Miracle be on the fide of his Faith, itis fuperfluous, and he needs it not; if against his Faith, let it be as great as possible, he will never regard it in the least, or believe it any other than Imposture, the coming from an Angel. So that with all that Incredulity for which you reproach me fo feverely, I take my-felf to be still the better and more Orthodox Christian. At least I am more fure of continuing to than you, who with your Credulity may be impos'd upon by fuch as are far short of Angels. For having this preparatory Disposition, 'tis odds but you may come in time to believe Miracles

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in any of the different Sects, who, we Sect. 5. know, all pretend to them. I am perfuaded therefore, that the best Maxim to go by, is that common one, "That Miracles are ceas'd:" And I am ready to defend this Opinion of mine to be the most probable in it-self, as well as most sutable to Christianity.

And now at laft he he-THIS Question, upon further Debate, happen'd to divide our two Companions. For the elderly Gentleman, my Antagonift, maintain'd, "That the giving up of "Miracles for the time present, wou'd be " of great advantage to the Atheists." The younger Gentleman, his Companion, question'd, " Whether the allowing 'em " might not be of as great advantage to " the Enthusiasts and Sectarys, against "the National Church: This of the two " being the greatest Danger (he thought) "both to Religion and the State." He was refolv'd, therefore, for the future to be as cautious in examining these modern Miracles, as he had before been eager in feeking 'em. He told us very pleafantly what an Adventurer he had been of that kind; and on how many Partys he had been ingag'd, with a fort of People who were always on the hot Scent of some new Prodigy or Apparition, some upstart Reveation or Prophecy. This, he thought, was

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Part 2. true Fanaticism Errant. He had enough of this Visionary Chace, and wou'd ramble no more in blind Corners of the World, as he had been formerly accustom'd, in Ghostly Company of Spirit-hunters, Witch-finders, and Layers-out for Hellish Storys and Diabolical Transactions. There was no need. he thought, of fuch Intelligences from Hell, to prove the Power of Heaven, and Being of a God. And now at last he begun to see the Ridicule of laying such a stress on these Matters: As if a Providence depended on them, and Religion were at flake, when any of these wild Feats were question'd. He was sensible there were many good Christians who made themselves strong Partisans in this Cause; tho he cou'd not but wonder at it, now he

> THE HEATHENS, he faid, who wanted Scripture, might have recourse to Miracles: And Providence perhaps had allow'd them their Oracles and Prodigys, as an imperfect kind of Revelation. The Jews too, for their hard Heart, and harder Understanding, had this allowance; when stubbornly they ask'd for Signs and Wonders. But CHRISTIANS, for their parts, had a far better and truer Revelation; they had their plainer Oracles, a more rational Law, and clearer Scripture, carrying its own Force, and withal fo

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well attested as to admit of no dispute. Sect. 5. And were I, continu'd he, to assign the exact time when Miracles probably might first have ceas'd, I shou'd be tempted to fancy it was when Sacred Writ took place, and was compleated.

THIS is Fancy indeed (reply'd the Miracles grave Gentleman) and a very dangerous past, one to that Scripture you pretend is of it-present. felf fo well attefted. The Attestation of Men dead and gone, in behalf of Miracles past and at an end, can never surely be of equal Force with Miracles present: And of these I maintain there are never wanting a Number sufficient in the World to warrant a Divine Existence. If there were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wou'd be apt to think there never were any. The present must answer for the Credibility of the past. This is "GOD Human witnessing for himself;" not "Men for Testimony. GOD." For who shall witness for Men, if in the Case of Religion they have no Testimony from Heaven in their behalf?

Men credible (faid the younger Gentleman) is another Question. But for mere Miracles, it seems to me, they cannot be properly said "To witness either for GOD or Men.". For who shall witness for the Miracles themselves? And what tho

Part 3 the they are ever so certain? What Security have we, that they are not acted by Damons? What Proof that they are not wrought by Magick? In short, "What "Trust is there to any thing above, or below, if the Signs are only of Power, "and not of Goodness?"

AND are you so far improved then, reply'd the severe Companion, under your new Sceptical Master (pointing to Me) that you can thus readily discard all Miraeles, as useless?

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THIS is Hancy indeed

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formewhat daunted with this rough Usage of his Friend; who was going on still with his Invective. Nay then (said I, interposing) Tis I who am to answer for this young Gentleman, whom you make to be my Disciple. And since his Modesty, I see, will not allow him to pursue what he has so handsomly begun, I will endeavour it my felf, if he will give me leave.

I went on, representing his fair Intention of establishing in the first place a rational and just Foundation for our Faith; so as to vindicate it from the Reproach of having no immediate Miracles to support it. He wou'd have done this (I said) undoubtedly,

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doubtedly, by shewing how good Proof sect. we had already for our Sacred Oracles, from the Testimony of the Dead; whose Characters and Lives might answer for them, as to the Truth of what they reported to us from God. This however was by no means " Witneffing for GOD," as the zealous Gentleman had hastily express'd himself. For this was above the Reach either of Men, or Miracles. Nor cou'd God witness for himself, or affert his Divine Being any other way to Men, than " By Testimony. " revealing himself to their Reason, ap-" pealing to their Judgment, and submit-" ting his Ways to their Censure, and cool " Deliberation." The Contemplation of the Universe, its Laws and Government, was (I aver'd) the only means which cou'd establish the found Belief of a DE-1 TY. For what the innumerable Miracles from every part affail'd the Sense, and gave the trembling Soul no respite? What the Miracles the Sky shou'd suddenly open, and all no proof of kinds of Prodigys appear, Voices be heard, or Characters read? What would this evince more than "That there were " certain Powers cou'd do all this?" But " What Powers; Whether One, or " more; Whether Superiour, or Subaltern; " Mortal, or Immortal; Wife, or Foolish; " Just, or Unjust; Good, or Bad;" this wou'd still remain a Mystery: as wou'd the true Intention, the Infallibility or CerPart 2. tainty of whatever these Powers afferted. Their Word cou'd not be taken in their own Case. They might silence Men indeed, but not convince them: fince " Power can never ferve as Proof " for Goodness; and GOODNESS is the " only Pledg of Truth." By GOODNESS alone, Trust is created. By GOODNESS superiour POWERS may win Belief. They must allow their Works to be examin'd, their Actions criticiz'd: And thus, thus only, they may be confided in; " When by repeated Marks their Benevo-" lence is prov'd, and their Character of " Sincerity and Truth establish'd." To whom therefore the Laws of this Universe and its Government appears just and uniform; to him it speaks the Government of one Just-ONE; to him it reveals and witnesses a GoD: and laying in him the Foundation of this first Faith, it fits him for a subsequent One. He can then hearken to Historical Revelation: and is then fitted (and not till then) for the Reception of any Message or miraculous Notice from Above; where he knows beforehand all is just and true. But this no Power of Miracles, nor any Power besides his REASON, can make him know, or apprehend.

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BUT now, continu'd I, fince I have been thus long the Defendant only; I am resolv'd to take up Offensive Arms, and be Aggressor in my turn; provided T HEOCLES be not angry with me for borrowing Ground from his Hypothesis.

WHATEVER you borrow of his, reply'd my Antagonist, you are pretty sure of spoiling it: And as it passes thro your hands, you had best beware lest you seem rather to restect on *Him* than *Me*.

I'LL venture it, said I; whilft I maintain that most of those Maxims you build upon, are fit only to betray your own For whilst you are labouring to unhinge Nature; whilst you are searching Heaven and Earth for Prodigys, and Atheism studying how to miraculize every thing : from Suyou bring Confusion on the World, you perstition, break its Uniformity, and destroy that admirable Simplicity of Order from whence the ONE infinite and perfect Principle is Perpetual Strifes, Convulsions, Violences, Breach of Laws, Variation and Unsteddiness of Order, shew either no Controul, or feveral uncontroul'd and unsubordinate Powers in Nature. We have before our eyes either the Chaos and Atoms of the ATHEISTS, or the Magick and Damons

Atheilm from Superstition.

Part 2. Damons of the POLYTHEISTS. Yet is this tumultuous System of the Universe afferted with the highest Zeal by some who wou'd maintain a DEITY. is that Face of Things, and there the Features by which they represent Divinity. Hither the Eyes of our more inquilitive and ingenuous Youth are turn'd with care, lest they see any thing otherwise than in this perplex'd and amazing View. As if Atheism were the most natural In-ference which could be drawn from a regular and orderly State of Things! But after all this mangling and disfigurement of Nature; If it happens (as oft it does) that the amaz'd Disciple coming to himfelf, and fearthing leifurely into Nature's Ways, finds more of Order, Uniformity and Constancy in Things than He suspected; He is of course driven into Atheism: And this merely by the Impressions he receiv'd from that preposterous System, which taught him to feek for DEITY in Confusion, and discover PROVIDENCE in an irregular disjointed World.

> AND when you, reply'd he, with your newly-espous'd System, have brought All things to be as uniform, plain, regular, and simple, as you cou'd wish; I suppose you will send your Disciple to seek for DEI-TY in Mechanism; that is to fay, in some exquisite System of self-govern'd Mat-

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ter For what else is it vou Naturalists Sect. ? make of the World, than a mere Machine?

from Sie grow weary with the orderly and reen-Northang elfe, reply'd L, if to the Machine you allow a Mind. For in this case 'tis not a Self-govern'd, but a God-goour Admiration. We maniforal barist

dles, Prodigys, Matter for Surprize and And what are the Tokens, faid her which shou'd convince us? What Signs shou'd this dumb Muchine give of its being thus govern'd ? ai blow off " ! y Tr " it proceed in Course: but an Effect of

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THE prefent, reply'd I, are fufficient. It cannot possibly give stronger Signs of Life and steddy Thought. Compare our own Machines with this great-ONE; and fee, Whether by their Order, Management and Motions, they betoken either so perfect a Life, or so consummate an Intelligence? The One is regular, fieldy, permanent; the other are irregular, variable, inconstant. In One there are the Marks of Wisdom and Determination; in the other, of Whimfy and Conceit: In one there appears Judgment; in the other Fancy only: In one Will; in the other Caprice: In one, Truth, Certainty, Knowledg; in the other, Error, Folly and Madness.—But to be convinced there is formething Above, which thinks and acts, we want, it feems, the latter of these Signs; as supposing there Vol. II. can

Atheism from Superstition.

Part 2 can be no Thought or Intelligence but what is like our own. We ficken and grow weary with the orderly and regular Course of Things. Periods, and stated Laws, and Revolutions just and proportionable, work not upon us, nor win our Admiration. We must have Riddles, Prodigys, Matter for Surprize and Horrour! By Harmony, Order and Concord, we are made Atheifts : By Irregularity and Discord, we are convinc'd of DE-ITY! " The World is mere Accident, if " it proceed in Course: but an Effect of " Wisdom, if it runs mad !"

> THUS I took upon me the part of a found THEIST, whilft I endeavour'd to refute my Antagonist, and shew that his Principles favour'd Atheism. The zealous Gentleman took high offence: And we continu'd debating warmly, till late at night. But THEOCLES was Moderator: And we retir'd at last to our Repose, all calm and friendly. However I was not a little rejoic'd to hear that our Comranions were to go away early the next Morning, and leave THEOCLES to me alone. Il adini !

ons of Life and fred ly Diosent. & Com-

For now (PALEMON!) that Morning was approaching, for which I fo much long'd. What your Longing may .II prove,

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prove, I may have reason to fear. You Sect. 5. have had enough, one wou'd think, to turn the edge of your Curiofity in this kind. Can it be imagin'd that after the Recital of Two fuch Days already past, you can with patience hear of Another yet to come, more Philosophical than either?—But you have made me promise; and now, whate'er it cost, take it you must as follows. 3310011H

en ein'd) whom I wak'd with the noil of People up in the Houle. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that THEOCEES had a little before parred with his Briends; ther which he went out to take his Moranag-Walks but work return (they thought) metry loom; for to he had left word; and chas no-body

The was yet deep Night (as I ima-

in the mean time (hou'd diffurb try Rell. were THIS was Dilien bance fufficions, when A heard it. I prefently for up; and had

the religion enough to lee the Hill, which sayas as a little diltance from the Houfe, I foon got chirher; and at the foot of the

Vol. II. Y 2 PART plain'd of his Unkindacis. For I was no

certainly (I told him) to efferminate and -nro work a friend, as to deferve that he though of]

streat me like a Wansan: Nor had I flows ove,

Recieal III pat Tro Rak A P de vou can III pat Tro Rak A P de vou con comes more Philosophical cha

bindan Canar be imagin a that affect

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have that enough, one would think to

provent may have realised of and Tolesen.

PHILOCLES to PALEMON,

IT was yet deep Night (as I imagin'd) when I wak'd with the noise of People up in the House. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that Theocles had a little before parted with his Friends; after which he went out to take his Morning-Walk, but wou'd return (they thought) pretty soon: For so he had left word; and that no-body in the mean time shou'd disturb my Rest.

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This was Disturbance sufficient, when I heard it. I presently got up; and finding it light enough to see the Hill, which was at a little distance from the House, I soon got thither; and at the foot of it, overtook Theocles; to whom I complain'd of his Unkindness. For I was not certainly (I told him) so effeminate and weak a Friend, as to deserve that he shou'd treat me like a Woman: Nor had I shown such

fuch an Aversion to his Manners or Con-Sect. r. versation, as to be thought fitter for the worldull Luxury of a soft Bed and Ease, than for Business, Recreation, or Study with an early Friend. He had no way therefore of making me amends, but by allowing me henceforward to be a Party with him in his serious Thoughts, as he saw I was resolved to be in his Hours and Exercises of this fort.

You have forgot then, faid THEO-CLES, the Affignation you had yesterday with the Sylvan N YM PHS at this Place and Hour? No, truly, faid I: For. as you fee, I am come punctually to the Place appointed. But I never expected you shou'd have come hither without me. Nay then, faid THEOCLES. there's hope you may in time become a Lover with me: for you already begin to show Jealousy. How little did I think these NYMPHS cou'd raise that Passion in you? Truly, faid I, for the Nymphs you mention, I know little of 'em as yet. My Jealoufy and Love regard Tou only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me. But now that I am again in possession of you, I want no Nymph to make me happy here; unless it were perhaps to join Forces against you, in the manner your belov'd Poet makes the Nymph A-

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and ou'd Part 3. G LE join with his two Youths, in forcing the God S I LENUS to fing to empirity

I DARE trust your Gallantry, reply'd THEOCLES, that if you had fuch fair Company as you speak of, you wou'd otherwise bestow your time than in an Adventure of Philosophy. But do you expect I shou'd imitate the Poet's God you mention'd, and fing "The Rife of "Things from Atoms; the Birth of Or-" der from Confusion; and the Origin of " Union, Harmony, and Concord, from the " fole Powers of CHAOS, and blind "Chance?" The Song indeed was fitted to the God. For what cou'd better fute his jolly Character, than fuch a drunken Creation; which he lov'd often to celebrate, by acting it to the Life? But even this Song was too harmonious for the Night's Debauch. Well has our Poet made it of the Morning, when the God was fresh: For hardly shou'd we be brought ever to believe that fuch harmonious Numbers cou'd arife from a mere Chaos of the Mind. But we must hear our Poet speaking in the Mouth of some foberer Demi-God or Hero. He then prefents us with a different Principle of Things, and in a more proper Order of Precedency, gives Thought the upper hand. He makes MIND originally to have govern'd Body; not Body Mind: For this had

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had been a Chaos everlasting, and Sect. 1.
must have kept all things in a Chaos-State to this day, and for ever, had it ever been.
But,

The active MIND, infus'd thro all the Space,
Unites and mingles with the mighty Mass:
Hence Men and Beasts.——

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HERE, PHILOCLES, we shall find our Sovereign Genius; if we can charm the Genius of the Place (more chast and sober than your SILENUS) to inspire us with a truer Song of Nature, teach us some celestial Hymn, and make us feel Divinity present in these solemn Places of Retreat.

HASTE then I conjure you, said I, good THEOCLES, and stop not one moment for any Ceremony or Rite. For well I see, methinks, that without any such Preparation, some Divinity has approach'd us, and already moves in you. We are come to the sacred Groves of the Hamadryads, which formerly were said to render Oracles. We are on the most beautiful part of the Hill; and the Sun, now ready to rise, draws off the Curtain of Night, and shews us the open Scene of Nature in the Plains below. Begin: For now I know you are full of those Divine

Part 3 vine Thoughts which meet you aver in this Solitudes a Give dem but Voice and Accepts: You may be fall as much done as you are us'd, and take no more notice of me than if I were absent.

The active MIND, infus'd thro all the

JUST as I had faid this, he turn'd away his Eyes from me, muling a while by himself; and soon afterwards, stretching out his Hand, as pointing to the Objects round him, he began

Medita-

the Genim of the Place (more chaft and "YE Fields and Woods, my Refuge " from the railforn World of Business, re-" ceive me in your quiet Sanctuarys, and " favour my Retreat and thoughtful Soli-" tude. Ye verdant Plains, how glad-" ly I salute ye!---Hail all ye blissful "Manfions! Known Seats! Delightful "Prospects! Majestick Beautys of this "Earth, and all ye Rural Powers, and "Graces! Blefs'd be ye chaft Abodes " of happiest Mortals, who here in peace-"ful Impocence enjoy a Life unenvy'd, " the Divine; whilst with its bless'd 4 Tranquillity it affords a happy Leisure 4 and Retreat for Man; who, made for "Contemplation, and to fearch his own "and other Natures, may here best me-" ditate the Cause of Things; and plac'd " amidst the various Scenes of Nature, may nearer view her Works, I won to 4 O

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first Center whence is parted. -Thus "O GLORIOUS Nature fofupremely "Fair, and fovereignly Good! All-loving "and All-lovely, All-divine! Whose "Looks are to becoming, and of fuch " infinite Grace; whole Study brings fuch Wildom, and whose Contemplation fuch Delight; whose every single "Work affords an ampler Scene, and is a nobler Spectacle than all that ever "Art presented !-- O mighty Nature! Wife Substitute of Providence! impow-" er'd Creatnes! Or Thou impowering DELTY, Supreme Creator! Thee I in-" voke, and Thee alone adore. To thee " this Solitude, this Place, these Rural Meditations are facred; whilft thus in-" spir'd with Harmony of Thought, tho " unconfin'd by Words, and in loofe " Numbers, I fing of Nature's Order in " created Beings, and celebrate the Beau-"tys which resolve in Thee, the Source " and Principle of all Beauty and Per-" fection. Commet of the londer were the

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"Thy Being is boundless, unsearch"able, impenetrable. In thy Immensity
"all Thought is lost; Fancy gives o'er its
"Flight: and weary'd Imagination spends
"it-self in vain; finding no Coast nor Li"mit of this Ocean, non, in the widest
"Tract thro which it soars, one Point
"yet nearer the Circumserence than the
"first

Meditation.

Part 3." first Center whence it parted. - Thus " having oft effay'd, thus fally'd forth " into the wide Expanse, when I return " again within My-felf, struck with the " Sense of this so narrow Being, and of " the Fulness of that Immense-one; I dare " no more behold the amazing Depths, " nor found the Abyss of Deity. Work affords an amplen Scene and is

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"YET fince by Thee (O Sovereign " MIND!) I have been form'd fuch as "I am, intelligent and rational; fince " the peculiar Dignity of my Nature is " to know and contemplate Thee; per-" mit that with due Freedom I exert " those Facultys with which thou hast " adorn'd me. Bear with my venturous " and bold Approach. And fince nor vain " Curiofity, nor fond Conceit, nor Love " of ought but Thee alone, inspires me " with fuch Thoughts as these, be Thou " my Assistant, and guide me in this Pur-" fuit; whilft I venture thus to tread the " Labyrinth of wide Nature, and endea-" vour to trace thee in thy Works."-

in thy impendicy HERE he stop'd short, and starting, as out of a Dream; Now, Philocles, faid he, inform me. How have I appear'd to you in my Fit? Seem'd it a sensible kind of Madness, like those Transarrog neater the Kilrounierence then the 打出 中

ports which are permitted to our Poets? Sect. 1. or was it downright Raving?

I ONLY wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your Transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to see Wonders in that Nature you taught me, and was coming to know the Hand of your Divine Artisseer. But if you stop here, I shall lose the Enjoyment of the pleasing Vision. And already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys in fancying such a Universal Genius as you describe.

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WHY, faid he, is there any difficulty Unity. in fancying the Universe to be One Intire Thing? Can one otherwise think of it, by what is visible, than that All hangs together, as of a Piece? Grant it: And what follows? Only this; that if it may indeed be faid of the World, "That it is fimply One," there shou'd be something belonging to it which makes it One. As how? No otherwise than as you may observe in every thing. For to instance in what we see before us; I know you look upon the Trees of this vast Wood to be different from one another: And this tall Oak, the noblest of the Company, as it is by it-felf a different thing from all its Fellows of the Wood, so with its own Wood of numerous spreading Branches (which

Part 3. (which feem fo many different TRBES) 'tis still, I suppose, one and the felf-fame Unity. TREE. Now shou'd you, as a mere Caviller, and not as a fair Scoptick, tell me that if a Figure of Wax, or any other Matter, were cast in the exact Shape and Colonies of this Tree, and temper'd, if possible to the fame kind of Substance. that therefore it might possibly the a real Tree of the same Kind or Species; I would have done with you, and reason no longer. But if you question'd me fairly, and defir'd I shou'd fatisfy you what I thought it was that made this Oneness or Sameness in the Tree or any other Plant; or by what it differ'd from the waxen Figure, or from any fuch Figure accidentally made, either in the Clouds, or on the Sand by the Seafhore; I should tell you, that neither the Wax, nor Sand, nor Cloud thus piec'd together by our Hand or Fancy, had any real relation within themselves, or had any Nature by which they corresponded

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this I shou'd affirm, "That wherever there was such a Sympathizing of Parts," as we saw here, in our real TREE;

any more in that near Situation of Parts,

than if fcatter'd ever fo far afunder. But

"Wherever there was fuch a plain Con-"currence in one common End, and to the

"Support, Nourishment, and Propaga-"tion of fo fair 4 Farm; we could not be

" mistaken in saying there was a peculiar "Nature

"Nature belonging to this Form, and com-Sect. 1."
"mon to it with others of the same which is a real Tree; lives, shourishes, and is still One and the same; even when by Vegetation and Change of Substance, not one Particle in it remains the same.

At this rate indeed, said I, you have found a way to make very adorable Places of these Sylvan Habitations. For besides the living Genius of each Place, the Woods too, which, by your account, are animated, have their Hamadryads, no doubt, and the Springs and Rivulets their Nymphs in store belonging to 'em: And these too, by what I can apprehend, of immaterial and immortal Substances.

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We injure 'em then, reply'd Theocles, to fay "they belong to these Trees;" and not rather "these Trees to them." But as for their Immortality, let them look to it themselves. I only know that both theirs and all other Natures must for their Duration depend alone on that Nature on which the World depends: And that every Genius else must be subordinate to that One good Gentus, whom I wou'd willingly persuade you to think belonging to this World, according to our present way of speaking. e Marare belonging to this for est and end

Part 3.

Personality.

Self.

LEAVING, therefore, these Trees, continu'd he, to personate themselves the best they can, let us examine this thing of Personality between you and me; and confider how you, PHILOCLES, are Tou, and I'm My-self. For that there is a Sympathy of Parts in these Figures of ours. other than in those of Marble form'd by a PHIDIAS OF PRAXITELES, Sense, I believe, will teach us. And yet that our own Marble, or Stuff (whate'er it be, of which we are compos'd) wears out in feven, or, at the longest, in twice seven Years, the meanest Anatomist can tell us. Now where, I befeech you, will that fame One be found at last, supposing it to lie in the Stuff it-self, or any part of it? For when that is wholly fpent, and not one Particle of it left, we are Our-selves still as much as before.

What you Philosophers are, reply'd I, may be hard perhaps to determine: But for the rest of Mankind, I dare affirm, that sew are so long themselves as half seven years. 'Tis good fortune if a Man be one and the same only for a day or two. A Year makes more Revolutions than can be number'd.

TRUE, said he: But notwithstanding this may happen to a Man, and chiefly to

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one whose contrary Vices set him at odds Sect. 1. fo often with himself; yet when he comes to fuffer, or be punish'd for those Vices. he finds himself, if I mistake not, still one and the same. And you (PHILOCLES!) who, tho you disown Philosophy, are yet fo true a Profelyte to Pyrrhonism; shou'd you at last, feeling the Power of the GE-NIUS I preach, be wrought upon to own the Divine Hypothesis, and from this new Identity. Turn of Thought admit a total Change in all your Principles and Opinions; yet wou'd you be still the felf-same PHILO-CLES: tho better yet, if you will take my Judgment, than the present-one, as much as I love and value him. You fee therefore, there is a strange Simplicity in this You and ME, that in reality they shou'd be still one and the same, when neither one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one Thought remains the same. And for that poor Endeavour of making out this Sameness or Identity of Being, from some self-same Matter, or Particle of Matter, Matter. fuppos'd to remain with us when all besides is chang'd; this is by so much the more contemptible, as that Matter it-felf is not really capable of fuch Simplicity. For I dare answer, you will allow this You and Me to be each of us simply and individually One, better than you can allow the same to any thing of mere Matter; unless quitting your Inclination for Scepticism.

Part 3. ricifm, you fall so in love with the Notion of an A Tom, as to find it full as intelligible and certain to you, as that You are Your-Seur Sin In Holmin ship ed

(!rirocrest) roy bad ...

Bur whatever, continu'd THEO. CLES, be suppos'd of uncompounded Matter (a Thing, at best, pretty difficult to conceive) yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of fuch Parts as unite and conspire in these Frames of ours, and others like them; if it can present us with so many innumerable Instances of particular Forms, that share this simple Principle, by which they are really One, live, act, and have a Nature A Genius. or Genius peculiar to themselves, and provident for their own Welfare; how shall we at the same time overlook this in the Whole, and deny the great and General ONE of the World? How can we be fo unnatural as to disown Divine Nature, preme One. our common Parent, and refuse to recog-

> Sovereigns, faid I, require no Notice to be taken of 'em, when they pass incognito, nor no Homage but where they appear in due Form. We may even have reason to presume they shou'd be displeas'd with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to discover them, when they keep themselves either wholly invisible, or

nize the Universal and Sovereign GENIUS?

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in very dark difguise. As for the Notice Sect. t. we take of these invisible Powers in the common way of our Religion, we have our visible Sovereigns to answer for us. Our lawful Superiours teach us what we are to own, and to perform, in Worship. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their Example. But in a philosophical way, I find no warrant for our being fuch earnest Recognizers of a controverted Title. However it be. you must allow one at least to understand the Controversy, and know the Nature of these Powers describ'd. May one not inquire, "What Substances they are of? Substance, " whether material or immaterial?"

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MAY one not, on the other hand, reply'd THEOCLES, inquire as well, "What "Substance, or Which of these two Sub-"stances you count your real and proper "Self." Or wou'd you rather be no Substance, but chuse to call your-self a Mode or Accident?

TRULY, said I, as accidental as my Life may be, or as that random Humour is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, so real or substantial as My-Self. Therefore if there be that Thing you call a Substance, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing surther relating to this Question, you know my Vol. II.

Z Sceptick

Part 3. Sceptick Principles : I determine neither way.

ALLOW me then, reply'd he (good PHILOCLES!) the fame Privilege of Scepticism in this respect; since it concerns not the Affair before us, Which way we determine, or Whether we come to any Determination at all in this point. For be the Difficulty ever so great; it stands the same, you may perceive, against your own Being, as against that which I am pretending to convince you of. You may raise what Objections you please on either hand; and your Dilemma may be of notable force against the manner of such a supreme Being's Existence. But after you have done all, you will bring the same Dilemma home to you, and be at a loss still about Your-SELE. When you have argu'd ever fo long upon these Metaphyfical Points of Mode and Substance, and have philosophically concluded from the Difficultys of each Hypothesis, "That there cannot be in Nature such a Uni-" versal-One as This;" you must conclude, from the same Reasons, "That "there cannot be any fuch particular-One " as Your-felf." But that there is actually fuch a one as this latter, your own Mind, tis hop'd, may fatisfy you. And of this Mind'tis enough to fay, "That it is some-" thing which acts upon a Body, and has " fome-

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Metaphyficks.

A Mind.

" something passive under it, and subject Sect. r. " to it: That it has not only Body or mere ~~ " Matter for its Subject, but in some re-" spect even it-self too, and what pro-" ceeds from it: That it superintends and " manages its own Imaginations, Appearan-" ces, Fancys; correcting, working, and " modelling these, as it finds good; and " adorning and accomplishing, the best it " can, this composite Order of Body and "Understanding." Such a MIND and governing Part I know there is somewhere in the World. Let PYRRHO, by the help of such another, contradict me, if he pleases. We have our several Under-Particular standings and Thoughts, however we Minds. came by 'em: Each understands and thinks the best he can for his own purpose: He for Himself; I for another Self. And who, I befeech you, for the WHOLE? -No-body? Nothing at all? The World, perhaps, you suppose to be mere Mind of Body: A Mass of modify'd Matter. The the Whole. Bodys of Men are part therefore of this Body. The Imaginations, Sensations, Apprehensions of Men are included in this Body, and inherent in it, produc'd out of it, and resum'd again into it; tho the Body it seems never dreams of it! The World it-felf is never the wifer for all the Wit and Wisdom it breeds! It has no Apprehension at all of what is doing; No Thought kept to it-felf, for its own Vol. II. proper Z 2

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Part 3. proper use, or purpose; Not a single Imagination or Reflection, by which to difcover or be conscious of the manifold Imaginations and Inventions which it fets afoot, and deals abroad with fuch an open hand! The goodly Bulk fo prolifick, kind, and yielding for every one elfe, has nothing left at last for its own share; having unhappily lavish'd all away !-By what Chance I wou'd fain understand. "How? or by what necessity? - Who " gives the Law?——Who orders and " distributes thus?" NATURE, say you. And what is Nature? Is It Sense? Is It a Person? Has She Reason or Understanding? No. Who then understands for her, or is interested or concern'd in her behalf? No-one; not a Soul: But Every one for himself.

> COME on then. Let us hear further. Is not this Nature still a SELF? Or, tell me, I beseech you, How are You one? By what Token? or by virtue of What? By a Principle which joins certain " Parts, and which thinks and acts con-" fonantly for the Use and Purpose of " those Parts." Say, therefore, What is your whole System a Part of? Or is it, indeed, no Part, but a Whole, by it-felf, absolute, independent, and unrelated to any thing besides? If it be indeed a Part, and really related; to what, I befeech

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Nature.

feech you, but to the Whole of NATURE? Sect. I.

Is there then such a uniting Principle in Nature, NATURE? If so, how are you then a subject to Self, and Nature not so? How have you a Mind. something to understand and act for you, and NATURE, who gave this Understanding, nothing at all to understand for her, advise her, or help her out (poor Being!) on any occasion, whatever Necessity she may be in? Has the WORLD such ill fortune in the main? Are there so many particular understanding active Principles every where? And is there Nothing, at last, that thinks, acts, or understands for All? Nothing that administers or looks after All?

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No (fays one of a modern Hypothesis) Contrary for the WORLD was from Eternity, as Belief. you fee it; and is no more than barely what you fee: " Matter modify'd; a Lump " in motion, with here and there a Thought, " or scatter'd Portion of dissoluble Intelli-" gence." - No (fays one of an antienter Hypothesis) For the World was once without any Intelligence or Thought at all; " Mere Matter, Chaos, and a Play of Two forts. " Atoms; till Thought, by Chance, came " into play, and made up a Harmony " which was never design'd, or thought " of."—Admirable Conceit !—Believe Faith of it who can. For my own share (thank Atheism. Providence) I have a MIND in my possession, Z 3

Part 3. possession, which serves, such as it is, to keep my Body and its Affections, my Paffions, Appetites, Imaginations, Fancys, and the rest, in tolerable Harmony and Order. But the Order of the UNIVERSE, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Let Epicurus, if he please, think his the better; and believing no Genius or Wisdom above his own, inform us by what Chance 'twas dealt him, and how Atoms came to be so wife.

Faith of Theism.

In fine, continu'd THEOCLES (raifing his Voice and Action) being thus, even by Scepticism it-self, convinc'd the more still of my own Being, and of this Self of mine, "That 'tis a real Self, drawn out, and copy'd from another principal and ori-" ginal SELF (the Great-one of the World)" I endeavour to be really one with It, and conformable to It, as far as I am able. I consider, That as there is one general Mass, one Body of the Whole; so to this Body there is an Order, to this Order, a MIND: That to this general MIND each particular-one must have relation; as being of like Substance (as much as we can understand of Substance) alike active upon Body, original to Motion and Order; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like Energy, Effect, and Operation; and more like itill, if it co-operates with It to general Good, and strives to will , horfished according

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according to that best of Wills. So that Sect. 1. it cannot furely but feem natural, " That " the particular MIND shou'd feek its " Happiness in conformity with the gene-" ral-one, and endeavour to refemble it " in its highest Simplicity and Excel-" lence."

THEREFORE, Now, faid I, good THEOCLES, be once again the Enthafiast; and let me hear a-new that Divine Song with which I was lately charm'd. I am already got over my Qualm, and begin better than ever to fancy fuch a Nature as you fpeak of; Infomuch that I find myfelf mightily in its Interest, and concern'd that all shou'd go happily and well with it. Tho at the rate it often runs, I can scarce help being in some pain on its account.

FEAR not, my Friend, reply'd he. For Energy of know that every particular NATURE Nature. certainly and constantly produces what is good to it-felf; unless something foreign disturbs or hinders it, either by overpowering and corrupting it within, or by Violence from without. Thus Nature in the Patient struggles to the last, and strives to throw off the Distemper. Thus even in these Plants we see round us, every Z 4 par-

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Part 3. particular NATURE thrives, and attains its Perfection, if nothing from without obstructs it, nor any thing foreign has already impair'd or wounded it: And even in this case, it does its utmost still to redeem it-felf. What are all Weaknesses.

Distempers.

Dittortions, Sicknesses, imperfect Births, and the feeming Contradictions and Perversitys of Nature, but merely of this fort? And how ignorant must one be of all natural Causes and Operations, to think that any of these Disorders happen by a Miscarriage of the particular Nature, and not by the Force of some foreign Nature which over-powers it? If therefore every particular Nature be thus constantly and unerringly true to it-felf, and certain to produce only what is good for it-felf, and conducing to its own right State; shall not the general-one, The NATURE of the Whole, do full as much? Shall That alone miscarry or fail? Or is there any thing foreign which shou'd at any time do violence upon It, or force It out of its natural way? If not, then all It produces is to its own advantage and good; the Good of All in general: And what is for the good of all in general, is Just and Good. 'Tis so, said I, I confess.

General Good.

> THEN you ought to rest satisfy'd, reply'd he; and not only fo, but be pleas'd and

fo

and rejoice at what happens, knowing Sect. 1. whence it comes, and to what Perfection it Refigna-

By Force of Probability, Itali

BLESS me! faid I, THEOCLES, into what a Superstition are you like to lead me! I thought it heretofore the Mark of a superstitious Mind, to search for Providence in the common Accidents of Life. and ascribe to the Divine Power those common Difasters and Calamitys which Nature has entail'd on Mankind, But now, I find, I must place all in general to one Account; and viewing things thro a kind of Magical Glass, I am to see the worst of Ills transform'd to Good, and admire equally whatever comes from one and the same perfect Hand.—But no matter, I can furmount all. Go on, THEOCLES, and let me advise you in my own behalf, that fince you have rekindled me, you do not by delaying give me time to cool again.

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I Wou'd have you know, reply'd he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm Fit, and be beholden to Temper or Imagination for gaining me your Assent. Therefore e'er I go yet a step farther, I am resolv'd to enter again into cool Reason with you, and ask, If you admit for Proof what I advanc'd yesterday upon that

Part 3. that head " Of a Universal UNION, " Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things?"

Principle
of Order,

By Force of Probability, said I, you overcame me. Being convinc'd of a Confent and Correspondence in all we saw of Things, I consider'd it as unreasonable not to allow the same throughout!

UNREASONABLE indeed! reply'd he. For in the Infinite Residue, were there no Principle of Union; it wou'd feem next to impossible, that things within our Sphere shou'd be consistent, and keep their Order. "For what was insi"nite wou'd be predominant."

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It feems fo.

TELL me then, faid he, after this Union own'd, how you can refuse to allow the name of Demonstration to the remaining Arguments, which establish the Government of a persect Mind.

Phenomena of Ill, Your Solutions, said I, of the ill Appearances are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration. And whatever seems vicious or imperfect in the Creation, puts a stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be solv'd.

Dip you not then, said he, agree with me, when I aver'd that the Appearances must must of necessity stand as they are, and Sect. r. things seem altogether as impersect, even on the Concession of a persect Supreme Mind existent?

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AND is not the same Reason good still? viz. "That in an Infinity of Things, mu"tually relative, a Mind which sees not in"finitely, can see nothing fully; and must Whence.
"therefore frequently see that as imperfect,
"which in it-self is really perfect."
The Reason is still good.

ARE the Appearances, then, any Objection to our Hypothesis?

None, whilst they remain Appearances only.

CAN you then prove them to be any more? For if you cannot, you prove nothing. And that it lies on you to prove, you plainly fee: fince the Appearances do not only agree with the Hypothesis, but are a necessary Consequence from it. To bid Me prove, therefore, in this case, is the same as to bid me be infinite. For nothing but what is infinite can see infinite Connexions.

THE Presumption I must confess, said I, by this reckoning, is wholly on your side. Yet still this is only Presumption.

TAKE

Part 3.
Demonstration.

TAKE Demonstration then, said he, if you can endure I shou'd reason thus abstractedly and drily. The Appearances of ILL, you say, are not necessarily that ILL they represent to us.

I own it.

THEREFORE what they represent may possibly be Good.

It may.

AND therefore there may possibly be no real ILL in things: but all may be perfectly concurrent to one Interest; the Interest of that Universal ONE.

It may be fo.

Why, then, if it may be so (be not surpris'd) "It follows that it must be so;" on the account of that great Unit, and simple Self-Principle which you have granted in the Whole. For whatever is possible in the Whole, the Nature or Mind of the Whole will put in execution, for the Whole's Good: And if it be possible to exclude Ill, It will exclude it. Therefore since notwithstanding the Appearances, 'tis possible that Ill may actually be excluded; count upon it, "That actually it is excluded." For nothing merely passive can oppose this universally active Principle,

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ciple. If any thing active oppose it, 'tis Sect. 1.

another Principle.

Allow it.

Manichaism.

'T is impossible. For were there in Nature Two or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there must be fome natural Reason for their Agreement: and this natural Reason cannot be from Chance, but from some particular Design, Contrivance, or Thought: which brings us back again to ONE Principle, and makes the other two to be subordinate. And thus when we have compar'd each of the Three Opinions, viz. " That there is no designing conclusion. " active Principle; That there is more than " one;" or, " That finally there is but "ONE:" we shall perceive, that the only confistent Opinion is the last. And fince one or other of these Opinions must of necessity be true; what can we determine, but that the last is, and must be so, demonstrably? If it be Demonstration, " That in Three " Opinions, One of which must necessarily " be true, Two being plainly abfurd, the " Third must be the Truth."

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nle. ENOUGH, said I, THEOCLES.

My Doubts are vanish'd. MALICE
and CHANCE (vain Phantoms!) have
yielded to that all-prevalent Wisdom
which

Part 3. which you have establish'd. You are Conqueror in the cool way of Reason, and may with Honour now grow warm again, in your Poetick Vein. Return therefore, I intreat you, once more, to that Perfection of Being; and address your-self to It as before, on our Approaches to these Sylvan Scenes, where first It seem'd to inspire you. I shall now no longer be in danger of imagining either Magick or Superstition in the case; since you invoke no other Power than that single One, which seems so natural.

Medita-

THUS I continue then, said THEO-CLEs, addressing my-felf, as you wou'd have me, to that Guardian-DEITY and Inspirer, whom we are to imagine present here; but not here only. For "O Migh-" ty GENIUS! Sole-Animating and In-" spiring Power! Author and Subject of " these Thoughts! Thy Influence is uni-" versal: and in all Things thou art in-" most. From Thee depend their secret " Springs of Action. Thou mov'st them " with an irrefistible unweary'd Force, by " facred and inviolable Laws, fram'd for " the Good of each particular Being; as " best may fute with the Perfection, Life, " and Vigour of the Whole. The vital " Principle is widely shar'd, and infinite-" ly vary'd: Dispers'd throughout; no " where

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" where extinct. All lives: and by Suc-Sect. 1. cession still revives. The Temporary Beings quit their borrow'd Forms, and yield their Elementary Substance to New-Comers. Call'd, in their several turns, to Life, they view the Light, and viewing pass; that others too may be Spectators of the goodly Scene, and greater numbers still enjoy the Privi-" lege of NATURE. Munificent and " Great, she imparts her-felf to most; " and makes the Subjects of her Bounty " infinite. Nought stays her hastning " Hand. No Time nor Substance is lost or un-improv'd. New Forms arise: " and when the old dissolve, the Matter of which they were compos'd is not left useless, but wrought with equal Ma-" nagement and Art, even in Corruption, " Nature's seeming Waste, and vile Ab-" horrence. The abject State appears merely as the Way or Passage to some better. But cou'd we nearly view it, and " with Indifference, remote from the Antipathy of Sense; we then perhaps " shou'd highest raise our Admiration: " convinc'd that even the Way it-felf was " equal to the End. Nor can we judg less of that confummate Art exhibited thro " all the Works of Nature; since our " weak Eyes, help'd by mechanick Art, " discover in these Works a hidden Scene " of Wonders; Worlds within Worlds, es of

Medit a-

Part 3." of infinite Minuteness, tho as to Art " still equal to the greatest, and pregnant " with more Wonders than the most dis-

" cerning Sense, join'd with the greatest

" Art, or the acutest Reason, can pene-

" trate or unfold.

" But 'tis in vain for us to fearch the " bulky Mass of MATTER: seeking to " know its Nature; how great the Whole

" it-felf, or even how small its Parts.

" IF knowing only fome of the Rules " of Motion, we feek to trace it fur-" ther, 'tis in vain we follow it into the " Bodys it has reach'd. Our tardy Ap-" prehensions fail us, and can reach no-thing beyond the Body it-felf, thro " which it is diffus'd. Wonderful Being! " (if we may call it so) which Bodys ne-" ver receive, but from others that lose " it; nor ever lose, but by imparting it " to others. Even without Change of " Place it has its Force: And Bodys big " with Motion labour to move, yet stir " not; whilst they express an Energy be-" youd our Comprehension.

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" In vain too we pursue that Phantom " TIME, too small, and yet too mighty " for our Grasp; when shrinking to a " narrow point, it scapes our Hold, or " mocks our fcanty Thought by fwelling

"to Eternity: an Object unproportion'd Sect. 1."
"to our Capacity, as is thy Being, O "
"thou Antient Cause! older than Time,
"yet young with fresh Eternity.

"IN vain we try to fathom the Abyss
" of Space, the Seat of thy extensive
" Being; of which no Place is empty,
" no Void but what is full.

"In vain we labour to understand that " Principle of SENSE and THOUGHT, " which feeming in us to depend fo " much on Motion, yet differs so much " from it, and from Matter it-felf, as not " to fuffer us to conceive how Thought " can more refult from this, than this a-" rife from Thought. But Thought we " own pre-eminent, and confess the real-" lest of Beings; the only Existence of " which we are made sure, by being con-" scious. All else may be but Dream and " Shadow. All that even Sense suggests " may be deceitful. The SENSE it-self " remains still: REASON subsists: and " THOUGHT maintains its Eldership of " Being. Thus are we in a manner con-" scious of that original and eternally ex-" istent THOUGHT whence we derive " our own. And thus the Assurance we " have of the Existence of Beings above " our Sense, and of THEE (the Great "Exemplar of thy Works) comes from " Thee: Vo L. II. Aa

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Part 3. "Thee, the ALL-TRUE, and Perfect, who hast thus communicated Thy-self who hast thus communicated Thy-self more immediately to us, so as in some manner to inhabit within our Souls; "Thou who art Original Soul, diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the Whole!

"ALL Nature's Wonders serve to ex"cite and perfect this Idea of their Au"thor. 'Tis here he suffers us to see,
"and even converse with him, in a man"ner more sutable to our Frailty. How
"glorious is it to contemplate Him, in
"this noblest of his Works apparent to
"us, The System of the bigger World!—

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HERE I must own, 'twas no small Comfort to me, to find that, as our Meditation turn'd, we were likely to get clear of an entangling abstruse Philosophy. I was in hopes Theocles, as he proceeded, might stick closer to Nature, since he was now come upon the Borders of our World. And here I wou'd willingly have welcom'd him, but that I thought it not safe at present to venture the least Interruption.

"Besides the neighbouring Planets (continu'd he, in his rapturous Strain)
"what Multitudes of fix'd STARS did
"we see sparkle, not an hour ago, in the
"clear Night, which yet had hardly
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" yielded to the Day? How many others Sect. 1. " are discover'd by the help of Art? Yet "how many remain still, beyond the " reach of our Discovery! Crouded as "they feem, their Distance from each " other is as unmeasurable by Art, as is "the Distance between them and us. "Whence we are naturally taught the "Immensity of that BEING, who thro "these immense Spaces has dispos'd such " an Infinite of Bodys, belonging each " (as we may well prefume) to Systems " as compleat as our own World: Since " even the finallest Spark of this bright "Galaxy may vie with this our Sun; "which shining now full out, gives us " new Life, exalts our Spirits, and makes

"PRODIGIOUS ORB! Bright Source " of vital Heat, and Spring of Day! Soft Flame, yet how intense, how ac-"tive! How diffusive, and how vast a Substance; yet how collected thus with-"in it-felf, and in a glowing Mass confin'd to the Center of this Planetary World! Being! Brightest Image, and Representative of the Almighty! Supreme of the Corporeal World! Unperishing in Grace, and of undecaying Youth! Fair, Beautiful, and hardly Mortal Creature! By what fecret ways dost Thou receive the Sup-VOL. II. " plys Aa 2

"us feel DIVINITY more present.

The MORALISTS,

Part 3. " plys which maintain Thee still in such medita." unweary'd Vigour, and un-exhausted tion. "Glory; notwithstanding those eternal-

"Iy emitted Streams, and that continual

"Expence of vital Treasures which in-

" lighten and invigorate the furrounding

Whence we are naturally taught one

the Distance between then! ablitows.

"AROUND him all the PLANETS,
"with this our Earth, single, or with At"tendants, continually move; seeking to
"receive the Blessing of his Light, and
"lively Warmth! Towards him they
"seem to tend with prone descent, as to
"their Center; but happily controul'd
"their Center; but happily controul'd
"fill by another Impulse, they keep their
"heavenly Order; and in just Numbers,
"and exactest Measure, go the Eternal
"Rounds.

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"But, O Thou who art the Author
"and Modifier of these various Motions!
"O Sovereign and Sole Mover, by whose
"high Art the rolling Spheres are go"vern'd, and these stupendous Bodys of
"our World hold their unrelenting Courses! O wise Occonomist, and powerful
"Chief, whom all the Elements and
"Powers of Nature serve! How hast
"thou animated these moving Worlds?
"What Spirit or Soul infus'd? What
"Biass fix'd? Or how encompass'd them
"in liquid Æther, driving them as with

"the Breath of living Winds, thy active Sect. 1.
"and unweary'd Ministers in this intri"cate and mighty Work?

"Thus powerfully are the Systems held intire, and kept from fatal interfering. Thus is our ponderous GLOBE directed in its annual Course; daily revolving on its own Center: whilst the obsequious MOON with double Labour, monthly surrounding this our bigger Orb, attends the Motion of her Sister-Planet, and pays in common her circular Homage to the Sun.

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"Yet is this Mansion-GLOBE, this " Man-Container, of a much narrower " compass even than other its Fellow-" Wanderers of our System. How nar-" row then must it appear, compar'd " with the capacious System of its own " Sun? And how narrow, or as nothing, in respect of those innumerable Systems of other apparent Suns? Yet how immense a Body it feems, compar'd with ours of human Form, a borrow'd Remnant of its variable and oft-converted Sur-" face? tho animated with a fublime " Celestial Spirit, by which we have Re-" lation and Tendency to Thee our Hea-" venly Sire, Center of Souls; to whom " these Spirits of ours by Nature tend, as " earthly Bodys to their proper Center.— Aa 3

Meditation.

Part 3." O did they tend as unerringly and constantly! But Thou alone composest " the Diforders of the Corporeal World, " and from the reftless and fighting Ele-" ments raisest that peaceful Concord, and " conspiring Beauty of the ever-flourish-" ing Creation. Even so canst thou con-" vert these jarring Motions of Intelli-" gent Beings, and in due time and man-" ner cause them to find their Rest; mak-" ing them contribute to the Good and " Perfection of the UNIVERSE, thy all-" good and perfett Work .-

> HERE again he broke off, looking on me as if he expected I shou'd speak; which when he found plainly I wou'd not, but continu'd still in a Posture of musing Thought: Why PHILOCLES! (faid he, with an Air of Wonder) What can this mean, that you shou'd fuffer me thus to run on, without the least Interruption? Have you at once given over your scrupulous Philosophy, to let me range thus at pleasure thro these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions, where my capricious Fancy or eafy Faith has led me? I wou'd have you know, my PHILOCLES, that I had never trusted my-felf with you in this Vein of Enthusiasm, but that I rely'd on you to govern it a little better,

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Sect. 1.

I FIND then, faid I (rouzing my-felf from my musing Posture) you expect I shou'd serve you in the same capacity as that Musician, whom an antient Orator made use of at his Elbow, to strike such moving Notes as rais'd him when he was perceiv'd to sink; and calm'd him again, when his impetuous Spirit was transported in too high a Strain.

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You imagine right, reply'd Theocles; and therefore I am refolv'd not to go on, till you have promis'd to pull me by the Sleeve when I grow extravagant. Be it fo, faid I; You have my Promise. But how if instead of rising in my Transports, I shou'd grow flat and tiresom? What Lyre or Instrument wou'd you imploy to raise me?

THE Danger, I told him, cou'd hardly be supposed to lie on this hand. His Vein was a plentiful one; and his Enthusiasm in no likelihood of failing him. His Subject too, as well as his Numbers, wou'd bear him out. And with the advantage of the rural Scene around us, his number'd Prose, I thought, supply'd the room of the best Pastoral Song. For in the manner I was now wrought up, 'twas as agreeable to me to hear him, in this kind of Passion, invoke his Stars and Ele-

Aa 4

ments,

Part 3. ments, as to hear one of those amorous

Shepherds complaining to his Flock, and
making the Woods and Rocks resound the
Name of Her whom he ador'd.—Begin therefore (continu'd I, still pressing
him) Begin a-new, and lead me boldly
thro your Elements. Wherever there is
danger, be it on either hand, I promise to
give you warning, when I perceive it.

LET us begin then, faid he, with this our Element of EARTH, which yonder we fee cultivated with fuch Care by the early Swains now working in the Plain below. - " Unhappy reftless Men, " who first disdain'd these peaceful La-" bours, gentle rural Tasks, perform'd " with such Delight! What Pride or " what Ambition bred this Scorn? Hence " all those fatal Evils of your Race. " Enormous Luxury, despising homely " Fare, ranges thro Seas and Lands, rifles " the Globe; and Men ingenious to their " Misery, work out for themselves the " means of heavier Labours, anxious " Cares, and Sorrow. Not fatisfy'd to " turn and manure for their Use the " wholefom and beneficial Mould of this " their EARTH, they dig yet deeper, " and feeking out imaginary Wealth, " they fearch its very Entrails." one tests and

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" Here, led by Curiofity, we find "Minerals of different Natures, which by their Simplicity discover no less of the Divine Art, than the most compounded of Nature's Works. Some are

"found capable of furprizing Changes;
"others as durable, and hard to be de"ftroy'd or chang'd by Fire, or utmost

"Art. So various are the Subjects of our Contemplation, that even the Study of these inglorious Parts of Nature, in

"the nether World, is able it-felf alone
to yield large Matter and Employment
for the busiest Spirits of Men, who in

"the Labour of these Experiments can willingly consume their Lives.—But

"the noisom poisonous Steams which the Earth breathes from these dark Ca-

" verns, where she conceals her Trea-

" fures, fuffer not prying Mortals to live

" long in this Search.

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"How comfortable is it to those who come out hence alive, to breathe a purea Air! to see the rejoicing Light of Day! and tread the fertile Ground!

How gladly they contemplate the Surface of the Earth, their Habitation,
heated and enliven'd by the Sun, and
temper'd by the fresh Air of fanning
Breezes! These exercise the resty Plants,
and scour the unactive Globe. And

Bion.

Part 3." when the Sun draws hence thick clouded Steams and Vapours, 'tis only to " digest and exalt the unwholesom Parti-" cles, and commit 'em to the fprightly "AIR; who foon imparting his quick " and vital Spirit, renders 'em again with " improvement to the Earth, in gentle " Breathings, or in rich Dews and fruit-" ful Showers. The fame AIR moving " about the mighty Mass, enters its Pores, " impregnating the Whole: And both " the Sun and AIR conspiring, so ani-" mate this Mother-Earth, that tho ever " breeding, her Vigour is as great, her " Beauty as fresh, and her Looks as " charming, as if She newly came out of " the Forming Hands of her Creator.

> "How beautiful is the WATER a-" mong the inferiour Earthly Works! " Heavy, Liquid, and Transparent: " without the springing Vigour and ex-" pansive Force of Air; but not without " Activity. Stubborn and un-yielding, " when compress'd; but placidly avoid-" ing Force, and bending every way with " ready Fluency! Infinuating, it dif-" folves the lumpish Earth, frees the in-" tangled Bodys, procures their Inter-" course, and summons to the Field the " keen Terrestrial Particles; whose hap-" py Strifes foon ending in strict Union, " produce the various Forms which we " behold.

" behold. How vast are the Abysses Sect. 1.
" of the Sea, where this soft Element is

" kept in store; and whence the Sun " and Winds extracting, raise it into

" Clouds! These soon converted into

" Rain, water the thirsty Ground, and

" supply a-fresh the Springs and Rivers;

" the Comfort of the neighbouring Plains,

" and fweet Refreshment of all Animals.

"But whither shall we trace the " Sources of the LIGHT? or in what " Ocean comprehend the luminous Mat-" ter so wide diffus'd thro the immense " Spaces which it fills? What Seats shall " we affign to that fierce Element of FIRE, " too active to be confin'd within the " Compass of the Sun, and not excluded " even the Bowels of the heavy Earth? " The Air it-felf fubmits to it, and ferves " as its inferiour Instrument. Even this " our Sun, with all those numerous Suns, " the glittering Host of Heaven, seem to " receive from hence the vast Supplys-" which keep them ever in their splendid " State. The invisible etherial Substance, " penetrating both liquid and folid Bodys, " is diffus'd throughout the Universe, " It cherishes the cold dull Massy Globe, " and warms it to its Center. It forms " the Minerals; gives Life and Growth " to Vegetables; kindles a foft, invisible, " and vital Flame in the Breasts of living " Creatures;

tion.

Part 2. " Creatures; frames, animates, and nurses s all the various Horms; sparing, as well " as imploying for their Use, those fulphu-" nous and combustible Matters of which " they are compos'd Benign and gentle " amidst all, it still maintains this happy " Peace and Concord, according to its " stated and peculiar Laws. But these " once broken, the acquitted Being takes " its Course unrul'd. It runs impetuous " thro the fatal Breach, and breaking into " visible and sierce Flames, passes trium-" phant o'er the yielding Forms, convert-" ing all into it-felf, and diffolving now " those Systems, which it-self before had " form'd. 'Tis thus'

> " Compass of the Sam, and not excited HERE THEOCLES Stopt on a sudden, when (as he imagin'd) I was putting my Hand out, to lay hold on his Sleeve.

the active to be confied withinking

O PHILOCLES, faid he, 'tis well remember'd. I was growing too warm, I find; as well I might indeed, in this hot Element. And here perhaps I might have talk'd yet more mysteriously, had you been one that cou'd think otherwise than in the common way of the foft Flames of Love. You might, perhaps, have heard Wonders in this kind: " How all things " had their Being hence, and How their " noblest

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"confirm'd and loft." But in these which Flights, I might possibly have gone near to burn my Wings.

INDEED, faid I, you might well expect the Fate of Lowrus, for your high-foaring. But this, indeed, was not what I fear'd. For you were got above Danger; and, with that devouring Element on your fide, had mafter'd not only the Sun himfelf, but every thing which stood in your way. I was afraid it might, in the issue, run to what they tell us of a universal Constagration; in which I knew not how it might go, possibly, with our Genius.

elfe fhall I fly with you, thro different

I A m glad, said he, Philosophers! to find this grown such a Concern with you. But you may rest secure here, if the Case you meant were that periodical Constagration talk'd of by some Philosophers. For there the Genius would of necessary be all in all: And in those Intervals of Creation, when no Form, nor Species existed any where out of the Divine Mind, all then was Deity: All was that One, collected thus within it-self, and subsisting (as they imagin'd) rather in a more simple and perfect manner, than when multiply'd in more ways; and becoming productive,

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Part 3. ductive, it unfolded it-felf in the various Map of Nature, and this fair visible World.

But for my part, said I (interrupting him) who can much better see DIVINITY unfolded, than in that involv'd and solitary State before Creation; I cou'd wish you wou'd go a little further with me in the Map of Nature: especially if descending from your lofty Flights, you wou'd be content to pitch upon this humble Spot of EARTH; where I cou'd better accompany you, where-e'er you led me.

But you, reply'd he, who wou'd confine me to this heavy Earth, must yet allow me the same Wings of Fancy. How else shall I sly with you, thro different Climates, from Pole to Pole, and from the Frigid to the Torrid Zone?

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O, SAID I, for this purpose I will allow you the PEGASUS of the Poets, or that wing'd Griffin which an Italian Poet of the Moderns gave to one of his Heroes: But'tis on this condition, that you take no such extravagant Flight, as his was, to the Moon; but keep closely to this Orb of Earth.

SINCE you will have it so, reply'd THEOCLES, let us try first on the darkest and

and most imperfect Parts of our Map, Sect. 1. and fee how you can indure the Profpect: " How oblique and faintly looks " the Sun on wonder Climates, far re-" mov'd from him! How tedious are " the Winters there! How deep the Hor-" rours of the Night, and how uncom-" fortable even the Light of Day! The " freezing Winds employ their fiercest " Breath, yet are not spent with blowing. " The Sea, which elsewhere is scarce con-" fin'd within its Limits, lies here im-" mur'd in Walls of Chrystal. The Snow " covers the Hills, and almost fills the "lowest Valleys. How wide and deep " it lies, incumbent o'er the Plains, hiding " the fluggish Rivers, the Shrubs, and " Trees, the Dens of Beafts, and Man-" fions of diffress'd and feeble Men!-" See! where they lie confin'd, hardly " fecure against the raging Cold, or the " Attacks of the wild Beafts, now Maf-" ters of the wasted Field, and forc'd by " Hunger out of the naked Woods .-"Yet not dishearten'd (such is the Force " of Human Breasts) but thus provided " for, by Art and Prudence, the kind " compensating Gifts of Heaven, Men " and their Herds may wait for a Re-" lease. For at length the Sun approach-" ing, melts the Snow, fets longing Men " at liberty, and affords them Means and "Time to make provision against the

Meditation.

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Part 3. " next Return of Cold. It breaks the " Icy Fetters of the Main; where wast " Sea-Monsters piercerthro floating Islands, " with Arms which can withstand the " Chrystal Rock: whilst others, who of " themselves seem great as Islands, are by " their Bulk alone arm'd against all but " Man; whose Superiority over Crea-" tures of fuch stupendous Size and Force, " shou'd make him mindful of his Privi-" lege of Reason, and force him humbly " to adore the great Composer of these " wondrous Frames, and Author of his

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1 WOFFE "Bur leaving these dull Climates, so " little favour'd by the Sun, for those hap-" pier Regions, on which he looks more " kindly, making perperual Summer; How " great an Alteration do we find? His "purer Light confounds weak-fighted "Moreals, pierc'd by his scorching Beams. "Scarce can they tread the glowing " Ground. The Air they breathe can-" not enough abate the Fire which burns " within their panting Breafts. Their "Bodys melt. O'ercome and fainting, " they feek the Shade, and wait the cool "Refreshments of the Night. Yet oft " the bounteous CREATOR bestows other "Refreshments. He casts a Veil of "Clouds before 'em, and raifes gentle "Gales: favour'd by which, the Men

"and Beafts purfue their Labours; and Sect. 1. "Plants refresh'd by Dews and Showers,"

" can gladly bear the warmest Sun-beams.

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Vol. II.

their various Growths, from the trium-"AND here the varying Scene opens We fee a Country " to new Wonders. " rich with Gems, but richer with the " fragrant Spices it affords How gravely " move the largest of Land-Creatures on "the Banks of this fair River! How " ponderous are their Arms, and vaft "their Strength, with Courage, and a " Sense superiour to the other Beasts! "Yet are they tam'd (we see) by Man-" kind, and brought even to fight their " Battels, rather as Allys and Confede-" rates, than as Slaves.—But let us turn "our Eyes towards these smaller, and " more curious Objects; the numerous " and devouring Infects on the Trees in " these wide Plains. How shining, strong, " and lasting are the subtile Threds spun " from their artful Mouths! Who but " The All-wise has taught 'em to compose " the beautiful foft Shells, in which re-" cluse and bury'd, yet still alive, they " undergo fuch a furprizing Change; " when not destroy'd by Men, who " clothe and adorn themselves with the " Labours and Lives of these weak Crea-" tures, and are proud of wearing fuch in-" glorious Spoils? How sumptuously ap-" parel'd, gay, and splendid, are all the va-

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Part 3. " rious Infects! which feed on the other Medita." Plants of this warm Region! How tion. " beautiful the Plants themselves in all "their various Growths, from the trium"phant Palm down to the humble Moß!

"Wants, and of the Divine Bounty, thus
"Wants, and of the Divine Bounty, thus
"Wants, and of the Divine Bounty, thus
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"But see! not far from us, that Fer"tilest of Lands, water'd and fed by a
"friendly generous Stream, which, e'er
"it enters the Sea, divides it-self into ma"ny Branches, to dispense more equally
"the rich and nitrous Manure, it bestows
"so kindly and in due time, on the adjacent Plains—Fair Image of that
"fruitful and exuberant Nature, who
"with a Flood of Bounty blesses all
"things, and Parent-like out of her ma"ny Breasts sends the nutritious Draught

Short

"in various Streams to her rejoicing Off- Sect. 1. fpring! Innumerable are the du-" bious Forms and unknown Species which drink the flimy Current: whether they are such as leaving the scorch'd Defarts, fatiate here their ardent Thirst, and 66 promiscuously engendring, beget a monstrous Race; or whether (as 'ris faid) by the Sun's genial Heat, active on the " fermenting Ooze, new Forms are gene-" rated, and issue from the River's fertile " Bed. -- See there the noted Tyrant of " the Flood, and Terrour of its Borders! "when fuddenly displaying his horrid " Form, the amphibious Ravager invades " the Land, quitting his watry Den, and " from the Deep emerging, with hideous " rush, sweeps o'er the trembling Plain. "The Natives from afar behold with " wonder the enormous Bulk, sprung from " fo small an Egg, and tell the Monster's "Nature cruel and deceitful: how he " with dire Hypocrify, and false Tears, " beguiles the Simple-hearted; and in-" fpiring Tenderness and kind Compas-" sion, kills with pious Fraud. -" Emblem of that spiritual Plague, dire " Superstition! Native of this Soil; where " first * Religion grew unsociable, and " among different Worshippers bred mu-" tual Hatred, and Abhorrence of each

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Meditation.

others Temples. The Infection spreads: " and Nations now profane one to ano-" ther, war fiercer, and in Religion's "Cause forget Humanity: whilst savage " Zeal, with meek and pious Semblance, " works dreadful Massacre; and for Hea-

" ven's fake (horrid Pretence!) makes desolate the Earth.

"HERE let us leave these Monsters " (glad if we cou'd here confine 'em!) " and detefting the dire prolifick Soil, " fly to the vast Desarts of these Parts. " All ghaftly and hideous as they appear, " they want not their peculiar Beautys.
"The Wildness pleases. We seem to live " alone with Nature. We view her in " her inmost Recesses, and contemplate " her with more Delight in these original " Wilds, than in the artificial Labyrinths " and feign'd Wildernesses of the Palace. " The Objects of the place, the scaly Ser-" pents, the favage Beafts, and poisonous "Infects, how terrible foever, or how " contrary to human Nature, are beau-" teous in themselves, and fit to raise " our Thoughts in Admiration of that " Divine Wifdom, so far superiour to our " short Views. Unable to declare the " Use or Service of all things in this Uni-" verse, we are yet assur'd of the Per-" fection of all, and of the Justice of that " Oeconomy, to which all things are fub-" fervient,

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" fervient, and in respect of which, Things Sect. 1." seemingly deform'd are amiable; Disor-

" der becomes regular; Corruption whole-

" fom; and Poisons (fuch as these we

" have feen) prove healing and beneficial.

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"Bur behold! thro a vast Tract of " Sky before us, the mighty ATLAS rears " his lofty Head, cover'd with Snow, a-" bove the Clouds. Beneath the Moun-" tain's foot, the rocky Country rifes into " Hills, a proper Basis of the ponderous " Mass above: where huge embody'd "Rocks lie pil'd on one another, and " feem to prop the high Arch of Heaven. " --- See! with what trembling Steps " poor Mankind tread the narrow Brink " of the deep Precipices! From whence " with giddy Horrour they look down, " miffrusting even the Ground which bears "'em; whilft they hear the hollow Sound " of Torrents underneath, and fee the "Ruin of the impending Rock; with fal-" ling Trees which hang with their Roots " upwards, and feem to draw more Ruin " after 'em. Here thoughtless Men, seiz'd " with the Newness of such Objects, be-" come thoughtful, and willingly con-" template the incessant Changes of this " Earth's Surface. They fee, as in one " inftant, the Revolutions of past Ages, " the fleeting Forms of Things, and the "Decay even of this our Globe; whose Bb 3

Meditation.

Part 3." Youth and first Formation they consi-Medita- " der, whill the apparent Spoil and irre-" parable Breaches of the wasted Moun-" tain shew them the World it-self only " as a noble Ruin, and make them think " of its approaching Period. --- But here " mid-way the Mountain, a spacious Bor-" der of thick Wood harbours our wea-"ry'd Travellers: who now are come " among the ever-green and lofty Pines," " the Firs, and noble Cedars, whose "towring Heads feem endless in the 4 Sky, the rest of Trees appearing only " as Shrubs beside them. And here a dif-"ferent Horrour seizes our shelter'd Tra-"vellers, when they fee the Day dimi-" nish'd by the deep Shades of the vast "Wood ; which closing thick above, " spreads Darkness and eternal Night be-" low. The faint and gloomy Light " looks horrid as the Shade it-felf! and " the profound Stillness of these Places " imposes Silence upon Men, struck with " the hoarse Ecchoings of every Sound within the spacious Caverns of the "Wood. Here Space aftonishes. Silence " it-felf feems pregnant; whilft an un-" known Force works on the Mind, and "dubious Objects move the wakeful Senfe. Mysterious Voices are either heard or " fancy'd: and various Forms of Deity " feem to present themselves, and appear "more manifest in these sacred Sylvan " Scenes; " Youth

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" Scenes; fuch as of old gave rife to Tem-Sect. 2.
" ples, and favour'd the Religion of the

"antient World. Even we our-felves,

"who in plain Characters may read Di-

" Earth, chuse rather these obscurer Pla-" ces, to spell out that mysterious Being,

" which to our weak Eyes appears at best

those miraculous Woods) were much too

" under a Veil of Gloud?" in it

HERE he paus'd a while, and began to cast about his Eyes, which before seem'd fix'd. He look'd more calmly, with an open Countenance and free Air; by which, and other Tokens, I cou'd easily find we were come to an end of our Descriptions; and that whether I wou'd or no, Theorems was now resolv'd to take his leave of the Sublime: the Morning being spent, and the Forenoon by this time well advanc'd.

in our Parleonban Hights. But for the Market Tra.H I. Tro B HaZine why you thould acclete fuch noble Sumeds as are

MEthinks, faid he, PHILOCLES!
(changing to a familiar Voice) we had better leave these unsociable Places, whither our Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, in our more conversable Woods, and temperate Climates. Here no sierce Heats nor Bb 4

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Part 3. Colds anney us, no Precipies nor Cataracts amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own Voices; whilst we hear the Notes of such a chearful Quire, and find the Ecchoes rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk to shall amount and the colors are the same and shall amount and the colors are the same and the colors are the colors and the colors are the colors and the colors are th

I Confess, faid I, whose foreign Nymphs (if there were any belonging to those miraculous Woods) were much too awful Beautys to please me. I found our familiar Home-Nymphs a great deal more to my humour. Yet for all this, I cannot but be concern'd for your breaking off just when we were got half the World over, and wanted only to take AMBRICA in our way home. Indeed as for Eu-ROPE, I cou'd excuse your making any great Tour there, because of the little Variety it wou'd afford us. Besides that it wou'd be hard to fee it in any view, without meeting still that politick Face of Affairs, which wou'd too much disturb us in our Philosophical Flights. But for the Western Tract, I cannot imagine why you shou'd neglect such noble Subjects as are there; unless perhaps the Gold and Silver, to which I find you fuch a bitter Enemy, frighted you from a Mother-Soil so full of it. If these Countrys had been as bare of those Metals as old SPARTA, WE might have heard more perhaps of the PERU's and MEXICO's than of all abbic)

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SLASA

ASIA and AFRICA. We might have Sect, 23 had Creatures, Plants, Woods, Mountains, Rivers, beyond any of those we have pass'd. How forry am I to lose the noble AMAZON! How forry—

HERE as I wou'd have proceeded, I faw so significant a Smile on Theocles's Face, that it stopt me, out of Curiosity, to ask him his Thought.

Nothing, said he; nothing but this very Subject it-self.—Go on.—I see you'l finish it for me. The Spirit of this sort of Prophecy has seiz'd you. And Philocles, is become a Pursuer of the same Mysterious Beauty.

encer and langer as a Month either plain.

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own it. Your Genius, the Genius of the Place, and the Great Genius have at last prevail'd. I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a natural kind; where neither Art, Natural nor the Conceit or Caprice of Man has Beautys. spoil'd their genuine Order, by breaking in upon that primitive State. Even the rude Rocks, the mosty Caverns, the irregular unwrought Grotto's, and broken Falls of Waters, with all the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it-self, as representing Nature more, will be the more engaging, and appear

Part 3 pear with a Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery of Princely Gardens. -- But tell me, I intreat you, how comes it That, excepting a few Philosophers of your fort, Paffion of the only People who are enamourd in this way, and feek the Woods, the Rivers, or Sea-fores, are your poor vulgar Lovers? law to fignificant a Smile on The Ro

> SAY not this, reply'd he, of Lovers only. For is it not the same with POETS, and all those other Students in NATURE, and the Arts which copy after her? In short, is not this the real Case of all who are Lovers either of the Muses or the of Lophery has feiz'd you - And self the OLES, the cold indifferent Purce class

ENTHU-SIASM.

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HOWEVER, faid I, all these who are deep in this Romantick way, are look'd upon, you know, as a People either plainly out of their Wits, or over-run with Melancholy and * ENTHUSIASM. We always endeavour to recal em from these Solitary Places. And I must own, that often when I have found my Fancy run this way, I have check'd my-felf; not knowing what it was posses'd me, when I was passionately struck with Objects of this kind pour letter brates and model Packs, the motived surray, the integular

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Letter of Enthusiasm, towards the end. See also Treatife IV. Book I. at the end. And below MISC. II. Ch. 1. at the beginning, grown odd odditiwn , soom

Nonwonder, reply'd he, if we are at shadows. a loss, when we pursue the Shadow for the Substance. For if we may trust to what our Reasoning has taught us; whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint Shadow of that First Beauty. First So that every real Love depending on Beauty. The Mind, and being only the Contemplation of Beauty, either as it really is in itself, or as it appears imperfectly in the Objects which strike the Sense; how can the rational Mind rest here, or be satisfy'd with the absurd Enjoyment which reaches the Sense alone?

FROM this time forward then, faid I, I shall no more have reason to fear those Beautys which strike a sort of Melancholy, like the Places we have nam'd, or like these solemn Groves. No more shall I avoid the moving Accents of soft Musick, or sly from the enchanting Features of the fairest Human Face.

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IF you are already, reply'd he, such a Proficient in this new Love, that you are sure never to admire the Representative-BEAUTY, except for the sake of the Ori-original. ginal; nor aim at any Enjoyment, but of the rational kind; you may then be consident.

I am so; and presume accordingly, to answer for my-self. However I shou'd not be Part 3. be ill fatisfy'd, if you explain'd your-felf a little better as to this Mittake of mine you feem to fear. Wou'd it be any help, to tell you, " That the Abfurdity lay in Enjoyment. " feeking the Enjoyment elsewhere than in " the Subject lov'd?" The Matter, I must confess, is still mysterious. Imagine then, good PHILOCLES, if being taken with the Beauty of the Ocean which you fee yonder at a diffance, it shou'd come into your head, to feek how to command it; and like some mighty Admiral, ride Master of the Sea; wou'd not the Fancy be a little abfurd? bull Abfurd enough, in conscience. The next thing I shou'd do, 'tis likely, upon this Frenzy, wou'd be to hire some Bark, and go in Nuptial Ceremony, VENETIAN-like, to wed the Gulf, which I might call perhaps

> these tolema Groves this more deall. In LET who will call it theirs, reply'd THEOCLES, you will own the Enjoyment of this kind to be very different from that which shou'd naturally follow from the Contemplation of the Ocean's Beauty. The Bridegroom-Doge, who in his stately Bucentaur floats on the Bosom of his THE-Tis, has less Possession than the poor Shepberd, who from a hanging Rock, or Point of some high Promontory, stretch'd at his ease, forgets his feeding Flocks, while he admires her Beauty. - But to come nearer rodhome,

as properly my own.

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home, and make the Question still more Sect. 2. familiar. Suppose (my Philocles!) that, viewing such a Tract of Country, as this delicious Vale we see beneath us, you shou'd for the Enjoyment of the Profipect, require the Property or Possession of the Land?

THE Covetous Fancy, reply'd I, wou'd be as abfurd altogether, as that other Ambitious one.

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O PHILOCLES! faid he; May I bring this yet a little nearer? And will you follow me once more? Suppose that being charm'd, as you seem to be, with the Beauty of these Trees, under whose shade we rest, you shou'd long for nothing so much as to taste some delicious Fruit of theirs; and having obtain'd of Nature some certain Relish by which these Acorns or Berrys of the Wood became as palatable as the Figs or Peaches of the Garden, you shou'd afterwards, as oft as you revisited these Groves, seek hence the Enjoyment of them, by satiating your-self in these new Delights?

THE Fancy of this kind, reply'd I, wou'd be fordidly luxurious; and as abfurd, in my opinion, as either of the former.

Part 3.

CAN you not then, on this occasion, faid he, call to mind forme other Forms of a fair kind among us, where the Admiration of Beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a Consequence?

I FEAR'D, faid I, indeed, where this wou'd end, and was apprehensive you wou'd force me at last to think of certain powerful FORMS in Human Kind, which draw after 'em a Set of eager Desires, Wishes and Hopes; no way sutable, I must confess, to your rational and refin'd Contemplation of Beauty. The Proportions of this living Architecture, as wonderful as they are, inspire nothing of a studious or contemplative kind. The more they are view'd, the further they are from fatisfying by mere View. Let that which fatiffies be ever fo disproportionable an Effect, or ever so foreign to its Cause; censure it as you please, you must allow however that it's natural. So that you, THEO-CLES, for ought I fee, are become the Accuser of NATURE, by condemning a natural Enjoyment.

FAR be it from us both, faid he, to condemn a Joy which is from Nature. But when we spoke of the Enjoyment of these Woods and Prospects, we understood by it a far different kind from that

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of the inferiour Creatures, who rifling in Sect. 2 these places, find here their choicest Food. Yet we too live by tasteful Food; and feel those other Joys of Sense in common with them. But 'twas not here (my Phi-LOCLES!) that we had agreed to place our Good; nor consequently our Enjoyment. We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real Good, when drawn to feek abfurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Object of Sense, and not in those Objects they might properly call their own: in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all that was truly Fair. Generous, or Good.

So that BEAUTY, faid I, and GOOD, Beauty and with you, THEOCLES, I perceive are still * one and the same.

'TIS fo, faid he. And thus are we return'd again to the Subject of our Yesterday's Morning-Conversation. Whether I have made good my Promise to you, in flewing + the true Good, I know not. But so, doubtless, I shou'd have done with good Success, had I been able

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^{*} Supra, pag. 238, drc.

Supra, pag. 245.

Part 3. in my poetick Extafys, or by any other Beauty and Efforts, to have led you into some deep View of Nature and the Sovereign General Wills. We then had provid the Force of Divine Beauty; and form'd in ourselves an Object capable and worthy of real Enjoyment.

O THEOCLES! faid I, well do I remember now the Terms in which you engag'd me, that Morning when you bespoke my Love of this mysterious Beauty. You have indeed made good your part of the Condition, and may now claim me for a Proselyte. If there be any seeming Extravagance in the case, I must comfort myfelf the best I can, and consider that all found Love and Admiration is ENTHU-SIASM: " The Transports of Poets, the " Sublime of Orators, the Rapture of Mu-" sicians, the high Strains of the Virtuosi; " all mere Enthusiasm! Even Learn-" ing it-felf, the Love of Arts and Curio-" sitys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adven-" turers; Gallantry, War, Heroism; All, " all ENTHUSIASM!"-'Tis enough: I am content to be this new Enthusiast, in a way unknown to me before.

AND I, reply'd THEOCLES, am content you shou'd call this Love of ours ENTHUSIASM: allowing it the Privilege of its Fellow-Passions. For is there

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a fair and plausible Enthusiasm, a reasona-Sect. 2. ble Extaly and Transport allow'd to other Subjects, fuch as Architecture, Painting, Musick; and shall it be exploded here? Are there Senses by which all those other Graces and Perfections are perceiv'd? and none by which this higher Perfection and Grace is comprehended? Is it fo preposterous to bring that Enthusiasm hither, and transfer it from those secondary and scanty Objects, to this Original and Comprehensive One? Observe how the Case stands in all those other Subjects of Art or Sci-Arts. ence. What difficulty to be in any degree knowing! How long e'er a true Taste A Judgis gain'd! How many things shocking, ment, how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledg'd the highest Beautys! For 'tis not instantly we acquire the Sense by which these Beautys. are discoverable. Labour and Pains are requir'd, and Time to cultivate a natural Genius, ever so apt or forward. But Who is there that thinks of cultivating this Soil, or of improving any Sense or Faculty Improvewhich Nature may have given of this ment. kind? And is it a wonder we shou'd be dull then, as we are, confounded, and at a loss in these Affairs, blind as to this higher Scene, these nobler Representations? Which way shou'd we come to understand better? which way be knowing in these Beautys? Is Study, Science, or Cc Learning Vol. II.

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tys else? And for the Sovereign BEAUTY, is there no Skill or Science requir'd? In Painting there are Shades and masterly Strokes which the Vulgar understand not, but find fault with: in Architecture there is the Rustick, in Musick the Chromatick kind, and skilful Mixture of Dissonancys:

And is there nothing which answers to this, in The WHOLE?

I Must confess, said I, I have hitherto been one of those Vulgar, that cou'd never relish the Shades, the Rustick, or the Dissonancys you talk of. I have never dreamt of fuch Master-pieces in NA-TURE. 'Twas my way to cenfure freely on the first view. But I perceive I am now oblig'd to go far in the purfuit of Beauty; which lies very absconded and deep: And if fo, I am well affur'd that my Enjoyments hitherto have been very shallow. I have dwelt, it feems, all this while upon the Surface, and enjoy'd only a kind of flight superficial Beautys; having never gone in fearch of Beauty it-felf, but of what I fancy'd fuch. Like the reit of the unthinking World, I took for granted that what I lik'd was beautiful; and what I rejoic'd in, was my Good. I never scrupled loving what I fancy'd; and aiming only at the Enjoyment of what I lov'd, I never troubled my-felf with examining

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Beauty.

amining what the Subjects were, nor ever Sect. 2. hesitated about their Choice.

BEGIN then, said he, and chuse. See what the Subjects are; and which you would prefer; which honour with your Admiration, Love, and Esteem. For by these again you will be honour'd in your turn. Such, PHILOCLES, as is the Worth of these Companions, such will your Worth befound. As there is Emptiness or Fulness here, so will there be in your Enjoyment. See therefore where Fulness is, and where Emptiness. See in what Subject resides the chief Excellence: where BEAUTY reigns: where 'tis intire, perfect, absolute; where broken, imperfeet, short. View these Terrestrial Beautys, and whatever has the appearance of Excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or stands as in the room of Fair, Beautiful, and Good: " A Mass of Metal; a Tract of Land; a " Number of Slaves; a Pile of Stones; " a human Body of certain Lineaments " and Proportions:" Is this the highest of the kind? Is BEAUTY founded then in Body only; and not in Action, Life, or Operation 3-

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HOLD! hold! faid I (good THEO-CLES!) you take this in too high a Key, above my reach. If you wou'd have me Vol. II. Cc 2 accomPart 3. accompany you, pray lower this Strain a little; and talk in a more familiar way.

Brein chen fild be, and chafe. See THUS then, faid he (smiling) Whatever Passion you may have for other Beautys; I know, good PHILOCLES, you are no fuch Admirer of Wealth in any kind, as to allow much Beauty to it; efpecially in a rude Heap, or Mass. But in Medals, Coins, Imbost-Work, Statues, and well-fabricated Pieces, of whatever fort, you can discover Beauty, and admire the Kind. True, faid I; but not for the Metal's fake. 'Tis not then the Metal or Matter which is beautiful with you. No. But the Art. Certainly. The Art then is the Beauty. Right. And the Art is that which beautifies. The fame. So that the Beautifying, not the Beautify'd, is the really Beautiful. It feems fo. For that-which is beautify'd, is beautiful only by the accession of something beautifying: and by the recess or withdrawing of the same, it ceases to be beautiful. Be it. In respect of Bodys therefore, Beauty comes and goes. So we fee. Nor is the Body it-felf any Cause either of its coming or staying. None. that there is no Principle of Beauty in Body. None at all. For Body can no way be the Cause of Beauty to it-

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felf. No way. Nor govern nor re-Sect. 2. gulate it-felf. Nor yet this. Nor mean nor intend it-felf. Nor this neither. Must not That therefore, which means and intends for it, regulates and orders it, be the Principle of Beauty to it? Of necessity. And what must that be? MIND, I suppose; for what can it be else?

Here then, said he, is all I wou'd have explain'd to you before: "That the "Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely, were ne"ver in the Matter, but in the Art and "Design; never in Body it-self, but in the "Form or Forming Power." Does not the beautiful Form confess this, and speak the Beauty of the Design, whene'er it strikes you? What is it but the Design which strikes? What is it you admire but MIND, or the Effect of Mind? 'Tis Mind alone which forms. All that is void of Mind is horrid: and Matter formless is Desormity it-self.

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elf.

O F all Forms then, faid I, Those (according to your Scheme) are the most amiable, and in the first Order of Beauty, which have a power of making other Forms themselves: From whence methinks they may be still the Forming Forms. So far I can easily concur with you, and gladly give the advantage to the Human Cc 2

Beauty.

Part 3. Form, above those other Beauty's of Man's Formation. The Palaces, Equipages and Estates shall never in my account be brought in competition with the original living Forms of Flesh and Blood. And for the other, the dead Forms of Nature, the Metals and Stones, however precious and dazling; I am refolv'd to relift their Splendour, and make abject Things of 'em, even in their highest Pride, when they pretend to fet off Human Beauty, and are officiously brought in aid of the Fair.

Orders of Beauty.

Do you not see then, reply'd THEO-CLES, that you have establish'd Three Degrees or Orders of Beauty? As how?

First Order.

Why first, the Dead Forms, as you properly have call'd 'em, which bear a Fa-Thion, and are form'd, whether by Man, or Nature; but have no forming Power, no Action, or Intelligence. Right. Next, and as the fecond kind, the Forms which form; that is, which have Intelligence, Action, and Operation. Right still.

Second Order.

> Here therefore is double Beauty. For here is both the Form (the Effect of Mind) and Mind it-felf: The first kind low and despicable in respect of this other; from whence the Dead Form receives its Lustre and Force of Beauty. For what is a mere Body, tho a humanone, and ever so exactly fashion'd, if in-

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ward Form be wanting, and the Mind be Sect. 2. monstrous or imperfect, as in an Idiot of Savage? This too I can apprehend, faid I; but where is the third Order?

HAVE patience, reply'd he, and fee first whether you have discover'd the whole Force of this second Beauty. How else shou'd you understand the Force of Love, or have the power of Enjoyment? Tell me, I beseech you, when first you nam'd these the Forming Forms, did you think of no other Productions of theirs besides the Dead Kinds, such as the Palaces, the Coins, the Brazen or the Marble Figures of Men? or did you think of something nearer Life?

I Cou'd easily, said I, have added, that these Forms of ours had a virtue of producing other living Forms, like themselves. But this Virtue of theirs, I thought, was from another Form above them, and cou'd not properly be call'd their Virtue or Art; if in reality there was a superiour Art, or something Artist-like, which guided their Hand, and made Tools of them in this specious Work.

HAPPILY thought, said he! You have prevented a Censure which I hardly imagin'd you cou'd escape. And here you have unawares discover'd that third Order

Cc 4

Third

Order.

Part 3. of Beauty, which forms not only fuch as we call mere Forms, but even the Forms which form. For we our-felves are notable Architects in Matter, and can shew lifeless Bodys brought into Form, and fashion'd by our own hands: but that which fashions even Minds themselves, contains in it-felf all the Beautys fashion'd by those Minds; and is consequently the Principle, Source, and Fountain of all Beauty.

It feems fo.

THEREFORE whatever Beauty appears in our fecond Order of Forms, or whatever is deriv'd or produc'd from thence, all this is eminently, principally, and originally in this last Order of Supreme and Sovereign Beauty.

True.

THUS Architecture, Musick, and all that is of human Invention, refolves itfelf into this last Order.

Right, faid I: and thus all the Enthusiasms of other kinds resolve themselves into ours. The fashionable Kinds borrow from us, and are nothing without us. We have undoubtedly the Honour of being Originals.

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NOW therefore say again, reply'd THEOCLES; Whether are those Fabricks of Architecture, Sculpture, and the rest of that fort, the greatest Beautys which Man forms; or are there greater and better? None that I know, reply'd I. Think, think again, faid he: and fetting afide those Productions which just now you excepted against, as Masterpieces of another Hand; think What there are which more immediately proceed from us, and may more truly be term'd our Issue. I am barren, said I, for this time: you must be plainer yet, in helping me to conceive. How can I help you, reply'd he? Wou'd you have me be conscious for you, of that which is immediately your own, and is folely in, and from your-felf? You mean my Sentiments, faid I. Cer-Beauty, tainly, reply'd he: and together with moral. your Sentiments, your Resolutions, Principles, Determinations, Actions; whatfoever is handsom and noble in the kind; all that flows from your good Understanding, Sense, Knowledg and Will; all that is engender'd in your Heart (good offspring. PHILOCLES!) and all that derives it-Generation. felf from your Parent-MIND, which un-like to other Parents, is never spent or exhausted, but gains Strength and Vigour by proprov'd it, by many a Work; not suffering that fertile Part to remain idle and unactive. Hence those good Parts, which from a natural Genius you have rais'd by due Improvement. And here, as I cannot but admire the pregnant Genius, and Parent-Beauty, so am I satisfy'd of the Offspring, that it is and will be ever beautiful.

I Took the Compliment, and wish'd, (I told him) the Case were really as he imagin'd, that I might justly merit his Esteem and Love. My Study therefore shou'd be to grow beautiful, in his way of Beauty; and from this time forward I wou'd do all I cou'd to propagate that lovely Race of mental Children, happily sprung from such a high Enjoyment, and from a Union with what was Fairest and Best. But 'tis you, Theoches, continu'd I, must help my labouring Mind, and be as it were the Midwise to those Conceptions; which else, I fear, will prove abortive.

Source.

You do well, reply'd he, to give me the Midwife's part only: For the Mind conceiving of it-self, can only be, as you Pregnancy say, assisted in the Birth. Its Pregnancy is from its Nature. Nor cou'd it ever have been thus impregnated by any other Mind, than that which form'd it at the beginning;

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ning; and which, as we have already Sect. 2. prov'd, is Original to all Mental, as well as other Beauty.

Do you maintain then, said I, that these mental Children, the Notions and Principles of Fair, Just, and Honest, with the rest of these Ideas, are innate?

Innate Ideas.

ANATOMISTS, said he, tell us that the Eggs, which are Principles in Body, are innate; being form'd already in the Fætus before the Birth. But When it is, whether before, or at, or after the Birth, or at What time after, that either these, or other Principles, Organs of Senfation, or Sensations themselves, are first form'd in us, is a matter doubtless of curious Speculation, but of no great Importance. The Question is, whether the Principles spoken of are from Art, or Nature? If from Nature purely; 'tis no matter for the Time: nor wou'd I contend with you, tho you shou'd deny Life it-self to be innate, as imagining it follow'd rather than preceded the moment of Birth. But this I am certain of; that Life, and the Senfations which accompany Life, come when they will, are from mere Nature, and nothing else. Therefore if you dislike the word Innate, let us change it, if you will, for INSTINCT; and call Instinct, that Instinct. which

Part 3. which Nature teaches, exclusive of Art, Culture or Discipline.

Content, said I.

LEAVING then, reply'd he, those admirable Speculations to the Virtuofi, the Anatomists, and School-Divines; we may fafely aver, with all their Consents, that Generation the feveral Organs, particularly those of Generation, are form'd by Nature. Whether is there also from Nature, think you, any Instinct for the after-Use of them? Or whether must Learning and Experience im-'Tis imprinted, faid I, print this-Use? enough in Conscience. The Impression, or Instinct is so strong in the Case, that 'twou'd be abfurdity not to think it natural, as well in our own Species, as in other Creatures; amongst whom (as you have already taught me) not only the mere engendring of the Young, but the various and almost infinite Means and Methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their Preconcep- anticipating Fancys, Pre-conceptions, or Presensations; if I may use a word you taught me * yesterday.

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Supra, page 307.

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Sect. 2.

I ALLOW your Expression, said THE-OCLES, and will endeavour to show you that the same Preconceptions, of a higher degree, have place in Human Kind. fo, faid I, I intreat you: for fo far am I from finding in my-felf these Preconceptions of Fair and Beautiful in your sense; that methinks, till now of late, I have hardly known of any thing like them in Nature. How then, faid he, wou'd you have known that outward Fair and Beautiful of Human Kind; if fuch an Object (a fair fleshly-one) in all its Beauty, had for the first time appear'd to you, by your-felf, this morning, in these Groves? Or do you think perhaps you shou'd have been unmov'd, and have found no difference between this Form and any other; if first you had not been instructed?

I HAVE hardly any Right, reply'd I, to plead this last Opinion, after what I have own'd just before.

Well then, said he, that I may appear to take no advantage against you; I quit the dazling Form, which carries such a Force of complicated Beauty; and am contented to consider separately each of those simple Beautys, which taken altogether, create this wonderful effect. For you will allow, without doubt, that in respect of Bodys,

Bedy.

Part 2. Bodys, whatever is commonly faid of the unexpressible, the unintelligible, the I Beauty of know not what of Beauty; there can lie no Mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to Figure, Colour, Motion, or Sound. Omitting therefore the three latter, and their dependent Charms; let us view the Charm in what is simplest of all, mere Figure. Nor need we go so high as Sculpture, Architecture, or the Deligns of those who from this Study of Beauty have rais'd fuch delightful Arts. 'Tis enough if we confider the simplest of Figures; as either a round Ball, a Cube, or Dye. Why is even an Infant pleas'd with the first View of these Proportions? Why is the Sphere or Globe, the Cylinder and Obelisk prefer'd; and the irregular Figures, in respect of these, rejected and despis'd?

> I Am ready, reply'd I, to own there is in certain Figures a natural Beauty, which the Eye finds as foon as the Object is presented to it.

Beauty of Is there then, faid he, a natural Beau-Soul, ty of Figures? and is there not as natural a one of Actions? No fooner the Eve opens upon Figures, the Ear to Sounds, As real, than straight the Beautiful results, and Grace and Harmony are known and ac-And neces. knowledg'd. No fooner are ACTIONS view'd, no sooner the buman Affections and Sarily moving. Passions

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abou " W Shap Passions discern'd (and they are most of Sect. 2. 'em as soon discern'd as selt) than straight an inward Eye distinguishes, and sees the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, apart from the Desorm'd, the Foul, the Idea Nations, or the Despicable. How is it possible therefore not to own, "That as these "Distinctions have their Foundation in Nature, the Discernment it-self is natural, and from Nature alone?"

If this, I told him, were as he reprefented it; there cou'd never, I thought, be any Difagreement among Men concerning Actions and Behaviour: as which was Base, which Worthy; which Handsom, and which Deform'd. But now we found perpetual Variance among Mankind; whose Differences were chiefly founded on this Disagreement in Opinion; "The "one affirming, the other denying that this, "or that, was sit or decent."

they admire and pranc

EVEN by this then, reply'd he, it appears there is Fitness and Decency in Actions; since the Fit and Decent is in this The Fit Controversy ever pre-suppos'd: And whilst and Decent. Men are at odds about the Subjects, the Thing it-self is universally agreed. For neither is there Agreement in Judgments about other Beautys. 'Tis controverted "Which is the finest Pile, the loveliest Shape or Face:" But without controversy, 'tis

Part 3. 'tis allow'd "There is a Beauty of each kind." This no one goes about to teach: nor is it learnt by any; but constanded fess'd by All. All own the Standard, Rule, and Measure: But in applying it to Things, Disorder arises, Ignorance prevails, Interest and Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it otherwise happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interesses and engages Men as Good, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as Honest.—But with us (Philo-Cles!) 'tis better settled: since for our parts, we have already decreed "That *Beauty and Good are still the same."

Confirma-

I REMEMBER, said I, what you forc'd me to acknowledg more than once before. And now (good Theocles!) that I am become so willing a Disciple, I want not so much to be convinc'd, methinks, as to be consirm'd and strengthen'd. And I hope this last Work may prove your easiest Task.

Not unless you help in it your-self, reply'd Theocles: For this is necessary, as well as becoming. It had been indeed shameful for you to have yielded without making good Resistance. To help one's-

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^{*} Supra, page 238, 245, 399.

felf to be convinc'd, is to prevent Reason, Sect. 2. and bespeak Error and Delusion. But upon fair Conviction, to give our heart up to the evident fide, and reinforce the Impression, this is to help Reason heartily: And thus we may be faid honestly to perfuade our-selves. Shew me then how I may best persuade my-self.

HAVE Courage, faid he, PHILOCLES! (raising his Voice) Be not offended that I fay, Have Courage! 'Tis COWARDICE alone hetrays us. For whence can false Shame be, but from Cowardice? To be asham'd of what one is fure can never be fhameful, must needs be from the want of Resolution. We seek the Right and Wrong in things; we examine what is Honourable, what Shameful: and having at last determin'd, we dare not stand to our own Judgment, and are asham'd to own there is really a Shameful and an Honourable. " Hear me (fays one who pre-" tends to value PHILOCDES, and be " valu'd by him) There can be no fuch " thing as real Valuableneß or Worth; no-"thing in it-felf estimable or amiable, " odious or shameful. All is Opinion; Opinion, " 'Tis Opinion which makes Beauty, and

" unmakes it. The Graceful or Ungrace-" ful in things, the Decorum and its Con-

" trary, the Amiable and Unamiable, Measure of " Vice, Virtue, Honour, Shame, all this vice. Dd Vol. II.

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Part 3. " is founded in Opinion only. OPINION " is the Law and Measure. Nor has Opi-" nion any Rule besides mere CHANCE; " which varies it, as Custom varies; and " makes now this, now that, to be thought " worthy, according to the Reign of " Fashion, and the ascendent Power of Falshood of " Education." What shall we say to fuch-a-one? How reprefent to him his Abfurdity and Extravagance? Will he defift the fooner? Or shall we ask what

Shame, of one who acknowledges no Shameful? Yet he derides, and cries Ridiculous! By what Right? what Title? For thus, if I were PHILO-CLES, wou'd I defend my-felf. " Am " I ridiculous? As how? What is Ri-"diculous? Every-thing? or Nothing?"

Ridiculous indeed! But fomething then, fomething there is Ridiculous: and the Notion, it feems, is right, " of a

Shame.

" Shameful and a Ridiculous in things." How then shall we apply the Notion? For this being wrong apply'd, cannot itfelf but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries SHAME, refuse to acknowledg any in his turn? Does he not blush, nor seem discountenanc'd on any occasion? If he does, the Case is very distinct from that of mere Grief or Fear. The Disorder he feels is from a Sense of what is shameful and odious in it-felf, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its Consequences.

For the greatest Danger in the world can Sect. 2. never breed Shame: nor can the Opinion of all the World compel us to it, where our own Opinion is not a Party. We may be afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a Modesty. But we can never really blush for any thing but what we truly think Shameful, and what we shou'd still blush for, notwithstanding we were ever so secure as to our Interest, and out of the reach of all Inconvenience that cou'd happen to us from the thing we are asham'd of.

Thus, continu'd he, shou'd I be able, by Anticipation, to defend my-felf; and looking narrowly into Mens Lives, and that which influenc'd 'em on all occasions. I shou'd have Testimony enough to make me say within my-self, " Let who will " be my Adversary in this Opinion, I shall " find him some way or other preposfes'd " with that of which he wou'd endeavour an Ac-" to dispossess me." Has he Gratitude or knowledge-Refentment, Pride or Shame? Which-moral ever way it be, he acknowledges a Sense Beauty and of Just and Unjust, Worthy and Mean. If Deformity. he be Grateful, or expects Gratitude, I ask " Why? and on What account?" If he be angry, if he indulges Revenge, I Anger, ask " How? and in what Case? Re-" veng'd of What? of a Stone, or Mad-" man?" Who is fo mad? "But for " What? Dd 2 Vol. II.

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Anger, an Acment of Just and Unjust.

Part 3." What? For a Chance-hurt? an Accident against Thought, or Intention?" Who is fo Unjust? Therefore there knowledge is Just and Unjust; and belonging to it a natural Presumption or Anticipation, on which the RESENTMENT OF ANGER is founded. For what else is it that makes the wickedest of Mankind often prefer the Interest of their Revenge to all other Interests, and even to Life it-self, but only a Sense of Wrong, natural to all Men, and a Desire to prosecute that Wrong at any rate? Not for their own fakes, fince they facrifice their very Being to it; but out of hatred to the imagin'd Wrong, and from a certain Love of Justice, which even in unjust Men is by this Example shewn to be beyond the Love of LIFE it-felf.

Pride,

Thus as to PRIDE, I ask, "Why " proud? Why conceited? and of What? " Does any one who has Pride think mean-" ly or indifferently of himself?" No: but honourably. And how this, if there be no real Honour or Dignity presuppos'd? For Self-valuation supposes Self-Worth; and in a Person conscious of real Worth, is either no Pride, or a just and noble one. In the fame manner, Selfcontempt supposes a Self-meanness or Defectiveness; and may be either a just Modesty, or unjust Humility. But this is and Baie- certain, that whoever is proud, must be proud

an Acknowledgment of Worth ness.

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proud of fomething. And we know that Sect. 2. Men of thorow Pride will be proud even ~~ in the meanest Circumstances, and when there is no visible Subject for them to be proud of. But they descry a Merit in themselves, which others cannot: And 'tis this Merit they admire. No matter whether It be really in them, as they imagine: It is a Worth still, an Honour, or Merit which they admire, and wou'd do, whereever they faw it, in any Subject besides. For then it is, then only, that they are humbled, " When they fee in a more emi-" nent degree in Others, What they re-" spect and admire so much in Them-" felves." And thus as long as I find Men either Angry or Revengeful, Proud or Asham'd, I am safe: For they conceive an Honourable and Dishonourable, a Foul and Fair, as well as I. No matter where they place it, or how they are mistaken in it: This hinders not my being fatisfy'd "That " the Thing is, and is univerfally acknow-" ledg'd; That it is of Nature's Impression,

" naturally conceiv'd, and by no Art or Natural

" Counter-Nature to be eradicated or de-Impression.

" ftroy'd."

AND now, what fay you, PHILO-CLES (continu'd he) to this Defence I have been making for you? 'Tis grounded, as you fee, on the Supposition of Dd 3 your Part 3. your being deeply ingag'd in this philofophical Caufe. But perhaps you have yet many Difficultys to get over, e'er you can fo far take part with Beauty, as to make this to be your Good. Good.

I HAVE no difficulty fo great, faid I, but what may be remov'd. My Inclinations lead me strongly this way; for I am ready enough to yield There is no real Good but the Enjoyment of Beauty. And I am as ready, reply'd THEOCLES, to yield There is no real Enjoyment of Beauty but what is Good. Excellent! But upon reflection, I fear I am little beholden to you for your Concession. As how? Because shou'd I but offer to contend for any Enjoyment of Beauty out of your Mental Way, you wou'd, I doubt, call fuch Enjoyment of mine absurd, as you did once before. Undoubtedly I shou'd. For what is it shou'd enjoy, or be capable Enjoyment. of Enjoyment, but MIND? or shall we fay, Body enjoys? By the help of Sense, perhaps; not otherwise. Is BEAUTY, then, the Object of Sense? Say How? Which way? For otherwise the help of Sense is nothing in the Case: And if Body be of it-felf incapable, and Sense no help to it, to apprehend or enjoy Beauty, there remains only the MIND which is capable either to apprehend or to enjoy.

Body.

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Charle what or of the man of the wife of Sect. 2. TRUE, said I; but show me, then, " Why BEAUTY may not be the Object " of the Sense?" Shew me first, I in-sense. treat you, " Why, Where, or in What you " fancy It may be fo?" Is it not Beauty which first excites the Sense, and feeds it afterwards in the Passion we call Love? Say in the fame manner, "That " it is Beauty first excites the Sense, and " feeds it afterwards in the Passion we call ", Hunger." You will not fay it. The Thought, I perceive, displeases you. As great as the Pleasure of good Eating is, you disdain to apply the Notion of Beauty to the good Dishes which create it. You wou'd hardly have applauded the preposterous Fancy of some luxurious Ro-MANS of old, who cou'd relish a Fricassee the better for hearing it was compos'd of Birds that wore a beautiful Feather, or that had fung deliciously. Instead of being incited by such a historical Account of Meats, you wou'd be apt, I believe, to have less Appetite, the more you fearch'd their Origin, and defcended into the Kitchin-Science, to learn the feveral Forms and Changes they had undergone, e'er they were ferv'd at this elegant voluptuous Table. But tho the Kitchin-Forms be ever so disgraceful, you will allow that the Materials of the Kitchin, fuch, for instance, as the Garden furnishes, Dd 4

Sense.

Part 3. are really fair and beautiful in their kind. Nor will you deny Beauty to the wild Field, or to these Flowers which grow around us, on this Verdant Couch. And vet, as lovely as are these Forms of Nature, the thining Graft, or filver'd Mof, the flowry Thyme, wild Rose, or Honeyfuckle; 'tis not their BEAUTY allures the neighbouring Herds, delights the brouzing Fawn, or Kid, and fpreads the Toy we see amidst the feeding Flocks: 'Tis not the Form rejoices; but that which is beneath the Form: 'tis Savouriness attracts, Hunger impels; and Thirst better allay'd by the clear Brook than the thick Puddle, makes the Fair NYMPH to be prefer'd, whose Form is otherwise slighted. For never can the Form be of real force where it is uncontemplated, unjudg'd of, unexamin'd, and stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appeafes provok'd Senfe, and fatisfies the brutish Part. Are you persuaded of this, good PHILOCLES? or rather than not give Brutes the advantage of Enjoyment, will you allow them also a Mind and rational Part?

Not so, I told him.

IF BRUTES therefore, faid he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying Beauty, as being Brutes, and having SENSE only (the brutish part) for their own share; it follows.

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follows, "That neither can MAN by Sect. 2." the same Sense or brutish Part, conceive

" or enjoy Beauty: But all the Beauty and

"Good he enjoys, is in a nobler way, and

"by the help of what is noblest, his "MIND and REASON." Here lies his Reason.

Dignity and highest Interest: Here his Capacity toward Good and Happiness. His Ability or Incompetency, his Power of Enjoyment, or his Impotence, is founded in This alone. As This is found, fair, noble, worthy; so are its Subjects, Acts, and Employments. For as the riotons MIND. captive to Sense, can never enter in competition, or contend for Beauty with the virtuous MIND of Reason's Culture; so comparison neither can the Objects which allure the of Objects, former, compare with those which attract and charm the latter. And when and Eneach gratifies it-felf in the Enjoyment and joyments. Possession of its Object; how much fairer are the Acts which join the latter Pair, and give a Soul the Enjoyment of what is generous and good? This at least, PHILO-CLES, you will furely allow, That when you place a Joy elsewhere than in the Mind, The Enjoyment it-self will be no beautiful Subject, nor of any graceful or agreeable Appearance. But when you think how Friendship is enjoy'd, how Honour, Gratitude, Candour, Benignity, and all internal Beauty; how all the focial

Pleasures, Society it-felf, and all that con-

flitutes

Part 3. stitutes the Worth and Happiness of Mankind; you will here surely allow Beauty in the Ast, and thirk it worthy to be view'd, and pass'd in review often by the glad Mind, happily conscious of the generous Part, and of its own Advancement and Growth in Beauty.

Recapitu-

THUS PHILOCLES (continu'd he, after a short pause) thus have I presum'd to treat of Beauty before so great a Judg, and fuch a skilful Admirer as your-felf. For taking rife from Nature's Beauty, which transported me, I gladly ventur'd further in the Chase; and have accompany'd you in fearch of Beauty, as it relates to us, and makes our highest Good, in its fincere and natural Enjoyment. And if we have not idly fpent our hours, nor rang'd in vain thro these deserted Regions; it shou'd appear from our strict Search, that there is nothing so divine as BEAUTY: which belonging not to Body, nor having any Principle or Existence but in MIND and REASON, is alone discover'd and acquir'd by this diviner Part, when it inspects It-self, the only Object worthy of it-felf. For whate'er is void of Mind, is Void and Darkness to the Mind's EYE. This languishes and grows dim, whene'er detain'd on foreign Subjects; but thrives and attains its natural Vigour, when

when imploy'd in Contemplation of what Sect. 2. is like It-felf. 'Tis thus that the improving MIND, flightly furveying other Objects, and passing over Bodys and the common Forms (where only a Shadow of Beauty rests) ambitiously presses onward to Its Source, and views the Original of Form and Order in that which is Intelligent. And thus, O PHILOCLES! may we improve and become Artists in the Knowlede kind; learning "To know Our-felves, of our " and what That is, which by improving, " we may be fure to advance our Worth, " and real Self-Interest." For neither is Interest. this Knowledg acquir'd by Contemplation of Bodys, or the outward Forms, the View of Pageantrys, the Study of Estates and Honours: nor is He to be esteem'd that felf-improving Artist, who makes a Ability. Fortune out of these; but He (He only) is the Wife and Able Man, who with a flight regard to these Things, applies himfelf to cultivate another Soil, builds in a different Matter from that of Stone or Marble; and having righter Models in his Eye, becomes in truth The Architect of his own Life and Fortune: by laying withinhimself the lasting and sure Foundations of Order, Peace and Concord. - But now 'tis time to think of returning home. The Morning is far fpent. Come! Let us away, and leave these uncommon Subiects:

Part 3. jects; till we retire again to these remote and unfrequented Places.

AT these Words THEOCLES mending his pace, and going down the Hill, left me at a good diftance; till he heard me calling earnestly after him. Having join'd him once again, I beg'd he wou'd stay a little longer: or if he were refolv'd fo foon to leave both the Woods, and that Philosophy which he confin'd to 'em; that he wou'd let me however part with 'em more gradually, and leave the best Impression on me he cou'd, against my next Return. For as much convinc'd as I was, and as great a Convert to his Doctrine, my Danger still, I own'd to him, was very great: and I forefaw that when the Charm of these Places, and his Company was ceas'd, I shou'd be apt to relapse, and weakly yield to that too powerful Charm, the World. Tell me, continu'd I, how is it possible to hold out against it, and withstand the general Opinion of Mankind, who have fo different a Notion of that which we call Good? Say truth now, THEOCLES, can any thing be more odd, or dissonant from the common Voice of the World, than what we have determin'd in this matter?

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Sect. 7.

WHOM shall we follow then? reply'd he. Whose Judgment or Opinion shall we take, concerning What is Good, What contrary? If All, or any part of Mankind are consonant with themselves, and can agree in this; I am content to leave Philosophy, and follow them: If otherwise; Why shou'd we not adhere to what we have chosen?—Let us then, in another View, consider how this Matter stands.

SECT. III.

WE then walk'd gently homewards (it being almost Noon) and he continu'd his Discourse.

ONE Man, said he, affects the Hero; Manners esteems it the highest Advantage of Life, of Men. to have seen War, and been in Action in the Field. Another laughs at this Humour; counts it all Extravagance and Folly; prizes his own Wit and Prudence; and wou'd take it for a Disgrace to be thought adventurous. One Person is as-Contrary siduous and indefatigable in advancing Pursuits. himself to the Character of a Man of Business. Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent; values not Fame, or a Character in the World; and by his goodwill

Part 3. will wou'd always be in a Debauch, and never live out of the Stews or Taverns; where he enjoys, as he thinks, his highest Good. One values Wealth, as a means only to indulge his Palat, and to eat finely. Another loaths this, and affects Popularity, Mutual and a Name. One admires Musick and Censure. Paintings, Cabinet-Curiofitys, and in-door Ornaments: Another admires Gardens, Architecture, and the Pomp of Buildings. Another, who has no Gusto of either fort, believes all those they call VIRTUOSI to be half-diffracted. One looks upon all Expence to be Madness; and thinks only Wealth it-felf to be Good. One games, another dreffes, and studies an Equipage; another is full of Heraldry, Points of Honour, a Family, and a Blood. One recom-Disagreement with mends Gallantry and Intrigue; Another orone anodinary Good-Fellowship; Another Buffoonether, ry, Satyr, and the common Wit; Another Sports, and the Country; Another a Court; Another Travelling, and the fight of foreign Parts; Another Poetry, and the fa-And with (bionable Learning. - All these go diffe-Themrent ways. All cenfure one another, and felves. are despicable in one another's Eyes. By

fits too they are as despicable in their own, and as often out of conceit with them-

felves, as their Humour changes, and their

Passion turns from one thing to another .-

What is it then I shou'd be concern'd for?

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Whose Censure do I fear? Or by whom, Sect. 3. after all, shall I be guided?

"IF Iask, "Are RICHES good, when Riches."

"only heap'd up, and un-imploy'd?"

One answers, "They are." The rest deny.

"How is it then they are to be imploy'd in order to be good?"

All disagree. All tell me different things.

"Since therefore RICHES are not, of themselves, good (as most of you deschare) And since there is no Agreement among you which way they become good; why may not I hold it for my Opinion, that they are neither good in themselves, nor directly any Cause or "Means of Good?"

If there be those who wholly despise Fame and Fame; And if among those who covet Honour. it, he who desires it for one thing, despises it for another; he who seeks it with some Men, despises it with others: Why may not I say, "That neither do I know how any Fame can be call'd a Good?"

IF of those who covet PLEASURE, Pleasure. they who admire it in one kind, are superiour to it in another; Why may not I say, "That neither do I know which of "these Pleasures, or how Pleasure it-self, "can be call'd Good?"

Part 3.

Is among those who covet Life ever so earnestly, that Life which to One is eligible and amiable, is to Another despicable and vile; Why may not I say, "That neither do I know how Life it-self can, of it-self, be thought a Good?"

Inslave-

In the mean time, This I know certainly; "That the necessary Conse"quence of esteeming these things high"ly, is to be a Slave, and consequently
"miserable."—But perhaps (PhiloCles!) you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of Reasoning.

More, faid I, than I believe you can

easily imagine. I perceiv'd the goodly Lady, your celebrated Beauty, was about to appear a-new: and I easily knew again that fair Face of LIBERTY, which I had seen but once in the * Picture you drew yesterday of that Moral Dame. I can assure you I think of her as highly as possible: and find that without her Help, to raise one above these seemingly essential Goods, and make one more easy and indifferent towards Life, and towards a Fortune; 'twill be the hardest thing in the

world to enjoy either. Sollicitude, Cares,

LIBER-

Goods of Fortune.

* Supra, pag. 252.

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and Anxiety, will be multiply'd: and in Sect. 3. this unhappy Dependency, 'tis necessary to make court, and be not a little servile. To flatter the Great, to bear Insults, to stoop, and sawn, and abjectly resign one's Sense and Manhood; all this must courageously be endur'd, and carry'd off, with as free an Air, and good Countenance as possible, by one who studies Greatness of this sort, who knows the general way of Courts, and how to fix unsteady Fortune. I need not mention the Envyings, the Mistrusts, and Jealousys—

neither need you; But finding you so fensible, as I do, of this unhappy State, and of its inward Sores (whatever may be its outward Looks) How is it possible but you must find the Happiness of that other contrary State? Can you not call to mind what we resolv'd concerning Nature? Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not by this Freedom from our Passions and low Interests, that we are reconcil'd to the goodly Order of the Universe; that we harmonize with Nature; and live in Friendship both with God and Man?

LET us compare, continu'd he, the Goods of Advantages of each State, and fet their the Mind. Vol. II. Ee Goods

Comparifon.

Part 3. Goods one against' another: On one side, those which we found were uncertainly so: and depended both on Fortune, Age, Circumstances, and Humour: On the other side, these which being certain themfelves, are founded on the Contempt of those others so uncertain. Is manly Liberty, Generosity, Magnanimity, not a Good? May we not esteem as Happiness, that Self-Enjoyment which arises from a Confiftency of Life and Manners, a Harmony of Affections, a Freedom from the Reproach of Shame or Guilt, and a Consciousness of Worth and Merit with all Mankind, our Society, Country, and Friends: all which is founded in Virtue only? A Mind subordinate to Reason, a Temper humaniz'd, and fitted to all natural Affection; an Exercise of Friendship uninterrupted; a thorow Candour, Benignity, and Good Nature; with constant Security, Tranquillity, Equanimity (if I may use fuch Philosophical Terms) are not these ever, and at all Seasons Good? Is it of these one can at any time nauseate and grow weary? Are there any particular Ages, Seafons, Places, Circumstances, which must accompany these, to make 'em agrecable? Are thefe variable and inconstant? Do these, by being ardently belov'd, or fought, occasion any Distur-bance or Misery? Can these be at any

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time over-valu'd? Or, to say more yet, Sect. 3: can these be ever taken from us, or can we ever be hinder'd in the Enjoyment of 'em, unless by our-selves? How can we better praise the Goodness of Providence, than in this, "That it has plac'd our "Happiness and Good in things We can bestow upon our-selves?"

IF this be so, said I, I see no reason we have to accuse Providence on any account. But Men, I sear, will hardly be brought to this good Temper, while their Fancy is so strong, as it naturally is, towards those other movable Goods. And in short, if we may depend on what is said commonly, "All Good is merely as "we fancy it. 'Tis Conceit that makes it. Opinion All. "All is Opinion and Fancy only."

WHEREFORE then, said he, do we ast at any time? Why chase, or why prefer one thing to another? You will tell me, I suppose, 'tis because we fancy it, or fancy Good in it. Are we therefore to follow every present Fancy, Opinion, or Imagination of Good? If so, then we must follow that at one time, which we decline at another; approve at one time, what we disapprove at another; and be at perpetual Variance with our-selves. But if we are not to sollow all Fancy or Opi-Vol. II. Ee 2

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Part 3. nion alike; If it be allow'd, "That of opinion." Fancys, some are true, some false;" then we are to examine every Fancy; and there

we are to examine every Fancy; and there is some Rule or other, by which to judg, and determine. Twas the Fancy of one Man to fet fire to a beautiful Temple, in order to obtain immortal Memory or Fame. 'Twas the Fancy of another Man to conquer the World, for the same Reafon, or what was very like it. If this were really the Man's Good; Why do we wonder at him? If the Fancy were wrong; fay plainly in What it was fo; or Why the Subject was not Good to him, as he fancy'd? Either therefore, " That is " every Man's Good which he fancies, " and because he fancies it; and is not con-"tent without it:" Or otherwise, "There " is That in which the Nature of Man is " fatisfy'd; and which alone must be his "Good." If That in which the Nature of Man is satisfy'd, and can rest contented, be alone his GOOD; then he is a Fool who follows that with Earnestness, as his Good, which a Man can be without, and yet be satisfy'd and contented. In the fame manner is he a Fool who flies that earnestly as his ILL, which a Man may endure, and yet be easy and contented. Now a Man may possibly not have burnt a Temple (as Erostratus) and yet may be contented. Or tho he may not

have

have conquer'd the World (as ALEXAN-Sect. 3" DER) yet he may be easy and contented; as he may still without any of those Advantages of Power, Riches, or Renown; if his FANCY hinders not. In short, we shall find, " That without any one of " those which are commonly call'd Goods, " a Man may be contented:" As, on the contrary, " He may possess them all, and " still be discontented, and not a jot the opinion "happier." If so; it follows, " That All, in what sense. "Happiness is from within, not from "without." A good FANCY is the Main. And thus, you fee, I agree with you, "That * OPINION is all in all." -But what is this, PHILOCLES, which has feiz'd you? You feem of a fudden grown deeply thoughtful.

To tell you truth, said I, I was considering What wou'd become of me, if, after all, I shou'd, by your means, turn Philosopher. The Change, truly, wou'd be somewhat extraordinary, reply'd Theocles. But be not concern'd. The Danger is not so great. And Experience shews us every day, That for talking or writing Philosophy, People are not at all the nearer being Philosophy.

See above Treatife III. Part 3. §. 2. pag. 307, 320, 324, &c. And below, MISC. IV. chap. 1.

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have conquer'd the World (as Aunxan Starq But, said I, the very Name is a kind of Reproach. The word IDIOT flood formerly as the Opposite to Philosopher: but now-a-days it means nothing more commonly than the PHILOSOPHER him-felf. The base vincent of the standard of t " a Man may be contented:"

Philosophy. YET, in effect what else is it (reply'd he) that we all do in general, but philofophize? If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, the Study of Happiness; must not Every-one, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize? Is not every Deliberation concerning our Interest, every Correction of our Taste, every Choice and Preference to be reckon'd of this kind? For " If Happiness " be not allow'd to be from Self, and " from within; then Either it is from out-" ward Things alone, or from Self and out-" ward Things together." If from outward Things alone; shew it us, in fact, " That " all Men are happy in proportion to " these; and that no one who possesses "them is ever miserable by his own " fault." But this, it feems, no body pretends to evince: All own the contrary. Therefore "If Happiness be " partly from Self, partly from outward " Things; then Each must be consider'd, " and a certain Value fet on the Concerns " of

" of an inward kind, and which depend Sect. ?. " on Self alone." If fo; and that I confider " How, and in What these are to be " prefer'd; when they are in feafon, or " out of feason; when to take place, when " to yield;" What's this, after all, but to philosophize? But even this, still, is enough to put one out of the ordinary way of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn for Business, and the World. Right! For this also is to be consider'd, and well weigh'd. And therefore This, still, is PHILOSOPHY; "To inquire Where, " and in what respect one may be most a " Loser; Which are the greatest Gains, " the most profitable Exchanges;" fince every thing in this World goes by Exchange. Nothing is had for Nothing. Favour requires Courtship: Interest is made by Sollicitation: Honours are acquir'd with Hazard; Riches with Pains; Learning and Accomplishments by Study and Application. Security, Rest, Indolence are to be had at other Prices. They may be thought, perhaps, to come eafy. For "What Hard-" ship is there? Where is the Harm?" 'Tis only to abate of Fame and Fortune. 'Tis only to wave the Point of Honour, and share somewhat less of Interest. If this be easy; all is well. Some Patience, you fee, is necessary in the case. Privacy must be endur'd; even Obscurity and Contempt.

Part 3. tempt.—Such are the Conditions: And Philosophy, thus Every-thing has its CONDITION.

Power and Preferments are to be had at one rate; Pleasures at another; LIBERTY and HONESTY at another. A good

MIND must be paid for, as other things. But we had best beware lest, perhaps, we pay too dear for It. Let us be affur'd we have a good Bargain. Come on then. Let us account. "What is a " MIND worth? What Allowance may " one handfomly make for it? or What " may one well afford it for?"- If I part with It, or abate of It, 'tis not for Nothing. Some value I must needs set upon my Liberty, some upon my inward Character. Something there is in what we call WORTH; fomething in Sincerity, and a found HEART. Orderly Affections, generous Thoughts, and a commanding REASON, are fair Possessions, not slightly to be given up. I am to consider first, "What may be their Equivalent? Whether I " shall find my Account in letting these " inward Concerns run as they please; or " Whether I shall not be better secur'd " against Fortune by adjusting matters " at home, rather than by making In-" terest abroad, and acquiring first one " great Friend, then another, to add still " more and more to my Estate or Qua-" lity?" For Where am I to take up? Begin; temet.

Begin; and fet the Bounds. Let me hear Sect. 3. politively " How far I am to go, and "Why no further?" What is a moderate Fortune, a Competency, and those other Degrees commonly talk'd of? Where is my Anger to stop? or how High may I fuffer it to rife? How far may I ingage in Love? How far give way to Ambition? How far to other Appetites? Or am I to let all loose? Are the Passions to take their fwing; and no Application to be given to'em, but all to the outward Things they aim at? Or if any Application be requifite; fay plainly, " How much to " one, and how much to the other?" How far are the Appetites to be minded, and how far outward Things? Give us the Measure and Rule. See Whether this be not to philosophize? and Whether willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, Everyone does not as much? "Where, then, " is the Difference? Which Manner is the " best?" Here lies the Question. This is what I wou'd have you weigh and examine. " But the Examination (fay " you) is troublesom; and I had better "be without it." Who tells you thus?
"Your REASON, you fay, whose Force, " of necessity, you must yield to." Tell me therefore, have you fitly cultivated that REASON of yours, polish'd it,

Philosophy.

Part 3. it, bestow'd the necessary Pains on it, and exercis'd it on this Subject? Or is it like to determine full as well when un-exercis'd, as when thorowly exercis'd, or ever fo expert? Consider, pray, in Mathematicks: Whose is the better REASON of the two, and fitter to be rely'd on? The Practifer's? or his who is unpractis'd? Whose in the way of War, of Policy, or Civil Affairs? Whose in Merchandize, Law, Physick? --- And in MORALITY and LIFE, I ask still, Whose? May he not, perliaps, be allow'd the best Judg of Living, who studies LIFE, and endeavours to form it by some Rule? Or is he indeed to be esteem'd most knowing in the matter, who flightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly philosobe not to whilesobite? and Wheehersaide linely of unwillingly, knowingly or un-

THUS, PHILOCLES (faid he, concluding his Discourse) Thus is PHILO-SOPHY establish'd. For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness; " What his Good is, and what his Ill." The Question is only, " Who reasons best?" For even He who rejects this reasoning or deliberating Part, does it from a certain Reason, and from a Perfuasion " That this is best."

Tell me therefore, thave your fitty walth

BY this time we found our-felves infensibly got home. Our *Philosophy* ended, and we return'd to the common Affairs of Life.



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